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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Peace in the ancient world has been studied primarily from the perspective of 
pacifism and questions related to war and peace. This study employs a socio-historical 
method to determine how peace was understood in itself, not just with respect to war. It 
demonstrates that the Greco-Roman world viewed peace as brief periods of tranquility in 
an existence where conflict was the norm, while Paul regarded peace as the norm and 
conflict as an intrusive aberration. 
Through a historical and literary survey of Greco-Roman thought and culture, this 
study shows that myth, legend, religion, education, philosophy, and science created and 
perpetuated the idea that conflict was necessary for existence. Wars were fought to attain 
peace, which meant periods of calm, quiet, and security with respect to the gods, one’s 
inner self, nature, others who are insiders, and others who are outsiders. Despite the 
 viii 
desirability of peace, genuine peace was seldom experienced, and even then, only briefly, 
as underlying enmity persisted without resolution. 
While Paul supports the prevailing conception of peace as tranquility and felicity 
in relation to God, self, nature, and others, he differs as to the origin, attainment, and 
maintenance of peace. In Paul, peace originates in God and is graciously given to those 
who are justified and reconciled to God through Jesus Christ. God removes the enmity 
caused by sin and provides the indwelling Spirit to empower believers to think and 
behave in ways that promote and maintain peace. 
This study also examines how three social dynamics (honor-shame, patron-client, 
friendship-enmity) affect Paul’s approach to conflict resolution with Philemon and 
Onesimus, Euodia and Syntyche, believers who are prosecuting one another in civil 
courts, and Peter. Rather than giving specific procedures for resolving conflict, Paul 
reinforces the believer’s new identity in Christ and the implications of God’s grace, love, 
and peace upon their thoughts, words, and behavior toward one another. Paul uses these 
three social dynamics to encourage believers in the right direction, but their ultimate 
accountability is to God. 
The study concludes with four strategic principles for educating the church and 
developing an atmosphere and attitude within the church for peacemaking. 
 
 ix 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Since the middle of the previous century, much of the scholarly interest in peace 
and peacemaking has gravitated toward the ethical issues associated with war and peace.
1
  
This is not surprising given the cumulative strain of world war, violent social revolution, 
genocide, and the threat of nuclear annihilation upon any ideological system, especially 
those with ethical foundations in, or related to, the Judeo-Christian tradition.  Therefore, 
scholars have studied biblical teachings on peace and explored their ethical implications 
for individuals, communities, and nations.
2
 
Several significant studies have focused on peace in the Greco-Roman world in 
conjunction with inquiries into biblical peace. These are written from the perspective of 
pacifism. Gerardo Zampaglione
3
 has done a thorough survey of literature from Homer 
through Augustine to uncover the attitudes toward war and peace, or more precisely what 
                                                
1
 A search of the ATLA Religion Database reveals 150 articles, essays, and books since 1950 that 
specifically address the biblical teaching on peace.  Over 30% of the writings focus on the ethical and 
political questions of war, peace, and international relations.  The tendency is even more pronounced when 
the search subject is simplified to peace without the qualifying tag of biblical teaching.  In that case the 
search produces 764 items in the same time frame, of which an overwhelming 73% are devoted primarily 
to the ethics and politics surrounding issues of war and peace. 
2
 In addition to articles related to war and peace, another 33% of the articles in the first ATLA 
survey (150 items) were exegetical and theological studies on the nature and meaning of biblical peace.  
However, less than 10% of the second survey (764 items) fell into this category.  This low percentage is not 
unexpected because the second sampling intentionally omitted articles expressly devoted to biblical 
teaching on peace.  The crucial statistic from both surveys is that 63% and 78% respectively of articles on 
peace in the last 60 years have focused primarily either on the theological and ethical understanding of 
peace or on its implications and applications for the church. 
3
 The Idea of Peace in Antiquity, trans. Richard Dunn (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1973). 
2 
he calls the idea of universal peace, in the ancient world.
4
 While his work is exhaustive, 
informative, and insightful, he does not provide a clear definition of peace from the 
perspective of the ancients, but rather adopts the general understanding of peace as the 
antithesis of war and then proceeds with his survey. His study of a millennium of Greek 
and Roman history proves fruitful, as he is able to demonstrate the vitality of pacifism in 
the ancient world. 
Klaus Wengst focuses more directly on the early evolutions of the Roman Empire 
with his examination of the Pax Romana, the peace that came to Rome and its borders 
following decades of civil war, the demise of the republic, and the birth of the empire 
initially through Julius Caesar, and then more definitively through Augustus.
5
  Wengst 
effectively bares the harsh social and economic features that became the destructive by-
products of a peace enforced by violence. He contrasts the effects of the golden age of 
imperial Rome under the Caesars with the revolutionary peace of Jesus Christ, and traces 
those effects through the first century of the apostolic fathers. The particular strength of 
his approach is the integration of the gospels and the apocalyptic material in the context 
of the first century. 
About a decade later Michel Desjardins published a short series of expositions of 
texts in the New Testament on peace.
6
 This is a valuable contribution for its treatment of 
the social implications of peace and non-violence. His brief chapter on Paul celebrates the 
                                                
4
 Ibid., 15. 
5
 Pax Romana and the Peace of Jesus Christ, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987). 
6
 Peace, Violence, and the New Testament, (Sheffield, Eng: Academic Press, 1997). 
3 
conceptual ideals of social equality and justice as the concomitants of peace, but asserts 
that Paul’s imminent eschatology undermined the effective implementation of his ethics 
in the earliest churches.
7
 
More recently, Willard M. Swartley
8
 has produced what amounts to a biblical 
theology of peace linking the old and new covenants around the central theme of peace.
9
 
He asserts that for the most part the major contributions to NT theology and ethics in the 
last half-century have neglected peace and have not given it the prominence that it had in 
the NT and in early Christianity. One chapter looks at peace in the Roman Empire and 
two chapters examine Paul, but neither provides an essential definition for peace, as it 
was understood over the long history of the Greco-Roman thought world. 
This study will examine peace and peacemaking in the ancient Greek and Roman 
literature from the age of Homer to the mid-1st c. C.E., including especially the Pauline 
epistles. Literary contexts, social settings, and rhetorical strategies will receive particular 
attention with three goals in mind: (1) to identify the respective understandings of peace 
held by Paul and those within the Greco-Roman thought world, (2) to determine how 
Paul’s understanding of peace may have differed from theirs, and (3) to discover what 
strategies and methods Paul used in resolving conflict among believers in his churches. 
                                                
7
 Ibid., 54–61. 
8
 Covenant of Peace: The Missing Peace in New Testament Theology and Ethics (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2006). 
9
 This is a more detailed and extensive study but similar to an earlier effort by Perry Yoder to 
argue that peace formed the center of the Judeo-Christian faith by relating every other major theme to the 
idea of shalom: Shalom: The Bible’s Word for Salvation, Justice, and Peace (Nappanee, IN: Evangel 
Publishing House, 1987). 
4 
The thesis of this study is that in the Greco-Roman thought world conflict was 
considered the norm and peace a welcome respite from the hardships of war, while in the 
Pauline perspective, peace is—indeed must be—the norm for the believing community, 
while conflict is clearly the aberration. This study will show that war was central to the 
Greek culture in its self-conscious identity, in its understanding of origins and existence, 
and in its conception of the future. Furthermore, this study will show how the heroic 
epics, the educational system, the philosophic schools, and the politics of the Hellenic 
city-states worked together to reinforce the idea that conflict was necessary not only for 
the Greek way of life and culture, but also for the integrity of the cosmos itself.  The rise 
of the Roman Empire is linked historically and philosophically to the Greek epic hero, 
the incessant civil wars among the Greek city-states, and ultimately the vision and 
identity of Alexander as a divinely-sanctioned ruler of the world. This continuity between 
Greece and Rome produced the predominantly imperialistic thought world that held sway 
in the first century from the heart of Rome itself to its most distant boundaries. 
Into this conflict-based and conflict-driven world of the first century, Paul brings 
a radical message of peace: his gospel proclaims peace and offers the power to implement 
it at a personal, social, and even cosmic level. Ironically, the peace that he proclaims is 
still won and maintained through war, war on a cosmic scale, where Jesus Christ is the 
heroic warrior who defeats the enemy in a climactic battle and delivers a secure kingdom 
to the king. In that regard, Paul’s vision for universal peace, for a universal kingdom, and 
for the final destruction of every threat to an enduring peace does not differ substantially 
from the imperialism of his day. 
5 
In other respects, however, Paul was very different. The distinctions between 
Paul’s conception of peace and that of Greco-Roman thinkers lay in their respective ideas 
concerning the cause of enmity, the source of peace, the means to achieve peace, and the 
power to preserve peace within human relationships. This study will examine those 
differences and how they affect Paul’s conception of peace and his approach to resolving 
conflict in his churches. 
Finally, this study will conclude with some suggested principles for the resolution 
of conflict within the church today. These principles are drawn both from the teachings 
and practices of Paul, and from the implications of those teachings as applied within the 
cultural and social setting of the twenty-first century. 
This study will focus primarily on the history and literature of Greece and Rome 
to the first century and the writings of Paul.
10
 The citations of the ancient authors follow 
the conventional references of Bekker and Stephanus wherever possible. Where specific 
line numbers are required for citations, they are taken from the digital library of the 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae
®
. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of the ancient 
texts are taken from the Loeb Classical Library, while the translations of the biblical texts 
are my own. 
                                                
10
 Thirteen NT epistles name Paul, either by himself or in association with various companions, as 
the author. Some scholars question the authenticity of these ascriptions. Most scholars agree that seven 
were indeed authored by Paul (Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and 
Philemon). The other six receive varying degrees of support depending on the extent to which they seem to 
represent later or inconsistent developments of Pauline thought. With these distinctions in mind, this study 
looks primarily to the seven undisputed letters with occasional references to the others when the parallels 
are so similar as to reinforce or clarify the primary texts. For a detailed treatment of Pauline authorship and 
an annotated bibliography for further related readings, see Luke Timothy Johnson and Todd C. Penner, The 
Writings of the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1999), 261–78. 
6 
Preliminary Considerations 
A study of this magnitude must identify the presuppositions, boundaries, and 
conventions within which the research is undertaken, as well as the pitfalls to be avoided. 
The subsequent discussion first presents some comments on method, followed by some 
general observations about the Greco-Roman world and about Paul that circumscribe this 
work. This section also includes a discussion of standard models for conflict resolution 
that are used in this study to analyze and categorize peacemaking in the ancient world. 
Methodological Considerations 
Any study of this sort that seeks to discover both the meanings of a term and the 
full range of ideas and concepts that have come to be associated with the word must take 
care to avoid potential snares in lexicography that were incisively identified by James 
Barr a half century ago.
11
 His first major concern that would pertain to this study relates 
to etymology: the derivation of words is not a reliable guide to their meaning, for over 
time words come to be used with senses widely divergent from their original sense and 
from the senses of the forms from which the words derived.
12
 
One advantage of working in Greek is that it is not as dependent as some of the 
other ancient languages on etymology and comparative linguistics for assigning meaning 
                                                
11
 The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961; reprint, London: 
SCM Press, 1983). Barr’s work reflects not only his technical expertise in linguistics but also his rigorous 
critique of what he saw as glaring methodological weaknesses in the biblical and theological scholarship of 
his time. His critique still stands a half century later and provides a necessary caution, despite correctives to 
biblical and theological scholarship that have been prompted by his critique. See Moisés Silva, Biblical 
Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1994), 17–28, for an accessible introduction and summary of Barr’s critique. 
12
 Barr, Semantics, 107. 
7 
to words. This study begins with a definition for peace (ei !rhvnh) from an ancient Greek 
dictionary and then demonstrates the various nuances of that definition depending upon 
its various contextual settings. 
A second concern raised by Barr is the failure to distinguish between words and 
concepts.
13
 Barr makes an extensive critique of Kittel’s TDNT, which purports to be a 
dictionary (a book of words with their definitions) but is actually an encyclopedia of the 
theological concepts associated with the words. Barr is not opposed to identifying these 
broader ideas and concepts, or even the historical development of the concepts. Rather, 
his complaint is the failure to distinguish between the meaning of a word on the one hand 
and the conceptual reality represented by it on the other hand. Kittel’s confusion that the 
words intrinsically meant all that their concept implied led to a further misconception that 
the Greek language itself was uniquely fit as the vessel for “expressing that which has 
taken place, that which God has done in Christ.”
14
 
This study distinguishes between the definition of peace (ei !rhvnh) and the various 
conceptions that were associated with the term. Those conceptions are not derived from 
the word peace (ei!rhvnh), but from a range of other words, phrases, and idioms––some of 
which never even mention the word peace––that occurred whenever the idea of peace in 
its broadest conception was in view. Consideration of these associated ideas is the basis 
for identifying the distinctive aspects of the respective Greco-Roman and Pauline 
conceptions of peace. 
                                                
13
 Barr, Semantics, 206–11.  
14
 Barr, Semantics, 212. 
8 
Observations Related to the Greco-Roman World 
The most accessible treatments of peace and peacemaking in the ancient world 
deal with war and statecraft: waging war in order to gain the peace and then governing 
the state so as to preserve the peace, or failing that, to preserve the state through war. In 
general, historians, poets, and dramatists preserve accounts of the former, while orators, 
philosophers, and politicians wrestle with the latter. Literature that has survived records 
little concerning personal peace, resolution of interpersonal conflict, or the psychological 
and emotional serenity that is so prominent an emphasis in today’s culture. That is not to 
say those personal concerns were absent, but rather the individual’s identity and welfare 
were subordinate to the state. Especially in Greece, but to some extent in Rome as well, 
one’s identity and fortunes were bound to one’s polis, that is, to one’s city-state. As the 
polis prospered or suffered, so the individual prospered and suffered. Only later, after the 
proliferation of Greece culture by Alexander and the emergence of the concept of being a 
citizen of the world (kovsmoV, and thus cosmopolitan) rather than of a particular polis, did 
the individual’s identity shift from the polis. Therefore, most of the peace literature from 
the ancient world relates to political peace and peacemaking, even in those circumstances 
where interpersonal conflict is involved. 
This feature is especially evident in Greek epic literature. The Trojan War, which 
is the backstory for both Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, began as a conflict between two 
kings, Menelaus of Sparta and Priam of Troy, whose son had abducted the wife of 
Menelaus. Rather than being resolved between the two kings, this interpersonal conflict 
leads to international war. Similarly, a conflict between the Greek hero Achilles and his 
9 
commander-in-chief Agamemnon results in prolonged war and the needless deaths of 
heroic warriors in both armies. Ironically, as Achilles considers his options—whether to 
stay and fight with the Greek army or to return to the peaceful obscurity of his farm and 
family—Homer does reveal a longing for personal serenity and inner peace that is absent 
in so much of the ancient literature. Both the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles 
and the inner conflict of Achilles between his desire for personal peace and his military 
obligations are significant archetypes of conflict resolution in the Greco-Roman world. 
Finally, the conflict between Odysseus and the rapacious suitors who try to seduce his 
wife during his long absence serves as another classic paradigm for conflict resolution 
because it involves the gods, retributive justice, and the reinstatement of peace once the 
enmity has been removed. 
 The multitude of references to peace in the ancient literature and the breadth of 
vocabulary and ideas that comprise the conceptual context of peace make an exhaustive 
treatment of the topic impossible for a study of this sort. Therefore, the primary resources 
must be carefully chosen to meet the specific goals of the study. Inasmuch as the focus 
for this study is the comparison of the Greco-Roman and Pauline conceptions of peace, 
the principal resources employed consist of representative authors from the major literary 
disciplines. The historians include Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plutarch, Livy, 
Josephus, Tacitus, Dio Cassius, and Suetonius. Among the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, 
Heraclitus, and the Stoics figure most prominently, although many others were consulted 
as well. Homer, Hesiod, several of the playwrights, Horace, Virgil, and Ovid provide the 
mythic/legendary origins of Greece and Rome and shape the modern understanding of 
10 
their own sense of identity. Finally, Isocrates, various ancient biographers of Alexander, 
Caesar, and Cicero speak for the politicians. 
The limitations of the study precluded an extensive examination of the genesis of 
Paul’s conceptions of peace. At certain points, his direct dependence on the scriptures is 
obvious, and those backgrounds are explored only to the extent necessary to illumine his 
own assertions. While the writings of Philo and Qumran would have had some relevance 
to Paul’s own backgrounds in Judaism, formal consideration of those resources extends 
beyond the purview of this study. 
Observations Related to Paul 
Paul writes his letters to communities of believers and applies his principles and 
standards of conflict resolution within those communities. Therefore, his instructions 
must be read within that context, for Paul is not intending these as universally applicable 
principles, but as principles by which believers are to govern their behavior and attitudes 
toward God, themselves, and others, and as procedures for dealing with conflict in the 
context of the community. Indeed, Paul’s constructs can only work within the believing 
community because they depend so heavily upon a common authority and value system. 
Paul assumes for himself and his churches that God is the ultimate authority. All 
human authorities have been established by God (Rom 13:1–2), all the opponents of God 
will eventually be destroyed (1 Cor 15:24), God will reign with uncontested sovereignty 
(1 Cor 15:28), and all persons are accountable to God (Rom 14:12). However, Paul also 
considers himself an authority for the churches. He bases his authority on his commission 
by God as an apostle (Rom 1:1; 1 Cor 1:1; 9:1–2; 2 Cor 1:1; Gal 1:1). Furthermore, he is 
11 
founder of the churches, except for Rome, and can thus appeal to his authority as patron 
(Phlm 8–10) or paterfamilias (1 Cor 4:14–16; 1 Thess 2:10–12), both of which place his 
churches under considerable social obligation to respect and obey him. Finally, Paul 
appeals to scripture as the authority and example for establishing requisite attitudes and 
behavior (Rom 4:3, 6; 1 Cor 10:6–11; Gal 3:6–7). Any effectiveness that Paul has as 
teacher and peacemaker for the churches is due in large part to their mutual acceptance of 
the same authority structure: God, scripture, Paul, and certain social/cultural conventions. 
In addition to their common commitment to the same authorities, Paul and his 
churches ostensibly share a common system of beliefs and values underlying not only an 
understanding of peace, but of all ethical matters as well.
15
 From Paul’s perspective, the 
only possibility of experiencing any peace at all rests squarely in the foundational truth 
that all believers are justified by faith and reconciled to God through Jesus Christ.
16
 Their 
shared identity in Christ trumps every other social, religious, or ethnic value that might 
lead to factionalism and conflict. Because Christ himself is not divided, the church as the 
body of Christ cannot tolerate divisions among its members either (1 Cor 1:10, 13; 12:25) 
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and so Paul requires that members eliminate any division or discrimination based upon 
social status, spiritual gifts, or any other factor. 
Therefore, the primary strategy and strength of Paul’s approach to peacemaking 
lies in his authority as an apostle of God and founder of the churches to exhort believers 
to comply with the mind, heart, attitude, and behavior incumbent upon them as brothers 
and sisters in Christ––attitudes and behaviors reflective of God’s own character and 
empowered by the indwelling Spirit of God. One can only be at peace with God, nature, 
oneself, and others to the extent that one has been justified and reconciled to God through 
Jesus Christ. Thus Paul enjoins believers to do the best they can to live peacefully with 
all persons, including those “outsiders” who are not justified and reconciled to God, who 
do not possess the indwelling Spirit, and who thus do not possess any of the requisites for 
peace (Rom 12:18). Life among believers, who do have the Spirit and thus have the 
ability to live their lives in accordance with the Spirit, however, is to be characterized by 
peace (Rom 8:6), even at the expense of personal status, wealth, or social standing. All of 
those cultural status markers are to be set aside as necessary for the higher priority of 
maintaining peace within the community of believers. 
Inasmuch as Paul’s focus in peacemaking is directed toward those who share a 
common system of authority, beliefs, and values, it would be naïve to presume that Paul’s 
peace ethic and expectation can simply be transferred or applied to an unbelieving world. 
That is not to say, however, that Paul restricts his conception of peace and his vision for a 
peaceful world to the confines of the church. His expectation for the future is that the 
whole cosmos will in fact enjoy that peace at the ultimate victory of God over all God’s 
13 
enemies including death itself (1 Cor 15:24–28). Paul’s missionary zeal is fueled by this 
vision and by his conviction that humanity must be reconciled to God or ultimately be 
destroyed along with the enemies of God (2 Cor 5:18–21; Rom 16:17–20). So then, 
Paul’s teaching on peace and peacemaking is directed to the church, but it also has a 
universal application insofar as the world is reconciled to God through Jesus Christ and 
lives according to the Spirit of God. 
Paul’s approach to peacemaking in the church tends to address the resolution of 
interpersonal conflict rather than the resolution of national or international conflicts and 
the related science of statecraft, which so occupied the most influential thinkers in Greece 
and Rome. Therefore, this study will examine Paul’s principles, models, and methods of 
conflict resolution in four discrete situations involving interpersonal conflict: his own 
confrontation with Peter concerning table discipline in Antioch (Gal 2:11–21), the legal 
complications facing Philemon and his runaway slave Onesimus (Phlm 1–25), the dispute 
between Euodia and Syntyche (Phil 4:2–3), and the civil litigation among the Corinthian 
believers (1 Cor 6:1–11). 
There is some irony in selecting just these four episodes from Paul as the basis for 
investigating his approach to conflict resolution. Intuitively, one might expect to find 
many more examples to address considering that Paul lived and ministered in a nearly 
continuous state of conflict. According to his own testimony, Paul’s life was laden with 
hardships, suffering, opposition, and conflict for the sake of the gospel.
17
 These included 
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conflicts between Paul and his churches, conflicts between Paul and various opponents 
outside the churches including Jews and Jewish officials, civil magistrates, Gentiles, and 
even Satan himself, and finally conflicts within the churches in which believers were 
clashing among themselves. Although these conflicts are prevalent, they are notoriously 
difficult to isolate and analyze. The letters simply do not contain enough information to 
enable scholars to accurately identify the parties involved, the precise matters at issue, or 
the interpersonal dynamics at work.
18
 
Two examples illustrate the complexity of identifying whether the opponents of 
Paul are individuals or groups, whether they vary from congregation to congregation, and 
whether their issues are primarily theological or sociological in nature.
19
 First, Moisés 
Silva finds six passages in Philippians that specifically mention or allude to opponents of 
Paul (1:15–17; 1:27–28; 2:16–16; 3:2; 3:12–16, 18–19). He then identifies eight distinct 
groups that could be in view for any or all of the texts (“brothers” with impure motives, 
Gentiles, unbelieving Jews, believing Judaizers, “enemies of the cross” that could be 
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“morally loose teachers,” libertines, or antinomians).
20
 While no one seriously thinks that 
one church would contain the whole range of opponents, all the possibilities must at least 
be considered for each text. Second, Robinson Butarbutar devotes a full third of his text 
to identifying the parties to the dispute over ei!dwloquvtwn in Corinth.
21
 His task requires 
not only identifying the various groups that may be involved (Jews, Judaizers, a Petrine 
party, proto-Gnostics, enthusiastic Hellenists, or even Epicureans), but also discerning 
their influence. He must then consider whether the actual dispute breaks out along party 
lines or represents a class conflict between rich and poor. Finally, he must integrate these 
factors into the historical setting in order to determine the proper hermeneutical context 
for 1 Corinthians 8–10. 
In both of these situations, as in the majority of the conflicts involving Paul, his 
opponents are groups rather than individuals and their disputes arise from disagreements 
over systemic changes to their religious practices and beliefs, changes that are required 
by Paul’s gospel for all believers regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds. In 
response to these disputes, Paul proclaims and teaches with a view to transforming the 
minds of his opponents. Paul seeks to persuade his opponents to accept his (that is, the 
authoritative, or better, God’s) perspective and to conform their behavior to his example, 
to the example of others, and ultimately to the example of Christ. In using this approach, 
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which emphasizes his personal authority, Paul is highly directive and does not negotiate 
or accommodate in order to arrive at some middle ground with his opponents. 
The four examples of conflict used in this study (Paul/Peter, Philemon/Onesimus, 
Euodia/Syntyche, and the civil litigation among believers) reveal a different approach by 
Paul. Except in his confrontation with Peter, Paul himself is not one of the disputants, but 
rather assumes the role of a facilitator assisting the two parties to come to resolution. As a 
facilitator Paul is less directive. He does not mandate a particular solution, but rather sets 
the table, so to speak, around which the parties can meet and negotiate their resolution. At 
the same time, Paul freely uses his influence, rhetoric, scripture, and social convention to 
“encourage” the parties to move in the right direction, but he stops short of imposing his 
own solution upon them. 
These four examples are also distinctive in that they present more clearly defined 
conflict scenarios and more obvious resolution models. The conflicts are interpersonal, 
rather than inter- or intra-group and they involve specific instances of offense rather than 
systemic problems. Even Paul’s dispute with Peter, which does concern a systemic issue 
(table discipline), unfolds as an interpersonal confrontation. In these four conflicts the 
parties are either named specifically (e.g., Euodia, Syntyche, Philemon, etc.) or at least 
identifiable categorically (believers who are litigants in the civil courts). The specifics of 
these disputes are either plainly set forth in the text (Paul/Peter), clearly inferred from the 
text and cultural backgrounds (Philemon/Onesimus), or not essential for analyzing Paul’s 
principles and procedures of conflict resolution (Euodia/Syntyche and civil litigants). 
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Finally, inasmuch as these four examples demonstrate several models for conflict 
resolution and provide enough detail for reasonably accurate reconstruction, they provide 
the most reliable sources for analyzing Paul’s approach to peacemaking in the churches. 
While the benefit of examining the systemic issues that conflicted Paul and his churches 
cannot be disputed, the goal of this study is to set forth Paul’s understanding of peace and 
peacemaking in light of Greco-Roman understandings of peace and then to identify those 
Pauline principles of conflict resolution that can be applied effectively in the church 
today. 
Models and Terminology for Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution is a necessary aspect of human relations, whether in family, 
business, education, politics, social organizations, or the church. To whatever extent 
conflict is ignored or the resolution is handled inequitably, social relationships deteriorate 
and societal infrastructure erodes. Therefore, self-preservation has led to the development 
of certain standard approaches to resolving conflict, that is, various models to be used 
depending upon the context, circumstances, or parties in the conflict. These models will 
provide the framework for evaluating Paul’s approach to conflict resolution. The essence 
of the following overview is drawn from standard definitions of models and terminology 
used in both religious and non-religious contexts.
22
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While conflict avoidance is not really a model for resolving conflict, responses of 
denial, withdrawal (whether emotionally or physically), or even capitulation are common 
enough mechanisms for coping with conflict when one party is ignorant, fearful, or 
otherwise powerless to confront the other in a conflict. Such responses may help manage 
conflict by reducing the episodes of unpleasant acting out in arguments, altercations, and 
violence. However, in the long run conflict management may simply function as a truce, 
rather than a treaty. A truce merely delays or interrupts hostilities long enough to restore 
a measure of functionality to the parties involved, providing a kind of “time out” to do 
such things as gather a harvest, complete a business project, establish negotiations, or 
enable some other activity crucial to the survival of the party in the hope of an ultimate 
solution. A treaty, on the other hand, terminates the hostilities and establishes peace by 
resolving the enmity that precipitated the conflict in the first place. Given Paul’s concern 
for reconciliation and restoration, a tactic of conflict avoidance or conflict management 
falls short of the conflict resolution that Paul seeks in his peacemaking. Therefore, in its 
analysis of Paul and peacemaking, this study focuses on conflict resolution and those 
models that most effectively lead to it. 
Negotiation typically involves an informal conversation in which the parties seek 
to resolve their conflict in a mutually acceptable settlement of their differences. This may 
simply require an exchange of information whereby the parties educate each other about 
their respective needs, interests, and sensitivities, or the process may entail the give-and-
take of bargaining to reach a satisfactory resolution. Negotiation is a voluntary 
engagement and depends to a large degree on the mutual need to reach settlement, the 
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mutual respect and cooperation of the parties, and a commitment to a mutually agreeable 
solution. In situations where one party is more powerful or knowledgeable than the other, 
the stronger party may take advantage of the weaker and press for a less-than-fair 
conclusion to the negotiation. 
Mediation introduces an impartial third party into the negotiation to assist the two 
principal disputants with their communication and understanding. The mediator typically 
has no authority to adjudicate in the dispute, and so the responsibility for resolving their 
conflict still rests with the two parties. However, the mediator has the opportunity to offer 
suggestions, explanations, or clarifications depending on the confidence and trust that the 
parties have invested in the mediator. Consequently, a skillful mediator can help the 
parties overcome an impasse, lessen the likelihood of one party taking advantage of the 
other, and ease the tensions that could otherwise lead to more adversarial dynamics. 
Arbitration, like mediation, involves a third party in the conflict resolution. With 
an arbitrator, however, two major changes occur. First, control and responsibility for the 
final settlement pass from the principal parties to the arbitrator. The disputants confer 
with the arbitrator and present their respective sides of the dispute along with their 
evidence, but ultimately the arbitrator decides the matter and hands down the terms of the 
settlement. The arbitrator makes no effort to assist the parties in reaching a mutually 
negotiated settlement themselves, but rather decides for them on the basis of the evidence 
they have presented. Second, the decision of the arbitrator is binding. While the 
intervention of a mediator is voluntary, the outcome of arbitration is usually binding. 
Typically, the disputants will agree formally to accept the terms of the settlement as a 
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precondition to commencing the arbitration. Consequently, there are legal implications 
related to the arbitration, though the arbitration itself is not strictly a judicial proceeding. 
That is to say, arbitration is not subject to the same legal constraints as litigation in the 
civil courts. Parties in conflict typically resort to arbitration when the loss of good faith 
and willingness to negotiate makes it impossible for them to resolve the dispute on their 
own or with the help of a mediator. This step from mediation to arbitration is often taken 
at the expense of personal relationships, aggravating strained relations and even leading 
to complete estrangement. 
Litigation moves conflict resolution from the private realm to the public domain 
and places the final resolution and terms of settlement in the hands of civil magistrates. 
As private proceedings, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration can take place under the 
auspices of the church and be conducted according to biblical principles, but litigation is 
institutionally and socially public and must follow the dictates of the civil laws, involving 
judges, perhaps a jury, lawyers, and the whole civil court system. Therefore, litigants in a 
civil proceeding have less control over the process and final settlement than disputants in 
any of the three private proceedings. From a spiritual perspective, civil litigation is least 
likely to promote reconciliation and restoration between the parties because it is the most 
adversarial model of conflict resolution and the verdict guarantees that one party will win 
and the other will lose. There is little if any opportunity for communication between the 
parties, or for understanding, repentance, and forgiveness—staples of conflict resolution 
in the church. 
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While negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and litigation are the standard models 
for conflict resolution, many nuances and variations exist for each and have proved their 
usefulness amid the complexities of conflict resolution in family, business, and society. 
Moore offers one such variation for disputes within an organization: an administrative or 
executive dispute resolution approach.
23
 This entails a third party, who may or may not 
be impartial, and focuses on the wider needs of the organization rather than the specific 
interests of the individual parties in the dispute. While this approach does allow for (but 
not require) negotiation, it also provides for the imposition of an executive decision based 
on criteria other than the concerns of the disputants. This model, better than the other 
four, may represent Paul’s approach to settling disputes over the more systemic issues 
mentioned previously. In such situations, Paul does not negotiate or compromise, but 
rather—as apostle, patron, and paterfamilias—he assumes the authoritative role of the 
executive. He settles the dispute on his own terms (which for Paul equates to God’s 
terms) and then expects the parties to adjust their attitudes and behaviors to comply with 
his settlement. 
Two other aspects of conflict resolution also require comment. The power of 
personality, education, knowledge, social status, and even physical stature can skew the 
dynamics of a negotiation and give one party an unfair advantage over the other. To 
ensure the greatest equity possible, each model of conflict resolution allows the parties to 
engage advocates to advise or represent them. These advocates may simply be trusted 
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friends to assist informally, or if the circumstances necessitate, they may also include 
attorneys and other trained professionals to provide more formal assistance. 
Finally, many conflicts arise over injury or loss suffered by one at the hands of 
another. Equitable resolution of such a conflict may require that the offending party make 
restitution to the injured party. In situations of material damage or loss, replacement or 
compensation is appropriate. From a spiritual perspective, restitution is not inconsistent 
with or obviated by forgiveness. While the injured party may exercise mercy toward the 
offender and waive the right to restitution, forgiveness does not automatically release the 
offender from the obligation of restitution. 
Conclusion 
With the foregoing observations and considerations as a framework, the next 
chapter discusses the development of Greek and Roman conceptions of peace from the 
Homeric epics to the first century of Imperial Rome. The subsequent two chapters 
respectively address Paul’s conception of peace and his approach to peacemaking, that is, 
the resolution of interpersonal conflict in his churches. The final chapter summarizes 
Paul’s principles of conflict resolution and proposes ways in which those principles might 
be applied in churches today. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
GRECO-ROMAN CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE 
IN THE FIRST CENTURY 
 
 
Peace, as the Greco-Roman world of the first century understood it, was an ideal 
drawn from Greek thought, cultivated during the latter days of the Roman republic, and 
ultimately defined by the Golden Age of Augustus. From the earliest references in Greek 
literature, through eight centuries of developing thought, and in its consummate 
expression as the Pax Romana of Imperial Rome, peace was always understood and 
defined within the nexus of religion, philosophy, and politics. At various times, one or 
another of the three may have influenced the general meaning of peace more than the 
others, but all were always involved to some extent in shaping the perceptions of peace. 
In the ancient literature, most references to peace occur in direct contrast to war or 
in discussions about war, suggesting that at the heart of the Greco-Roman understanding 
of peace lay the fundamental conception of peace as the antithesis of war. Furthermore, 
that same literature contains many more accounts and discussions of war without any 
reference to peace at all. Consequently, one can learn definitions, attitudes, preparations, 
strategies, tactics, politics, and just about everything else related to war without needing 
to involve the subject of peace. However, one cannot discover much at all about peace in 
the ancient world without also engaging in an extensive study of war. This contrast in the 
treatments of war and peace in the ancient literature suggests that war was primary and 
normative in the Greco-Roman thought world and that peace was secondary, defined and 
understood solely in relationship to war. 
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Despite that imbalance between war and peace in the literature and the obvious 
priority given to war in the ancient understanding and conduct of life, distinct portraits of 
peace do emerge, not only as the antithesis of war, but as prosperity, security, and a sense 
of well-being in relationships with the gods, with nature, with one’s inner self, with those 
in one’s own social, economic, and political sphere (insiders), and with all those beyond 
it (outsiders). Taken together these portraits indicate a multi-faceted conception of peace 
much broader and more highly nuanced than simply the antithesis of war. Nevertheless, 
that basic idea of peace as the opposite of war persists in nearly every aspect of ancient 
literature and life in the Mediterranean basin during the millennium preceding and 
inclusive of the New Testament period. 
Beginning with a short, but revealing, definition of peace from the philosophical 
literature associated with the Academy in Athens, this chapter will trace the conceptions 
of peace through the history and literature of Greece and Rome, showing how the basic 
understanding of peace as the antithesis of war developed, how it was later refined and 
nuanced, and how it was preserved in the religion, philosophy, and politics of Greece and 
ultimately passed along to Rome. This chapter will also examine several examples of 
conflict resolution for further insights into the ancient understanding of peace, as well as 
alternatives to war for securing and maintaining peace. 
A Philosophical Definition of Peace 
Among ancient philosophical dictionaries, one notably offers a concise, formal 
definition of peace. The so-called Definitions of Plato states that peace is “a quiet period 
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in respect of military conflict.”
1
  While not the earliest record of a Greek understanding 
of peace, this definition from the Classical period
2
 does preserve the fundamental Archaic 
conception of peace as the opposite of war.
3
 The definition (ei!rhvnh hJsuci"a e !p= e“cqraV 
polemikavV) comprises the subject ei!rhvnh, the predicate nominative hJsuci"a, and the 
prepositional phrase e !p= e“cqraV polemikavV modifying hJsuci"a (thus literally, “quiet with 
respect to the enmities/hostilities of or relating to war”).
4
 
Throughout ancient Greek literature, ei!rhvnh (“peace”) and hJsuci"a (“tranquility, 
quiet, silence”) occur as synonyms,
5
 often in parallel expressions,
6
 so this particular word 
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 This is most evident when hJsuci"a is used in expressions that would typically use ei !rhvnh. Thus 
Thucydides can contrast povlemoV (“war”) and hJsuci"a (“peace,” Hist. 3.12.1.4; 4.62.2.4; 5.16.1.4), or he 
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choice for the definition is not at all unusual or unexpected. However, hJsuci!a embraces 
much more than just the idea of peace. If ei"rhvnh denotes peace by naming the idea, then 
hJsuci!a colors it with emotionally evocative hues that further refine the conception of 
peace. In its broader use, hJsuci!a implies a state or condition of tranquility, a situation 
without the disruptions of noise, movement, or agitation.
7
  The idea suggests a calm and 
order that may attend one’s external circumstances and way of life
8
 or may describe the 
inner composure of one’s mind and heart.
9
  Taken together the many nuances of hJsuci!a 
                                                                                                                                            
peace” (5.35.8.1), and “holding, keeping, maintaining, observing the peace” (2.72.1.9; 2.100.5.7; 5.94.1.1; 
6.25.1.1), all of which more typically would use ei "rhvnh instead of hJsuci!a. Thucydides is not alone in this. 
The same pattern occurs extensively in ancient literature, notably but not exclusively in texts concerned 
with war and peace. 
6
 A few examples from Plato represent typical combinations of the two terms: meta; de… tau:ta 
hJsuci!aV genome!nhV kai… ei "rhvnhV pro;V tou;V a[llouV (“Afterwards when tranquility reigned and we were 
at peace with our neighbors,” Menex. 243e1); ei "rhvnhV hJmiæn genome!nhV, hJsuci!an h\gen hJ povliV (“we got 
general peace and the city enjoyed tranquility,” Menex. 244b4); and e"n ei "rhvnh/ te… kai… hJsuci!a # (“in peace 
and quiet,” Resp. 575b3). 
7
 The major lexicons are consistent in their definitions: quietness, rest, tranquility, calm; silence, 
stillness; solitude (LSJ, BDAG, Spicq, Louw-Nida). However, uses by the ancient authors provide the finer 
nuances that lend rich expressiveness to the term. 
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 In the midst of devastation all around, Pericles guarded Athens and kept the city as free as 
possible from civil disturbance, that is, the outbreak of violence because of the agitation and irritation of its 
citizens. Literally, “he was guarding the city and preserving it to the greatest extent possible with calm” (di= 
hJsuci !aV, Thucydides, Hist. 2.22.1.6). Similarly, Isocrates can speak of those who counsel peace (ei "rhvnhV) 
as insisting that the people maintain peace (hJsuci !an), be content with what they have and not crave great 
possessions contrary to justice (De pace 6.4–6). Or, he can commend educators as the most intent seekers 
of tranquility (hJsuci !an) in all Athens, “giving their minds to their own affairs . . . and living . . . in the 
greatest simplicity and decorum” (Antid. 227–28). 
9
 Later in his life Isocrates professes to love peace (hJsuci !an) and tranquility (ajpragmosuvnhn), by 
which he means the peace of mind that comes by withdrawing from the stress and demands of public life, 
and by finally escaping the busyness one incurs in pursuit of profession, career, and public service (Antid. 
151.3–6). This desire for simplicity, rest, and quietude after a life of arduous labor, exposed to trouble and 
danger, comes naturally with age and accomplishment. When urged to come out of retirement and assist 
friends in Thessaly, Isocrates declines in order to preserve his life of tranquility (hJsuci !an) in his old age 
(Ad fil. Jas. 2.5). Plutarch relates similar sentiments concerning two Roman generals Sulla (138–78 B.C.E.) 
and Verginius Rufus (14–97 C.E.). Sulla foresees his own death and tells of an invitation from the afterlife 
by his son to put an end to his anxious thoughts and to come live quietly (ajpragmovnwV) in peace (hJsuci !an) 
with his dear wife and son. The adverb ajpragmovnwV implies a tranquility free from the daily responsibility 
27 
suggest an unperturbed, undisturbed, and therefore pleasant, agreeable, and acceptable 
situation. Serenity and stillness, perhaps even restorative solitude, are also a part of that 
picture and help to create a fuller impression of all that hJsuci!a would have implied in its 
ancient usage. In short, hJsuci!a provides a rich and expansive description of what ei"rhvnh 
would have felt like to those who had experienced the depth and fullness of peace. 
Although the establishment of ei"rhvnh would certainly have included hJsuci!a with 
all its personal and social benefits of tranquility, order, and pleasurable contentment, the 
two ideas are still not identical. While hJsuci!a qualitatively describes ei "rhvnh, and even 
approaches a definition, it does not by itself essentially define it. The meaning of hJsuci!a 
must be further qualified in order to encompass the full significance of ei"rhvnh. Therefore, 
the compiler of Plato’s dictionary adds the prepositional phrase e"p= e“cqraV polemikavV to 
express the sense in which hJsuci!a does define ei"rhvnh. 
The preposition e"pi! can have a wide range of meanings,10 but here it most likely 
expresses reference or respect. The locative and temporal nuances simply do not make 
sense with the noun e“cqraV (“enmities, hostilities”) as the object. Thus hJsuci!a defines 
                                                                                                                                            
and burden of business, leadership, and his incessant public duties of settling disputes, prescribing laws, 
and determining the governance of the city (Sull. 37.2–4). Verginius refuses the imperial purple thrust upon 
him by his troops when Nero’s death is confirmed. The jealousy of his competitors aided the general’s own 
genius as they claimed the office and released him from war and misery “into a calm haven of life, and an 
old age full of peace (ei "rhvnhV) and quiet (hJsuci !aV)” (Galb. 10.4). The use of ei "rhvnhV and hJsuci !aV together 
is significant, especially in reference to a military general. Both words bring their richest nuance to describe 
the general’s later life, first as a life of peace without the danger, suffering, and deprivation of war, and 
second as a life of tranquility without disturbance, trouble, agitation or anxiety. In short, he would enjoy 
“this tranquility of mind and of heart, this calm existence, sheltered from trouble and danger, [that] is the 
hope of all citizens” (Spicq, TLNT, 2:182–83). 
10
 According to LSJ, ejpi! with an accusative object can express location (on, upon), direction (to, 
toward, up to, as far as, before, in the presence of), time (for, during, until), standard (according to), and 
various nuances of causality, including purpose, cause, and reference/respect. 
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ei !rhvnh “in respect to enmities” or “as far as regards hostilities.” The adjective polemikavV 
then describes the hostilities as belonging to, pertaining to, or with the characteristics of 
war,
11
 thereby yielding a definition of peace as “quiet with respect to war-like hostilities.” 
 Grammatically, all that is evident enough, but intuitively it does not seem quite 
right. Ancient attitudes toward war and peace, as well as stylistic tendencies in the 
language, would seem to call for the simple reading e!pi " povlemon (“in respect to war”), as 
war and peace represent one of the quintessential antitheses in a dualistic worldview.
12
 
However, the phrase is clearly e!p= e“cqraV polemikavV, thus placing the emphasis on 
enmity rather than war. In this distinction lies a profound insight to the conception of 
ei !rhvnh (“peace”) in its relationship to e“cqra (“enmity, hostility”) and povlemoV (“war”). 
The Greeks viewed peace not merely as the calm when the fighting stops, but more as the 
enduring security that comes only when the underlying enmity itself is finally eliminated. 
Greek usage identifies three aspects of enmity/hostility: one’s inner disposition, 
the thing itself, and its outward expression. The first deals with “the inner disposition 
from which hostility arises, i.e., ‘hatred,’” and is represented by mise"w, miæsoV, and similar 
words denoting hatred, aversion, and intense dislike. The second denotes enmity/hostility 
itself “irrespective of the underlying disposition or of its manifestation or otherwise in 
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 Herbert W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1956), 237, and Bruce M. 
Metzger, Lexical Aids for Students of New Testament Greek, 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
1998), 43, indicate that adding the suffix ikoV to a noun-stem creates an adjective expressing the idea of 
relation, fitness, or ability. Unfortunately, polemikavV does not translate smoothly into English but implies 
an enmity that produces or results in war, an enmity that is severe enough to end up in full military conflict.  
12
 See below for the philosophical origins of Greek dualism. The idea that the universe consists in 
the tension between mutually exclusive alternatives typified pre-Socratic thought and persisted well into the 
Common Era. 
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visible form.” Finally, the third level relates to the outward expression of that hostility, 
whether nationally and internationally as povlemoV (“war”), or more locally as stavsiV, a 
broadly applicable term for civil strife, dissension, political unrest, inner strife in the soul, 
disagreement between groups, or domestic strife, that is, any disruption in normal civic, 
domestic, or personal social and economic processes.
13
 
The ancient literature is replete with illustrations of personal and national enmity 
detailing all the devastating consequences of not resolving that enmity before it explodes 
in some catastrophic form of outward expression.
14
 However, the example par excellence 
is the enmity between Achilles and Agamemnon. The Iliad recounts how their personal 
enmity led to the destruction of individuals and nations. The point of contention, that is, 
the specific reason for the enmity between them, is that Agamemnon, the commander-in-
chief of the Greek forces at Troy, has deprived the great hero and warrior Achilles of his 
slave girl, Briseïs, whom he had been awarded as a trophy in the campaign against Troy. 
The story unfolds as Achilles wrestles through the tensions of enmity, anger, shame, and 
honor in relation to his conflicting desires for personal peace and the glory of war. For 
Achilles, none of that can be settled until the matter causing his enmity has been justly 
resolved.
15
 The efforts to resolve that enmity are discussed more fully below. 
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 W. Foerster, “e!cqrovV, e“cqra,” TDNT 2:811–15. 
14
 On the sociological role or function of enmity in the Greco-Roman world, see David F. Epstein, 
Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218-43 B.C. (London: Croom Helm, 1987) and Peter Marshall, Enmity 
in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul’s Relations with the Corinthians, WUNT 2/23 (Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, 1987). 
15
 The wrath of Achilles likely encompasses the three levels of enmity at once, for the story line of 
the poem develops all three: the seed, maturation, and fruit of enmity. Achilles is angry and does harbor an 
30 
Centuries later Thucydides records the tensions that led to decades of war among 
the city-states in Greece. He recounts scores of skirmishes associated with a half-century 
of war, but focuses on the enmity between Athens and Sparta. Sparta resented Athenian 
empire building under the guise of creating a unified Greece for defense against Persia. 
All the turmoil among the city-states of that period could be traced back through their 
alliances and animosities to that one great point of contention:  Athenian hegemony.
16
  
Despite the many treaties and truces among the various combatants, peace did not come, 
and could not have come, until Athenian hegemony was eliminated. However, that was 
not something that Athens would relinquish simply through negotiation. Therefore, from 
the perspective of Sparta and its allies, Athens must be crushed in order to achieve peace, 
and so the Peloponnesian war was fought to gain the peace that would follow.
17
 
Therefore, one can see reflected in the epic and historical literature, as well as in 
the formal definition of peace, the Greek understanding that war at every level, whether 
within the individual, between persons, or among nations, arises from enmity and that no 
genuine peace is truly possible until that enmity is removed. Even in those situations that 
                                                                                                                                            
inner resentment toward Agamemnon from being wronged. That in turn gives rise to an enduring enmity 
against him and the desire for revenge. And finally that enmity does find expression in his spiteful refusal 
to fight, putting at risk the whole Greek army and ultimately costing the life of his dearest friend. Anger is 
always a consequence of enmity, so that unresolved enmity will eventually result in expressions of wrath. 
Although Homer does not use mise!w/mi !soV, e“cqra, or ojrghv for expressing hatred, hostility, and anger, as 
one might expect based on later literature, his two epics are brimming with those ideas through the use of 
other vocabulary, some enduring and some consigned to archaism. The same phenomenon occurs in poetry 
and prose. The vocabulary differs, but the conceptions persist, and so one must look for synonyms and 
analogous expressions, as well as the specific words used in later literature to denote the ideas and concepts 
that one is tracing through the ancient literature. 
16
 Thucydides summarizes these main points: Persia was repelled by a common effort among the 
Greeks, a defensive alliance followed, the Athenians and Spartans quarreled and with their respective allies 
made war against each other, and Athens maintained and extended its strength and wealth through its many 
alliances (Hist. 1.18.2–1.19). 
17
 Thucydides, Hist. 118.3–124.3. 
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are free from outward expressions of hostility such as armed conflict, civil disturbance, 
and the like, that is to say, even in those situations that have every external appearance of 
peace, there is no true peace so long as the underlying enmity remains unresolved. 
This subtle distinction between “genuine” and “apparent” peace is the reason for 
specifying how hJsuci !a relates to ei"rhvnh. On the one hand, hJsuci!a is phenomenological 
in that it describes what one subjectively experiences in a given “peaceful” situation, that 
is, what seems to be the reality (peace and quiet, calmness and tranquility) without regard 
for unseen threats or festering issues that could potentially shatter that serenity. On the 
other hand, ei"rhvnh is objective in that it denotes a “peaceful” situation (calm, quiet, and 
tranquil) only when those conditions exist without unresolved enmity that could destroy 
the security and serenity of the situation. To rephrase this in terms of Foerster’s three 
levels of enmity, ei"rhvnh exists only when the inner disposition, the specific occasion, and 
the external expression of e“cqra are all removed. Anything short of that, no matter how 
much the situation may resemble ei"rhvnh, is not truly ei"rhvnh but hJsuci !a.18 
This distinction between an apparent peace (the appearance of tranquility despite 
lingering hostility) and genuine peace (both the experience of tranquility and the absence 
of any underlying hostility) was not just a nuance of formal definition but existed in the 
mind and awareness of the people as well. At one point, the Corinthian delegation in the 
Spartan alliance argued for immediate war against Athens. Hailing from a coastal city-
                                                
18
 This is not to say that hJsuci !a is of no value. The later Stoics valued it highly, considering 
hJsuci !a, that is, inner peace and dispassionate tranquility in the face of contrary circumstances, to be a 
crucial factor in the attainment of their moral purpose, which was to live a life of serenity (eu[roia) in 
perfect concord with nature (kata; fuvsin). This ideal permeates Stoic literature but is most conveniently 
accessible in Epictetus, Diatr. 4.4. 
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state that already knew the serious threat posed by Athens, the Corinthians spoke to those 
city-states in the interior that were not yet fully aware of the enmity with Athens and the 
dangers that might one day reach them. 
They [the outlying city-states] ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt 
war in place of peace [ei!rhvnh]. For though it is the part of men of discretion to 
remain tranquil [hJsucavzein] should they not be wronged [ei! mh; ajdikoiænto],19 it 
behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a 
favorable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing 
themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamored of the 
quiet [hJsuvcw "] of peace [ei!rhvnhV] as to submit to wrong. For he who for the sake 
of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil [hJsucavzoi], 
very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink.
20
 
A half-century or more later, after Sparta had defeated Athens and made a muddle 
of Hellenic security themselves, Isocrates tried a similar argument to rouse a war-weary 
Athens to lead a pan-Hellenic alliance and defeat a mounting Persian threat once and for 
all. This is the only war better than peace, because once the war is won, those who desire 
the tranquility can enjoy just that and do so without a lingering threat to their security. 
It is disgraceful for us, I say, now that all Hellas is being continually outraged, to 
take not a single step to wreak a common vengeance, although we have it in our 
power to accomplish deeds as lofty as our dreams. For this war is the only war 
which is better than peace [ei!rhvnhV]; it will be more like a sacred mission than a 
military expedition; and it will profit equally both those who crave the quiet life 
[hJsuci#an] and those who are eager for war; for it will enable the former to reap 
the fruits of their own possessions in security and the latter to win great wealth 
from the possessions of our foes.
21
 
                                                
19
 That is, “treated unjustly and thereby provided with a basis for enmity.” This in effect is 
reiterating the point that hJsuci #a is fine and appropriate unless there is some unresolved basis for enmity, in 
which case the more noble desire for ei !rhvnh requires that they go to war. 
20
 Thucydides, Hist. 1.120.3.1–5.1. 
21
 Isocrates, Paneg. 182.1–8. 
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In addition to direct juxtapositions and contrasts between ei !rhvnh and hJsuci"a, the 
ancient literature makes a distinction between treaties and truces that likewise focuses on 
the necessity of resolving the enmity before true peace is possible. The authors use the 
language of truce, on the one hand, where combative parties agree to stop fighting for a 
period of time for reasons such as weather, harvest, or a mutual enemy, though nothing 
has actually been settled between them, and the language of peace, on the other hand, 
where the cause of hostility has been removed, the parties have reconciled, and fighting 
has ceased. With a truce combatants knew they would fight again when circumstances 
allowed because the offense that initiated the conflict was still unresolved. With a treaty, 
however, the parties embraced peace and celebrated both the cessation of fighting and the 
removal of the original offense. They expected peace to last, but not a truce. 
The foregoing discussion of the philosophical definition of peace, the distinction 
between ei !rhvnh (“peace”) and hJsuci"a (“tranquility”), the nature of e[cqra (“enmity”), 
and the record of the ancient authors has shown that from the earliest times the Greeks 
conceived of peace not merely as freedom from war, but also necessarily as freedom 
from the underlying enmity that precipitates war. However, despite this broader sense of 
peace than just the opposite of war or the absence of armed conflict, they consistently 
refer to peace in those very terms, simply as the antithesis of war.
22
  Their references to 
peace, their portraits and images of peace, and their many conceptions of peace are nearly 
always framed in the context of or with regard to war. In sharp contrast, war is defined, 
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 To say “often” may be and understatement. For a few examples of the seemingly inexhaustible 
supply, see Thucydides, Hist. 1.40.2.6; 2.2.3.2–5; 2.36.3.3; Isocrates, De pace 2.1–2; 51.5–7; Xenophon, 
Hell. 2.2.19.1; 3.2.1.6; Plato, Lach. 179c4; Resp. 543a4; 557e4–5. 
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described, and discussed in its own right, without the need for any references to peace in 
order to clarify what is understood and meant by war. Therefore, war had an independent 
identity in the Greek world of ideas, but peace essentially had no identity apart from war. 
This then prompts the observation that war was apparently accepted as the norm, while 
peace was considered an interruption—welcome though it may have been, nevertheless 
an interruption—in the normal, routinely discordant and disruptive, course of life. This in 
turn raises several questions directly relevant to this discussion:  Which factors in Greek 
experience led to that perception? How was that norm acculturated and preserved? Was 
any alternative available to the Greek mind and experience? Before considering Greek 
portraits and conceptions of peace, it is appropriate to propose answers to these questions. 
War and Conflict in Greek Thought and Culture 
The simplest, and perhaps even simplistic, reason for the predominance of war 
and conflict in Greek thought lies in its prominence in Greek experience.
23
 War, or the 
threat of war, was a constant reality during the formative periods of Greek thought and 
culture. From the Trojan War to the conquests of Alexander, one can scarcely find a 
sustained period of true peace within and among the Greek city-states. Their mythology 
and religion, their science and philosophy, their art and literature all show signs of having 
developed under the tension of war and peace, as the Greeks struggled to understand life 
in the face of continual conflicts of war. Then, as their mythology, religion, and education 
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 The word “war” typically denotes military conflict. However, metaphorically it can—and often 
did—denote conflict of all kinds in the ancient world. Therefore, throughout this study, “war and conflict” 
may be used collectively to embrace the fullness of the literal and metaphorical ideas that “war” implied in 
the ancient world, particularly within the Greek worldview as discussed below. 
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developed, they in turn became the vehicles for preserving and promoting Greek culture, 
identity, and values. This section will document the prevalence of war in the historical 
experience of the Greeks, its effects on the development of their cultural identity, and 
how that identity was perpetuated through their mythology, religion, and education. 
War and Conflict in Greek Experience 
The archeological search for Homer’s Troy, begun by Heinrich Schliemann in the 
1870s and subsequently continued by others, has yielded convincing evidence for a major 
fortress city at the traditional location of ancient Troy.
24
  A few years later Schliemann 
also uncovered ruins at Mycenae, the ancient Greek city of legendary king Agamemnon, 
who with his brother Menelaus, king of Sparta, led the Greek forces against Troy.
25
 
These findings leave little question that the epic conflict between Greece and Troy did 
have some basis in history. In the Late Bronze Age, perhaps near the turn of the 12th c. 
B.C.E., a timeframe consistent with the traditional setting for the epic legend, the West 
and the East fought a major battle that was immortalized in the folklore of the Greeks, 
was later recorded in the Homeric epics, and eventually became the definitive event that 
fashioned the self-consciousness of an empire. 
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 Schliemann was by all standards an amateur archeologist. Consequently, even as his work 
captured the imagination of some, it excited controversy among others. Susan Hueck Allen, Finding the 
Walls of Troy: Frank Calvert and Heinrich Schliemann at Hisarlik, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999), provides a full account of the intrigue surrounding the discovery of ancient Troy. 
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York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 11. See also Caroline Moorehead, Lost and Found: The 9000 
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The Trojan War became the paradigm for how Greeks viewed themselves in the 
world: they were destined to defend the West against the barbarians of the East in a war 
for the values, glory, and supremacy of Greece. In telling the stories of Achilles and 
Odysseus, Homer established an ethic of war and an enduring cultural identity for all 
Greeks. At the center of that identity stood the heroic warrior, the glory of war, and the 
bard to preserve the story. 
In a brief survey of the Odyssey and Iliad, Caldwell identifies Homer’s military 
ethic. It can be summarized under three topics: (1) why men fought (for the protection of 
family and land, for the honor of their nation, for personal fame and glory that would live 
on after they had died), (2) what attitudes a soldier should have (willingness to sacrifice 
pleasure, commitment to endure hardship, bravery in battle, courage in facing death, and 
personal honor), and (3) which obligations a soldier was to fulfill (honoring the gods for 
success in battle, upholding a truce, burying the dead, negotiating whenever possible 
instead of fighting, allowing champions to square off against each other to resolve issues, 
respecting a dead or wounded opponent).
26
  These find expression throughout the ancient 
literature, sometimes with affirmation and other times with derision.
27
 
Subsequent to that war Greece slipped into its Dark Age:  dark because Mycenae 
declined and its magnificent culture, extravagant wealth and glorious splendor were lost 
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 Wallace E. Caldwell, Hellenic Conceptions of Peace (New York: Columbia, 1919), 19–30. 
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 The playwrights of the 5th and 4th c. B.C.E. drew extensively on the heroic myths and legends as 
the subject matter of their plays. For better or worse these plays kept the heroic ethos before the people. 
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to Greece and to the world;
28
  dark because no literature has survived to enlighten the 
modern world with respect to the culture in that period;
29
  and dark because the limited 
material remains suggest a period of migration, competition for land and resources, and 
extensive conflict between rival factions.
30
  Of this period after the war Thucydides says, 
“Hellas was still subject to migrations and in process of settlement, and hence did not get 
rest [mh; hJsucavsasa] and wax stronger.”31  He goes on to list several reasons for that 
unsettlement and conflict. Among them he mentions war between the Thessalians and 
Boetians,
32
 and the invasion of the Dorians,
33
 which created conflict over ownership and 
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 Herodotus confirms this incursion of the Dorians as the first of four (Hist. 5.76). It occurred 
during the reign of Codrus (ca. 1089–1068 B.C.E.), the last monarch of Athens before the establishment of 
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access to the growing and grazing fields.
34
  Limited though the resources for the Dark 
Age may be, one can confidently conclude that “in the early period of Greek history wars 
were of frequent, almost annual, occurrence; and warfare became a natural part of a 
citizen’s existence with careful rules and regulations—almost a sport.”
35
 
As Greece began to emerge from the Dark Age early in the 8th c. B.C.E., living 
circumstances improved, but the Peloponnesus remained embroiled in conflict. Sparta 
and Messene were engaged for about forty years in a series of battles known collectively 
as the First Messenian War (764–724 B.C.E.).
36
  As with any conflict between city-states, 
both sides appealed to their allies and soon Corinth, Argos, Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis 
were all fighting as well. 
Not long thereafter, all of Greece was involved in another war among the city-
states, the Lelantine War. The war drew combatants not just from the Peloponnesus, the 
north and west of Greece, the Aegean islands, or even the city-states in Asia, but also 
from as far away as northern Africa, southern Italy, and Sicily. Thucydides identifies this 
                                                                                                                                            
came with expansionist intentions. They had already planted a settlement at Megara (about half-way 
between Athens and Corinth) and were threatening to attack Athens until the heroic death of the Athenian 
king Codrus, which they interpreted as a portent of their own defeat should they continue. Therefore, the 
Dorians abandoned their plan and retreated. See also Lycurgus, Leoc. 84–87. 
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infamously as a war of transition from border disputes among neighbors to pan-Hellenic 
war involving major alliances and expeditions in which “all the rest of Hellas took sides 
in alliance with the one side or the other.”
37
 
The nature of war and the way the Greeks thought about war were changing. Even 
as the Trojan War had been paradigmatic for conflict between East and West, so also the 
Lelantine war became a paradigm for the rules and ideals of war among the Greek city-
states. Even as the bard Homer had defined Greek ethos and values, so too the historians 
Herodotus and Thucydides, recalling the Lelantine war over a century later, explained the 
great wars of their own time and reinforced the Homeric values and cultural identity. 
Thus two great paradigms for war, Troy and Lelantine, portray war as glorious, 
unifying, necessary, and advantageous for establishing and advancing Greek culture in 
the face of barbarian opposition. Unfortunately, it was not the barbarian that bore the 
brunt of this burgeoning military power, but rather the Greeks themselves. Even as the 
Lelantine war concluded, other wars broke out and the city-states continued to expand 
their military forces and refine the art of war at the cost of destroying one another. 
A second Messenian war erupts on the heels of the Lelantine war in 685 B.C.E.
38
  
Pausanias recounts the first strike by Messene against Sparta and the inevitable escalation 
of the war amid familiar patterns of alliances built upon long-standing enmities among 
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the city-states.
39
  For example, the Lepreans join Sparta, not because they have common 
cause with Sparta, but because of their bitter enmity for one of Messene’s allies.
40
 
Although Pausanias records these events in the 2nd c. C.E., between eight and nine 
centuries after the fact, his accounts show just how prevalent and persistent the heroic 
ethos from the 8th c. B.C.E. really was. His sources, and thus his accounts, resound with 
echoes of Troy. Aristomenes, the leader of the Messenian revolt, is regarded as a hero, 
even into Pausanias’ own day.
41
  Like the heroes at Troy, Aristomenes is born from a 
divine-human union: his father is a god and his mother is human.
42
  He lives according to 
the heroic war ethic,
43
 and he is motivated to restore peace justly. Success in the battle 
will recover what rightfully belongs to Messene and return what properly belongs to 
Sparta, giving each its due and thus removing the cause for enmity. Failure, however, will 
mean death, which the warriors will face courageously and with the satisfaction of having 
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honored Messene, of having fought and died gloriously, and of having accomplished 
deeds that will preserve their memory among the living. In this account of Aristomenes 
and many other allusions to the Trojan War, Pausanias preserves the ethos and ideals of 
Greece for his Roman audience. 
The next century and a half (650–500 B.C.E.) spawned dozens of wars, some short 
and others more protracted, in which city-states were torn from within by rebellion and 
debilitated from without by other city-states, alliances, and leagues. Early in the 5th c. 
B.C.E., the city-states began to coalesce and show some signs of solidarity that might 
eventually distinguish Greece as a unified nation. However, even these initiatives were 
undertaken only in preparation for war. The Ionian revolt (499 B.C.E.) was one such 
initiative. Under the leadership of Athens, the city-states spent the next twenty years 
preparing for, waging, or recovering from war until Persia was decisively defeated and 
finally driven off the mainland in 479 B.C.E.
44
 
This should have been Greece’s finest hour, and in some respects it was. This was 
Troy all over again: West against East, a unified Greece defending Europe against the 
barbarian in Asia. The Athenian Miltiades at Marathon and the Spartan Leonidas at 
Thermopylae rose to heroic heights in victory and defeat, exemplifying bravery in battle 
and courage in death, garnering glory for their gallantry against overwhelming odds, 
fighting to defend the fatherland and to protect the honor of their name and the honor of 
all Greece. Their speeches and memorials equal the drama and eloquence, the power and 
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 Herodotus presents his accounts of the major battles as follows. Under Darius: the recovery of 
Ionia (Hist. 6.1–42) and the battle of Marathon (6.94–140). Under Xerxes: the move into Europe (7.56–
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poignancy, of any in Homer.
45
  These heroes were the quintessential Greeks: born in war, 
trained for war, and immortalized by war. They personified Greece itself. 
It would seem that Greece had finally come into its own, finally recovered and 
even surpassed, the eminence and distinction of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations 
from which it had sprung. However, within a few years of the victory over Persia, city-
states were challenging Athenian ascendancy, the Delian league continued to fight Persia, 
and Sparta was contending with the Helot rebellion (464 B.C.E.).
46
 The next three decades 
under Pericles (461–429 B.C.E.), the so-called Golden Age of Greece, remain as frenetic 
and incongruent as any period in the history of Greece: massive building programs, 
territorial expansion, innovation in the arts and sciences, on the one hand, lifting the 
human mind and spirit to unprecedented heights of achievement and expression, but 
constant bickering, petty rivalries, war and rebellion, on the other hand, threatening to 
destroy Greece from within before its full flowering. A glint of optimism flashed through 
Greece as Athens and Sparta made peace in 445 B.C.E. But, what was intended to last 
thirty years, fell apart in half that time and plunged Greece into the civil war that crippled 
Athens forever and nearly destroyed all of Greece.
47
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 In signing the so-called Thirty Years’ Peace with Sparta, Athens had to cede most of its 
territory, effectively dismantling its empire. However, Athens retained its navy and so continued to pose a 
military threat to Sparta. This was intolerable and soon led to the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides recaps 
the events of the fifty years between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, underscoring the instability of 
that period, the ineffectual efforts to establish a lasting peace, and the political games that promoted and 
perpetuated the tensions among the city-states and their allies (Thucydides, Hist. 1.89–118). 
43 
The Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta (431–404 B.C.E.) consisted of 
two distinct periods of war separated by a few years of so-called peace: the Archidamian 
War (431–421 B.C.E.), the peace of Nicias (421–415 B.C.E.), and the Sicilian and Aegean 
campaigns (415–404 B.C.E.).
48
  The wars were brutally fought, to be sure, but one could 
hardly call the peace peaceful. The peace of Nicias would seem to fit the philosopher’s 
definition of peace—at least on paper—for it was a “quiet period in respect of military 
conflict.” However, it would never have qualified as peace in the more nuanced sense, for 
the enmity between Athens and Sparta was never resolved. Not only did the participants 
live with the constant threat of war at any time, but they also had to fight wars during this 
so-called period of peace with city-states not a party to any treaty or truce.
49
 
Even as this peace was never really peace as the Greeks understood peace, so the 
war was never really war as the Greeks understood war. There were no heroes, there was 
no noble cause, there were no winners, and there was no glory. The Greeks also fought 
wars for the peace that followed, but with this war, there was no peace either. The very 
soul of Greece was all but dead.
 50
 
After the war Sparta became the leading city-state. With their society organized 
primarily for the education, training, and preparation of its citizens for war, the Spartans 
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proved inept at governing for peace.
51
  Sparta began to unravel and the rest of the 4th c. 
B.C.E. was a roller coaster ride marking the rise and fall of one city-state after another 
trying to take control and unify Greece. During this time, Isocrates was calling for Athens 
to rally the city-states for one final, decisive battle against Persia, that great barbarian in 
the East. Isocrates was not the only one sounding this call, but he was certainly the most 
prominent and enduring. Georgias (408 B.C.E.) and Lysias (384 B.C.E.) preceded him, yet 
his Panegyricus (380 B.C.E.) and On the Peace (355 B.C.E.) stand as two masterpieces of 
political rhetoric in the ancient world.
52
  His rhetoric is full of allusions to Troy and to the 
heroic ethos, part of his strategy to rekindle that pan-Hellenic flame that had burned so 
brightly during the Persian wars and throughout the Golden Age of Greece.
53
  Yet, 
despite his urgings, Athens had no power base from which to respond. 
This was the scenario Isocrates had always feared: a rich, powerful, seemingly 
invincible Athens crippled by its own folly.
54
  Therefore, he abandoned the two ideals of 
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 George Norlin, ed. and trans., “General Introduction” in Isocrates, 3 vols., Loeb Classical 
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Athenian democracy, freedom and autonomy, and appealed to Philip II of Macedonia to 
unify Greece and put down the Persian threat once and for all.
55
  To the credit of Isocrates 
and his political persuasion, that is what eventually happened, not through Philip II as 
Isocrates had imagined, but through his son Alexander. 
Though Isocrates never lived to see it, Greece did rise again and to even greater 
heights than before, for in Alexander Greece had not just a quintessential Greek leading 
the nation, but the archetypal Homeric hero reborn. Before he ever left Greece, before he 
had achieved any military or political stature, Alexander believed that through his mother 
he was a descendent of Achilles,
56
 and like Achilles he was destined to lead all Greece to 
victory against the Persian king.
57
  This was dramatically demonstrated at his arrival in 
Asia when he stopped at Troy, made sacrifices to Athena, offered libations to the heroes, 
and anointed the tomb of Achilles with oil and garlands.
58
  Alexander offered sacrifices 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 Aggression—the passion to dominate—he regards as the disease of Greek foreign policy, 
resulting soon or late in weakness or disaster. He accepts the recognized law of Greek ethics, that 
power begets folly, folly begets insolence, and insolence begets ruin, and shows that it operates 
even more surely in the history of states than in the lives of individuals. . . . Irresponsible power is 
like the bait of a trap: those who are lured by it are caught in its toils. . . . Imperialism has, in fact, 
been the curse of Athens, its only fruits being hatred, wars, and an empty treasury. 
 Sophrosyne, self-control—the disposition to live and let live, to cherish freedom for 
oneself and respect freedom in others—is the saving virtue of states no less than of men in their 
relations to each other. 
55
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subsequent letters: to Philip, I (342 B.C.E.) and to Philip, II (338 B.C.E.). Note that the Roman numerals 
following Philip’s name are given to distinguish the two letters from each other, not to distinguish to 
different addressees. All three items are directed toward Philip II of Macedonia. 
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to Priam,
59
 and seemed poised, like the son of Achilles, to destroy a king and claim all of 
Asia in the name of Greece. 
Although this identification with Achilles shaped Alexander’s sense of destiny, he 
also saw himself as the great king Agamemnon.
60
 Plutarch agrees and praises Alexander 
as “more self-restrained than Agamemnon,” and “more magnanimous than Achilles.”
61
 
The two volumes of Homer, which Alexander carried with him, kept under his pillow at 
night,
62
 and considered as indispensable for military operations as weapons,
63
 essentially 
defined Alexander—as they defined all Greeks. They gave him an identity, they centered 
his values, they excited his imagination and created his thirst for adventure, and in them 
he discovered his destiny. 
However, Alexander symbolized much more to Greece than a restoration of the 
heroic ethos in the leadership and collective consciousness of the nation. This student of 
Aristotle likewise bore the philosophical imprint of the Golden Age of Greece in his soul, 
with the philosopher Diogenes as his alter ego.
64
  Thus Alexander conquered the world 
not merely as the heroic warrior-king modeled after Agamemnon, but as the philosopher-
king whose great purpose was “to combine foreign things with things Greek, to traverse 
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and civilize every continent, to search out the uttermost parts of land and sea, and to push 
the bounds of Macedonia to the farthest Ocean, and to disseminate and shower the 
blessings of Greek justice and peace over every nation.”
65
 
Thus Plutarch suggests that though Alexander claimed the Iliad and Odyssey as 
“equipment for his campaigns, . . . his true equipment was philosophic teaching, and 
treatises on fearlessness and courage, and self-restraint also, and greatness of soul.”
66
  Yet 
even in this regard he surpassed his teachers seeing the world through cosmopolitan eyes. 
He believed that he came as a heaven-sent governor to all, and as a mediator for 
the whole world, those whom he could not persuade to unite with him, he 
conquered by force of arms, and he brought together into one body all men 
everywhere, uniting and mixing in one great loving-cup, as it were, men’s lives, 
their characters, their marriages, their very habits of life. He bade them all 
consider as their fatherland the whole inhabited earth, . . . as akin to them all good 
men, . . . being blended into one by ties of blood and children.
67
 
As one considers Alexander in this light a few ideas anticipating the Hellenistic 
and Roman ages come to the fore. First, Alexander considered himself heaven-sent, that 
is, having divine sanction behind his authority and mission. Great leaders of the heroic 
age had divine parentage or ancestry, and Alexander likewise had a sense of that.
68
  But 
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48 
as the heroic age and its predisposition to view reality within a mythological framework 
gave way to natural philosophy and eventually to science, the tendency to associate rulers 
with divinity abated until it was revived on a grand scale in Rome with Julius Caesar, 
Augustus, and subsequent emperors in the Imperial Cult. 
Second, Alexander regarded the whole world as his realm. Not only the Minoan 
and Mycenaean influence, but even that of Athens, remained localized within the Aegean 
basin. However, under Alexander, and later the Roman emperors, the West exercised an 
extensive territorial dominance over empires that had already existed in the East since the 
previous millennium. 
Third, Alexander saw himself as unifying the world under the blessings of justice 
and peace from Greece. He believed that whatever Greece had achieved politically and 
culturally, when applied to the other nations of the world, would unify and pacify them as 
well. Three centuries later Augustus would adopt a similar perspective with respect to 
himself and Rome. In retrospect, however, the sad truth is that both were mistaken and 
their perceptions turned out to be more propaganda than reality. In the case of Alexander 
neither the mainland of Greece during his lifetime nor the empire thereafter ever enjoyed 
true peace.
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discourage Anaxarchus and others from calling him the “Son of Zeus.” In fact, at times he delighted in it. 
Although he did not seem to take that divine association too seriously, except when exploiting the idea to 
intimidate the barbarians, he did believe that those who come to power and rule do so with the approbation 
of god, and that they enjoy a favored status as the “noblest and best” of all god’s children. Others, however, 
did take this more seriously because of the intrigue related to his conception. Both his mother and father 
had paranormal visions or experiences that led them to think that she had been the “partner of a superior 
being,” and because a lion was involved in Philip’s vision, that Heracles would have some association with 
Alexander’s life. 
69
 Though Alexander had subdued most of Greece and achieved some pretense of order and 
support before departing for Persia, Justin records that the city-states resumed their in-fighting when he left 
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Fourth, and most crucial to this study, Alexander pursued his program of world 
rule and domination through military power. Those who could not be persuaded—and 
one wonders what methods of persuasion may have been available that would have been 
genuine persuasion and not coercion—were subjected to and by the swift, fierce, and 
overwhelming military forces of Alexander.
70
  In his mind, as in the Greek and Roman 
mind more generally, one fights the war to gain the peace. Lasting peace cannot come 
unless the cause of the enmity is completely removed, and the most certain route to that 
entailed total destruction of the enemy. Once peace has been secured, subsequent threats 
to the peace must be met with the same swift severity. Again, Alexander was not unique 
in this regard. Augustus, and many of his successors as well, took a similar approach, one 
that seems to have become the standard for all enlightened despots, namely, benevolence 
toward those who comply and violent dispatch of those who resist. 
In the person of Alexander, the Greek thought world and culture finds its fullest 
expression. He embodies all that is Greece and carries that culture throughout his empire. 
He is the first from the West to push deep into the Middle East and Asia with a distinctly 
                                                                                                                                            
(Epit. 12.1) and that they rejoiced at his death as at the death of an enemy (Epit. 13.1). The political and 
military maneuvering intensified as his foes and friends alike began jockeying for power in the vacuum that 
followed his death. The mourning throughout the rest of the empire may have been genuine, but the peace 
was no more enduring than in Greece. After a half-century of conflict over the partitioning of the former 
empire, three smaller, highly aggressive, and competitive empires emerged. But it still required another two 
centuries and the military power of the Roman Empire to unify and stabilize the vast territory that 
Alexander had once imagined as his peaceful empire. 
70
 Justin, Epit. 11.1–5 describes Alexander’s initial sweep through Greece to quell the many 
uprisings on the mainland, most notably defections by Thebes and Athens to the Persian side. His strategy 
consisted of marching from north to south with a fully arrayed expeditionary force, winning support by 
wooing some cities, besieging others, and demolishing yet others. His final act before leaving for Persia 
was to put to death all the relatives in his stepmother’s family and any of his own relatives that may have 
had any potential designs upon the throne. Yet, Justin goes on to say (Epit. 12.1) that as soon as he left for 
Persia, nearly all of Greece went back to war, hoping to recover all that had been lost, and such turmoil at 
home continued throughout his Egyptian and Persian campaigns. The accounts of those campaigns show a 
similar strategy, but they are more graphic and considerably longer with extensive details of his conquests. 
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Western culture, a culture that has been formulated and preserved in a climate of nearly 
continuous warfare and thus views warfare and conflict as the norm. The question still 
remains, however, as to how that norm was codified and preserved within the culture. To 
make a start in answering the question one can look to Greek mythology, religion, and 
education as the vehicles for preserving and conveying the predominance of war and 
conflict, not only as a cultural norm, but also as a desirable cultural value. 
War and Conflict in Greek Mythology, Religion, and Education 
Inasmuch as the categories of mythology and religion overlap, this study will 
consider myth and mythology as the stories and collectively the story framework that 
explain the origins of the cosmos, the Greek people, and their value system as initially 
formulated during the early stages of cultural development. Religion, on the other hand, 
consists of the practices whereby the people venerate or otherwise interact with the gods, 
goddesses, and other supernatural beings that inhabit the myths. 
War and Conflict in Greek Mythology 
War and conflict appear throughout the Greek myths. Even among the divinities 
warfare is common and the stories of their origin and accession to power are riddled with 
deceit, treachery, conflict, brutality, and at times unrelenting enmity. Following Chaos, 
the first of all existence, Earth came into being as the foundation for all things. Earth 
(female) first produced Sky and Sea (both male), and then Sky and Earth produced the 
Titans, the generation of gods that spawned the Olympian gods of Greek myth.
71
  The 
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Titans Cronos and Rhea gained power when Cronos conspired with his mother Earth to 
castrate his cruel father Sky. Drops of blood that fell from his wound as Sky withdrew 
from Earth produced other offspring including ironically Aphrodite, goddess of love.
72
 
Subsequently, Cronos and Rhea bore Zeus, Hera, and the other Olympians. Lest 
he be overthrown as he had done to his father, Cronos tried to destroy all his children, but 
he was thwarted by his wife’s cunning. Eventually, Zeus grew up and led the Olympians 
in revolt against all the Titans when the cruelty of Cronos became intolerable. The battle 
rocked the cosmos, but eventually the Olympians prevailed and the Titans were banished 
to the underworld.
73
 
The conclusion of this war between the Titans and Olympians by no means set the 
heavens at peace. The gods continued to have their squabbles, not least the marital woes 
of Zeus and Hera over his (and her) infidelities with other divinities and humans. Their 
children could not get along either, and the presence of their son Ares, the god of war, 
was always an awkward if not tense occasion. Among the children fathered by Zeus 
appear divinities whose names identify them as the personification of certain “dignities,” 
                                                                                                                                            
most detailed and most complete account of the origins of the gods. Other myths are recorded in the poetry 
of Homer and Pindar (late 6th c. B.C.E.), in the so-called Homeric Hymns, in the plays of Aeschylus, 
Sophacles, Euripides, and Aristophanes (5th to late 4th c. B.C.E.), and in the later works of the Hellenistic 
writers and poets Apollonius of Rhodes, Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus. Among Roman authors Virgil is 
preeminent, but Ovid, Catullus, Horace (all 1st c. B.C.E.) and Apuleius (2nd c. C.E.) also make a strong 
contribution to the preservation of Greek myth. 
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that is, desirable qualities and characteristics for one’s life: Eunomi !a (“order”), Dikhv 
(“justice”), Ei"rhvnh (“peace”), Eujfrosunh (“mirth, merriment”), Qali!a (“abundance”), 
=Aglai¯a (“beauty”), and so on.74  However, these stand in contradistinction to other 
divinities bearing the names of such undesirable qualities as  [EriV (“strife”) and her 
disreputable children: +Usmi!naV (“fightings”), MavcaV (“battles”), Nei!kea (“quarrels”), 
=Amfilogi!aV (“disputes”), and   “Ath (“ruin”).75  Thus, even among the gods, conflict was 
an inescapable consequence of the flaws and contradictions in their basic natures. 
The Greeks created their gods in their own image, with all the virtues and vices 
common to human experience. In so naming their gods, the Greeks predisposed them to 
certain characteristics and behaviors that mirrored Greek life and thereby projected their 
own experience—particularly war and conflict—upon the gods. This helped to create and 
perpetuate the sense that war and conflict were the norm, and that conflict was the 
unavoidable pathway to power. Nevertheless, the ostracism of Ares, the god of war, did 
show a certain contempt for war, but at the same time, Ares and Aphrodite were lovers 
also showing at least ambivalence toward, if not outright acceptance of, the inevitability 
of war and the necessary role it plays in the continuity of life. 
Homer’s epics clearly show that conflict among the gods eventually intruded into 
human affairs. Petty jealousy in three Olympian beauties (Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite) 
ultimately caused the Trojan War, so divine conflicts did not just become a part of, but 
actually determined, human events. Knowing that their destiny was in the hands of the 
                                                
74
 Hesiod, Theog. 886–921. 
75
 Hesiod, Theog. 211–232. 
53 
gods, military and political leaders routinely sought the favor of the gods, which then led 
naturally to the association of war and conflict with religion and religious observance. 
War and Conflict as Religious Duty 
Ancient authors include with just about every account of war some reference to 
oracles, omens, or other practices intended to discern or invoke the favor of the gods for a 
victorious outcome in battle. One example from the Trojan War illustrates how myth and 
religion become didactic for a culture as a story and its lessons are told and retold. When 
Agamemnon and the Greek forces are ready to sail for Troy, they are denied favorable 
winds because Artemis has been wronged. Agamemnon sacrifices his eldest daughter 
Iphigenia to appease her.
76
 Artemis relents, the winds turn favorable, the fleet sails, and 
the epic assault against Troy ensues. However, this religious act to assuage the enmity of 
the goddess eventually destroys Agamemnon’s whole family. This story becomes a staple 
of both Greek and Roman literature and preserves the lessons and values for centuries.
77
 
Examples of religious customs and rituals determining military action abound in 
accounts of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Herodotus and Thucydides relate dozens 
of incidents where festivals, dreams, omens, oracles, birds, lost teeth, lightening bolts, 
and killing of sacred animals lead commanders, soldiers, politicians, and traitors to act or 
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not act in a given situation.
78
 When war between Athens and Sparta became inevitable, 
all of Greece erupted in a frenzy of prophecy and oracle-mongering. An earthquake on 
Delos was taken to be an ill omen, and indeed “every other incident of the sort which 
chanced to occur was carefully looked into.”
79
 
In addition to seeking strategic direction and learning the disposition of the gods 
toward one side or the other, the military leaders had to be careful not to offend the gods 
and thus incur their wrath in the midst of the battle. Defeat in battle and probably death, 
whether directly in battle or not, awaited those who violated the gods or mocked religious 
symbols or customs.
80
 
This brief treatment of mythological and historical texts shows how thoroughly 
war and conflict became integrated into the foundational values and religious sensibilities 
of Greek culture. The people fought incessantly so that war and conflict were a part of 
their normal routine. As a result, their mythologies had gods whose lives were equally 
dominated and defined by contention and fighting. This rivalry among the immortals then 
became the rationalization for warfare among the mortals. The gods precipitated conflict, 
they influenced the course of battles, and ultimately they determined the outcome of the 
war. Mortals were simply pawns in a cosmic struggle among the gods. Thus it becomes 
their religious duty to fight well and thereby please and honor the gods who protect them. 
Similarly, leaders sought the favor of the gods in order to make appropriate strategic 
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decisions, to enhance their chances for personal glory, and to gain the victory that would 
honor their gods and their city-state. War then has not only become inevitable in life, but 
it has also developed into a civic and religious duty. This positive valuation of war in the 
nexus of myth and religion confirms war and conflict as the cosmic norm, and thus the 
cultural norm as well. It only remains to show how the cultural norm of war and conflict, 
along with its associated values, was secured and perpetuated through the educational 
systems of the various city-states. 
War and Conflict in Education Systems 
Plato saw Homer as the fount for such a system, for in his mind Homer was “the 
poet who educated Greece.” Plato believed that from Homer one could “learn how to 
manage and educate people, and that one should arrange one’s whole life in accordance 
with his teachings.”
81
  The interpersonal dynamics among the heroes, the inner conflicts 
of the heroes regarding duty, honor, glory, pleasure, loss and revenge, the advice of the 
gods and older humans for those in turmoil, and especially the maturation of Telemachus, 
all exemplify the Greek system of values and demonstrate how those values ought to be 
applied to oneself and passed on to others. Therefore, Homer was not merely a poet 
memorializing the heroes of Greece for their glorious deeds, nor a bard entertaining them 
by singing their songs, but he was supremely an educator using epic poetry to preserve 
and promulgate the identity, values, and culture of Greece. With this threefold task before 
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him, it is no wonder he invokes the Muses in telling his story,
82
 for only with their aid can 
the poet produce “songs and poetry that glorify the achievements of the past and teach 
them to future generations.”
83
  Thus Homer’s heroic ethos, based on honor and glory in 
the military arena, became the heart and soul of Greek educational systems. 
Spartan Educational System 
For example, Sparta, the archetypal military culture, was designed from family to 
fields both to produce warriors who embodied the heroic ideal and to reproduce itself 
generation after generation.
84
  Family life was strictly regulated. Children belonged to the 
state, not to the family. Both the boys and girls received an education emphasizing 
physical training in sports, gymnastics, and dance. This toughened the boys for the rigors 
of military training and strengthened the girls that they be physically fit and sexually 
attractive to the young men, that they produce strong, healthy children, and that they 
easily endure the ordeal of childbirth. 
At seven years of age the boys were removed from home and placed in military 
barracks. They were assigned to a group of about 16 other boys with whom they would 
eat, sleep, live, train, and eventually fight until they were about thirty years old, at which 
point they would be allowed to leave the barracks and live at home with their wives and 
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families. The boys were subject to strenuous exercise and strict deprivation of food, 
clothing, and shelter, so they would learn how to survive in harsh conditions—even if 
that meant stealing, lying and cheating. The boys also studied music and poetry, not for 
the aesthetics, but to rouse their spirits, to glorify those who had died courageously in 
battle, to lessen their fear of death, and to keep the heroic ideal before them as they 
headed into war. 
As young men progressed in their military training, one of their standing duties 
was to patrol the surrounding countryside to keep the Helots under control. The Helots 
were a class of serfs or state slaves that were required to work in the homes and in the 
fields without personal profit or benefit from their labor. This led to a fairly liberal policy 
toward their abuse of the Helots, including a toleration of vigilantism and even death 
squads, all of which the Spartans considered part of a healthy training regimen for their 
young warriors.
85
 
The Spartan culture and its educational system arose from and maintained deep 
religious association with the Olympian gods. Lycurgus, the lawgiver who transformed 
Sparta from kingship to military oligarchy, received his system of law from an oracle at 
Delphi. This gave his law, the so-called “rhetra,” what amounted to divine sanction. This 
sense of divine approbation combined with the heroic ideals of Homer, whom Lycurgus 
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is alleged to have known, led to the practice of offering sacrifices to the Muses prior to 
battle. This reminded the warriors of their training and the need for courage in facing the 
enemy, so that their glorious accomplishments in battle may be worthy of remembrance 
by the Muses. As the enemy approached and the battles lines were set, the king sacrificed 
a goat, the pipers played a hymn to Castor, and the lines advanced in full confidence and 
calm, believing that the gods attended and favored them. 
Despite the brevity of this overview, one can see how thoroughly the heroic ideals 
of Homer permeated and shaped the military culture and education of Sparta. Although 
Athens, the great rival and counterpart to Sparta, abandoned the military ideal in culture 
and education, the city-state still felt the influence of Homer in its educational system.
86
 
Athenian Educational System 
As governance in Athens moved from oligarchy to democracy, accessibility to the 
gymnasium, formerly limited to the aristocracy, likewise expanded to include the general 
population. Thus the heroic values typically associated with the gymnasium, the military, 
and the aristocracy also passed on to the Athenian people. The ideas of valor, emulation, 
and heroic deeds found new expression in the champions of competitive sport. 
The greater involvement of the populace in the courts and the political processes 
created a need for articulate, well-reasoned, persuasive speech, and so the art of rhetoric 
was born. The grand ideas of justice, injustice, reconciliation, and retribution pervaded 
speeches for the law courts. The themes of glory, honor, moral excellence, exemplary 
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character, noble deeds, and their opposites were proclaimed in praise or defamation of 
prominent figures, political leaders, military heroes, and Olympic champions. The moral 
character of the students was developed through imitation of Homeric heroes. As students 
learned to construct their own speeches they scoured the heroic epics and mythological 
literature for topics, ideas, examples, and themes to expound. 
Throughout its Golden Age (mid-5th c. B.C.E.) and the following century, Athens 
saw the rise of the intellectual, scientific, literary, dramatic, and rational dimensions of its 
thought world. The literature, drama, and philosophy that the students encountered were 
full of allusions to and development of the stories, themes, ideas, and values spawned by 
the Homeric epics. The one area of intellectual flowering that did not draw directly upon 
the substance of the heroic literature, that is, natural philosophy, developed as a conscious 
reaction against it. These thinkers sought other explanations for the origin and nature of 
the cosmos than those offered by myth and legend. And yet, ironically, they adopted the 
same themes of conflict and resolution that had inspired the myths and legends they 
rejected as their paradigm for explaining the cosmos. Thus whether the Athenian thinkers 
and educators embraced the heroic values and ideals of Homer or reacted against them, 
the primary influence in all they did was still Homer. 
Thus far this study has presented a highly nuanced definition of peace from the 
Platonic era that reveals a Greek predisposition to see the cosmos in terms of war and 
conflict, rather than in terms of peace. Within the Greek thought world, war is the norm 
and peace consists of calm periods in the midst of war. A further refinement became 
apparent with the distinction between peace as merely the absence of conflict and peace 
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as the removal or resolution of the enmity that caused the conflict in the first place. An 
inquiry into the source of this Greek presupposition that war and conflict represented the 
cosmic norm revealed that their long history of virtually continuous warfare created a 
mythology, religion, and educational system that rationalized, reinforced, and perpetuated 
the cultural perception of war and conflict as the norm. 
Having established how deeply grounded, pervasive, and persuasive that view of 
war was in the Greek mind and culture, this study may now appropriately return to its 
present task of discovering and refining the Greek and Roman understandings of peace 
that led to a fairly uniform conception of peace in the first century of the Roman Empire. 
Greek and Roman Conceptions of Peace 
The following selective survey of Greek and Roman literature will isolate discrete 
portrayals of peace that not only discuss the nature of peace but also depict how it looked, 
felt, and functioned in the life and experience of the people. Some represent an idealized 
recollection of the past, others describe the immediate realities of wars fought in pursuit 
of peace, and still others offer abstract reflections on the nature of the cosmos and human 
society. All of these will clarify the formal definition of peace discussed above, either by 
providing examples or illustrations of various aspects of the definition, by refining certain 
nuances, or by extending its application into personal, social, and cosmic realms. 
The Earliest Literature: Homer and Hesiod 
The earliest literature providing glimpses of a Greek conception of peace comes 
from two 8th century B.C.E. authors: Homer (Iliad, Odyssey, and a collection of Hymns) 
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and Hesiod (Theogony and Works and Days). Although their works contain only a half-
dozen explicit references to ei!rhvnh (“peace”) and about a dozen synonyms or metaphors 
for peace, their conception of peace is consistent with the formal philosophical definition 
discussed above and shows how early, robust, and persistent the Greek conception of 
peace really was. Their works also present a few archetypal examples of interpersonal 
conflict and the attempts to resolve them. 
The Literature of Homer 
Much has already been said of the nature and influence of Homer’s epics. They 
portray the heroic age of Greece, a time of myth and legend in which human character 
and accomplishments reach such grand proportion as to overlap with the divine. These 
stories have some basis in history, but epic transcends history and uses both supernatural 
(mythic) and superhuman (legendary) elements to create the heroes and events that have 
shaped the cultural identity of the Greeks and have determined how they see themselves 
and their world. 
At the heart of Homer’s heroic ethos lies the concept of klevoV (“renown”). The 
conflicts, as well as the nuances of peace, in Homer’s epics only make sense when they 
are understood in conjunction with klevoV. For the hero this kle"oV is the “pearl of great 
price” for which all else including life itself is sacrificed. Although kle"oV translates as 
“good report, fame, glory, repute, or renown,” what it really meant was immortality. The 
heroic age had a pessimistic view of the afterlife.
87
  Therefore, with no other expectation 
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than a miserable, shadowy existence after death, one’s best hope for immortality was to 
be kept alive figuratively in the memories of the living. That is just what kle!oV offered: 
enduring fame and undying renown because of glorious deeds memorialized in song.
88
 
The hero earned klevoV by risking his life in battle, fighting bravely and fiercely to 
the very end. If victorious, the hero garnered glory, fame, prestige, honor, and riches for 
himself and his country, and if defeated or killed, his glory lay in fighting courageously 
and facing death unafraid. His deeds would be memorialized in song and he would thus 
gain a measure of immortality among those who sang and heard the songs. 
Each of the three occurrences of ei "rhvnh (“peace”) in the Iliad makes a nostalgic 
reference to the distant past—a time prior to the Trojan War, before the Greeks had even 
arrived at Troy.
89
 The basic conception of peace was thus the state or condition opposite 
to being at war. In each instance, however, that peaceful past implies an advantage over 
the present time of war and distress. First, in peace one has the luxury of time to indulge 
in endless conversation and discussion, but the urgency of war requires immediate action. 
Second, in that time of peace Troy was fully populated and the families were prosperous, 
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but the war has depleted both the population and the wealth. Finally, with great dramatic 
poignancy, Homer portrays the past as peaceful and idyllic in contrast to the frenzy and 
chaos of war. As the climactic battle between Hector and Achilles rages, the very place 
where they are fighting is described as it appeared in more peaceful times.
90
  Thus, the 
three citations depict peace and war as mutually exclusive alternatives, but they also hint 
at qualitative aspects of peace that make it preferable to war. 
This great tension between peace and the heroic ethos comes into focus in the two 
conflicts of Achilles: his enmity toward Agamemnon and his inner conflict over his own 
destiny.
91
 Achilles discovers that the desire for kle!oV and the desire for peace will always 
conflict, because kle!oV needs war—a final battle for the hero to prove himself. 
Agamemnon has dishonored and angered Achilles by taking from him the maiden 
Briseïs.
92
 In response Achilles has withdrawn from the war allowing Troy nearly to rout 
the Greeks. The two are at an impasse as the destiny of Achilles and the outcome of the 
war hang in the balance. Recognizing that the Greek cause will be lost without Achilles, 
Nestor and Odysseus step in as mediators to reconcile the two men.
93
 Nestor confronts 
Agamemnon first. With genuine remorse, the king acknowledges his fault and seeks to be 
reconciled to Achilles. Then, on behalf of Agamemnon, Odysseus appeals to Achilles and 
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presents the offer of restitution including Briseïs, expensive gifts, first choice in the spoils 
of war, one of Agamemnon’s daughters in marriage, and seven Greek cities. However, 
despite the lavish restitution and several emotional appeals to patriotism, honor, family, 
the welfare of his fellow-warriors, and even the survival of Greece, Achilles refuses to be 
reconciled. Thus the enmity is never resolved and peace is never made.
94
 
In his refusal to reconcile with Agamemnon, Achilles expresses bitterness over a 
dilemma regarding his own destiny: whether to quit the war, return to Greece, and enjoy 
a long, peaceful, happy life in obscurity or to remain with the troops, resume the battle, 
and accept his destiny of a brief life, a glorious death, and the enduring fame (klevoV) of 
the hero.
95
 The peace he envisions is a full and prosperous life without fear of impending 
death. He also speaks of his wealthy home in the “deep-soiled” (richly fertile) Phthia, 
evoking images of abundance and security in which the productivity of the land sustains 
and enriches life.
96
 This image of peace was so attractive and compelling that Achilles 
had already decided to return home and he would not be dissuaded by Agamemnon, his 
gifts, or the pleadings of the mediators. However, when Hector kills his dearest friend 
Patroclus, Achilles changes his mind and returns to the battle for revenge against Hector. 
When Achilles finally engaged Hector, the very ground on which they fought and 
spilled their blood had, in former times of peace, consisted of wild fig trees waving in the 
breeze, bubbling springs—one warm, the other cold—feeding into a common river, with 
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women doing their laundry at the stone water tanks. Again, idyllic images of abundance 
and security prevail. Nature itself, both as the wild fig tree providing uncultivated fruit 
for food and as the springs providing hot water to wash and cold water to refresh, sustains 
human life. Therefore, peace was that time before the war when the natural necessities of 
life could proceed unimpeded and even the women could venture outside the protection 
of the city walls in safety. 
The one reference to ei!rhvnh (“peace”) in the Odyssey occurs in the context of an 
interpersonal conflict and thus provides an example of conflict resolution as well as a 
highly textured portrait of peace. The conflict occurs near the very end of the story. 
In the final scenes, after Odysseus has returned home to Ithaca, he encounters the 
suitors who wasted his wealth and dishonored his wife while he was away. With the help 
and approval of the gods, Odysseus exacts retribution by ambushing the suitors in his 
home and killing the whole group.  Their aggrieved fathers and friends are outraged and 
mobilize to attack Odysseus and avenge the death of the suitors. 
The conflict is interpersonal as it involves Odysseus and kinsfolk of the deceased 
suitors. The kinsfolk are so hostile toward Odysseus that they by-pass any negotiation 
and pursue a violent solution. They intend to resolve their enmity by killing Odysseus, 
who prepares his household to respond in kind. Before the hostilities can fully break out 
in armed conflict, the gods intervene with what amounts to binding arbitration in the form 
of a stylized judicial proceeding. Though the scene contains no courtroom or trial, Homer 
uses various literary devices to include all the basic elements of a trial in his story. 
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Zeus is the arbitrator/judge, Athena is the advocate for Odysseus (defendant), and 
Eupeithes, the father of a slain suitor, speaks for the kinsfolk (plaintiff). Homer uses the 
impassioned speech of Eupeithes inciting the assembly of kinsfolk against Odysseus as 
the literary device for presenting the plaintiff’s case: Odysseus is guilty of a monstrous 
offense, namely, killing Greek men by leading some away to die in war and killing others 
upon his return. Therefore, he himself deserves to die and must be put to death. Homer 
then uses the speeches of the minstrel Medon and the hero Halitherses, who are trying to 
calm the mob, as a device to present the case for the defense: Odysseus acted with divine 
approval and support (Medon) and the suitors brought this on themselves by outrageous 
behavior and the kinsfolk are equally guilty because they did not confront the suitors and 
dissuade them from their folly (Halitherses). 
After hearing the evidence, the gods confer, Zeus renders a verdict, Athena enacts 
it with cooperation from Odysseus, and the matter is brought to a peaceful conclusion. As 
the case is discussed and resolved by the gods, both of whom favor Odysseus, the many 
textures and nuances of peace become evident. 
 But Athena spoke to Zeus, son of Cronos, saying:  “Father of us all, . . . 
Will you still further bring to pass evil war and the dread din of battle, or will you 
establish friendship between the two sides?” 
 Then Zeus, the cloud-gatherer, answered her, and said:  “My child, . . . 
Now that noble Odysseus has taken vengeance on the suitors, let them swear a 
solemn oath, and let him be king all his days, and let us on our part bring about a 
forgetting of the killing of their sons and brothers; and let them love one another 
as before, and let wealth and peace abound.”
97
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In Athena’s question to Zeus the antithesis of war is not peace as a retrospective 
ideal from a bygone era, as noted above in the Iliad, but a prospective reconciliation of 
the two hostile parties. Peace is thus the cessation of hostilities, the calm that follows the 
conflict, whether that conflict be resolved through the total destruction of the enemy, as 
seen in the outcome of the Trojan War, or through the rapprochement achieved when the 
demands of justice have been served, as with Odysseus and the suitors. Framed as it is, 
Athena’s question also underscores a foundational premise in the heroic literature that the 
gods ultimately determine human affairs. War and peace, life and death, even exploits of 
the great heroes were all subject to the Fates and the determinations of the gods. So then 
the implied question is whether Zeus will allow the plan for Odysseus to unfold as 
designed, or intervene for some reason to change the course of events. 
Zeus allows Athena, the architect of the plan, to act as she will in the matter, but 
responds with a recommendation for what he thinks is fitting. In his view, the destruction 
of the suitors fulfilled the demands of justice, so that no further grievance on the part of 
surviving kinsfolk is warranted. The matter is settled and should be forgotten. Odysseus 
should be reinstated as king, previous friendly relations should be restored, and a time of 
peace and prosperity should follow. 
Implicit in this recommendation and confirmed in events that follow are several 
ideas about peace and peacemaking that suggest movement from the militaristic ideals of 
the Iliad to the more legally oriented perspective that appears in later literature. First, 
before any peace can be established the demands of justice must be satisfied, and this is 
precisely what Odysseus effects with the suitors. As a result, Zeus accords Odysseus 
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heroic status, declaring him to be noble, excellent, and even god-like, in his quest for 
vengeance. However, Odysseus is so esteemed not for his prowess as warrior, even 
though his vengeance is as intense and heroic as any battle scene from the Trojan War, 
but rather for satisfying the demands of justice. The whole story requires that he punish 
the suitors for their twenty years of boorish behavior toward his wife Penelope, abusive 
disdain for his son Telemachus and the loyal household staff, contemptuous disregard for 
the customs of hospitality, and dissipation of his wealth. The gods support Odysseus as 
he advances the cause of justice. 
Second, before peace can be established some social order must be in place. In the 
absence of Odysseus there was no king, Telemachus was not of age to assume his father’s 
place, and the fathers of the suitors failed to restrain the wanton behavior of their sons. 
Consequently, the household was in disarray, the wisdom and advice of the elders was 
ignored, and all of Ithaca suffered from the social upheaval. Zeus required that the 
kinsfolk of the suitors swear allegiance to Odysseus as king to restore the social order 
before further reconciliation leading to peace could occur. 
Third, the gods must take an active role in assuaging the grievance (whether real 
or perceived) of the injured party to effect reconciliation and promote concord. Although 
justice has been served in the death of the suitors, their kinsfolk perceive the deaths as but 
one more supposedly “great deed” that Odysseus has perpetrated against the Achaeans, 
along with his other “great deeds” of leading men off to war and then losing both the men 
and their ships. Thus the kinsfolk see Odysseus not as a hero but as a criminal that must 
be punished before he escapes. Neither the claims of justice nor the wisdom of the elders 
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nor even the death of their leader will deter the kinsfolk from their fight for vengeance. 
Only the intervention of the gods, namely, Athena appearing in the midst of the fight and 
Zeus hurling his thunderbolts in the path of Odysseus, will persuade the warriors on both 
sides to forsake the strife of war and return to their homes. Therefore, justice alone was 
not enough for reconciliation. The gods had also to “hasten a forgetfulness” of their 
grievance, that is, to remove from their minds the offense that originated the conflict in 
order to restore them to friendly terms with each other. 
When peace finally is established, it comes as the calm following the conflict, that 
is, the prospective peace implied in Athena’s original question to Zeus. At the same time, 
however, the peace is associated with a restoration of the past, not only in terms of civil 
relationships among the people, but also in terms of recovering the former wealth and 
abundance that had been squandered by the suitors. 
In summary, the conceptions of peace in Homer’s epics are determined by the 
ideals of the heroic age: the glorification of war, the skill and courage of the warrior, and 
to a lesser extent the wisdom and counsel of the aged sage. Peace is the antithesis of war, 
a time when warriors are not engaged in battle, whether that be the idyllic past before the 
war began or the restored calm after the hostilities have ended. That state of peace is 
characterized by a harmony within nature that produces material prosperity for individual 
and household and by a friendliness among people that engenders security from dangers 
within and without. This sense of peace entails order in the cosmos, satisfaction, well-
being and contentment in society, and the general perception that life is as it should be in 
relation to the gods, to nature, to oneself, to one’s own community, and to outsiders. 
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In this heroic age fighting is considered an honorable way to resolve conflict, 
whether involving individuals or states. At the same time, the tragic effect of war, even 
upon the victors, is clear enough to those aged warriors who have grown wise through a 
lifetime of experience in war, especially as they observe the bruised honor of individuals 
instigating war between nations. Therefore, while they are intensely proud of their own 
accomplishments and are still prepared to fight if necessary, the heroic sages seek to avert 
disaster through reasonable, just, and honorable mediation between the hostile parties. 
Finally, whether by means of war or mediation, peace will ultimately come only through 
the intervention of the gods. 
The Literature of Hesiod 
Under the inspiration of the Muses Hesiod tells of “things that shall be and things 
that were aforetime.” This view of things “from the beginning”
98
 sheds the most light on 
the foundations of the heroic age and the nature of peace in its ideal form. As Hesiod 
portrays the conflicts among the gods, whose powers tend to be evenly matched, victory 
is more often gained through clever strategy, careful alliance, and convincing ruse than 
through strength alone. As a result, those qualities that serve the gods well are also highly 
regarded in the heroic warrior, or more specifically, the warrior-sage. 
The only direct reference to ei!rhvnh (“peace”) in the Theogony occurs as the name 
of the goddess Peace, another example of how the early gods often personified the virtues 
and vices of social relationship. Most illuminating is the fact that Peace is presented with 
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two other goddesses Eujnomi!a (“good order”) and Di!kh (“justice”) as together “minding 
the works of mortal men.”
99
  The trio of Order, Justice, and Peace is suggestive of the 
dialogue between Zeus and Athena at the close of the Odyssey when Zeus stipulates that 
justice be done with the suitors and orderly governance restored before peace might again 
flourish in Ithaca. Therefore, even as the gods originate and personify the causes of 
conflict and war, so they also originate and personify the preconditions of its resolution. 
However, despite the influence of the trio and the collective wisdom of the gods, their 
own major conflicts were settled more often by force than by reason. They used their wits 
to win battles rather than to resolve conflicts. Consequently, among the gods themselves 
peace came to represent merely the calm that followed victory, and war became the 
primary means for achieving peace. 
In Hesiod’s cosmology then there is the rudimentary concept of a just and orderly 
peace. However, it is more than simply a concept. By virtue of its personification in the 
gods Order, Justice, and Peace, peace is intrinsic to the cosmos itself, inherent in its very 
design and structure. Yet Hesiod must also contend with the dissonance between design 
and reality, whereby the gods themselves, not to mention the weak and fallible humans, 
cannot sustain the ideal of peace amid the reality of their appetite for power and their 
competition for prominence. Hesiod probes this tension further in Works and Days as he 
ostensibly seeks to resolve a conflict with his brother stemming from a financial dispute 
over their inheritance by changing his brother’s mind about the nature of life and society 
through reasoning and argumentation. 
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Hesiod’s strategy to resolve the conflict with his brother is fairly straightforward. 
He reasons with his brother Perses, making an ethical appeal that he turn away from the 
path that leads to violence and ill-gotten gain and turn to the path that leads to justice, 
peace, and prosperity.
100
  The mechanism for accomplishing this is the commitment to 
honest hard work, so Hesiod begins his argument with an explanation of the benefit and 
necessity of work: hard work benefits the worker by producing an orderly home and 
material prosperity.
101
 
However, life did not always require such labor to subsist or even to prosper. 
Similar to Homer’s nostalgic flashback to the pre-war peace, Hesiod also recalls peace in 
the Golden Age when “the tribes of men lived on earth remote and free from ills and hard 
toil and heavy sickness,” a time before the gods “kept hidden from men the means of 
life,” a time when one “would easily do work enough in a day to supply [him] for a full 
year without working.”
102
 
The golden race lived in an age when the Titan Cronos ruled the heavens.
103
  This 
is the primordial Golden Age of peace and prosperity that informs Homer’s allusions in 
the Iliad to an idyllic peace prior to the war. Hesiod describes it further as an age when 
mortal men “lived like gods without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and grief.” 
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They enjoyed good health as long as they lived, without any encroachments of age upon 
their physical bodies. Death was no more difficult or traumatic than simply falling asleep. 
People lived in ease as the earth “automatically,” that is, on its own without the need of 
any human cultivation, produced an abundance of food for their sustenance and for the 
nurture of their flocks. They feasted and celebrated their prosperity “beyond the reach of 
all evils,” in physical, material, and spiritual security, loved and favored by the gods.
104
  
This Golden Age was a paradisiacal conception of peace that lingered in the minds of all 
Greeks and formed the ideal to which they aspired to return.
105
 
Hesiod’s fourth generation was “nobler and more righteous, a god-like race of 
hero-men who are called demi-gods.”
106
  This was the heroic age, the setting for Homer’s 
epics.
107
 Although these were noble heroes who gained their reputation and glory on the 
field of battle, the grim reality of war claimed most of their lives. However, all that they 
may have lacked of peace during their lives was more than compensated in their afterlife, 
as they now “dwell at the ends of the earth . . . untouched by sorrow in the islands of the 
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blessed along the shore of deep swirling Ocean.”
108
  As reward for their courageous life 
and death, these heroes have been restored to the Golden Age, where they are happily 
nourished by the “grain-giving earth” that bears its “honey-sweet” fruit three times a 
year, and where a reinstated Cronos rules over them once again in a realm of peace and 
blessedness—paradise lost and regained. 
This recovery of the Golden Age by the heroes provides hope amid Hesiod’s 
otherwise bleak view of his own timeframe, the Iron Age. Though some good can be 
found among the evil, life is short and marked by tension and conflict within the family, 
aggression between cities, injustice in the civic processes, and a wretched humanity in 
“bitter sorrows . . . [with] no help against evil.”
109
  Nature itself conspires with the gods 
to withhold peace and prosperity when confronted with human injustice, disorder, and 
violence. On the contrary, societies flourish under the blessing of the gods and the 
fruitfulness of nature only as justice is maintained. Only then can people live in peace: 
free from fear of war, famine, or natural disaster, and rich in natural resources, material 
prosperity, and extended family.
110
 
From Hesiod’s perspective, because the gods oversee all of human affairs and are 
always active in the judgment of human behavior, peace and prosperity are the reward for 
truth and justice, while suffering in the form of war, famine, disease, and poverty is the 
punishment for violence, cruelty, falsehood and injustice towards others, whether they are 
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“strangers” or “men of the land.”
111
  This brings a social and ethical aspect to Hesiod’s 
understanding of peace that is not so fully developed in Homer’s work. 
Homer espouses certain values, principles, and social norms by means of 
exemplification in the lives of his heroes. His contemporary audience is to appropriate 
those qualities for themselves by emulating the positive and avoiding the negative. Thus 
Homer addresses the attitude, behavior, and values of his contemporary audience 
indirectly by drawing moral lessons from legendary events of the past, which are then 
universally relevant and applicable by individuals in any age. Hesiod, on the other hand, 
promotes similar values, but rather than using exemplification from the past, he codifies 
those values and expresses them as imperatives, maxims, and principles for the conduct 
of life in his present age. Thus Hesiod addresses his audience directly by using the moral 
lessons of the past as principles to deal with ethical issues that he specifically identifies in 
his contemporary social setting. What Homer promotes through exemplification in the 
individual heroes, Hesiod espouses through codification in laws and maxims for the 
ordering of society. 
Summary of Early Greek Conceptions of Peace 
Homer and Hesiod preserve the first written accounts of early Greek conceptions 
of peace. They present two basic conceptions: an idealized view of peace and a realistic, 
or more pragmatic, view. The former, idealized peace is set in an ostensibly paradisiacal 
age of the distant past, a purely mythical age that fostered the origins of the cosmos, the 
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gods, and the first generation of humanity. This Golden Age depicts peace as harmony 
within the cosmos such that human beings live in complete security and without fear of 
any kind. They are favored and blessed by the gods, so they fear no punishment or 
reprisals. They are fed and prospered by a self-sustaining earth that yields abundant 
harvests, supporting them and their flocks without the necessity of human cultivation. So 
they fear no deprivation of the necessities of life. On the contrary, they enjoy great 
prosperity and fruitfulness in every respect. Because all their needs are met and everyone 
enjoys rich prosperity, the society is well-ordered, just, and peaceful. Consequently, they 
fear no greed, hostility, or aggression from others. 
The latter, pragmatic peace is defined more narrowly as the antithesis to war, a 
time or condition that is free from the open hostilities of warfare. This view of peace has 
qualitative points of contact with the ideal peace, but realistically can never approach full 
implementation of the ideal. The ideal peace can exist only in a utopian world unmarred 
by evil, a world that the ancients sought but never achieved. Therefore, the pragmatic 
peace only restrains or limits warfare, but cannot restore the paradisiacal ideal of peace. 
When people are not at war, they are free to cultivate their lands and tend their flocks, 
they can move around freely, they can live with relative security and generally prosper. 
So, in that regard, the pragmatic peace resembles the ideal, but the reality of the human 
condition precludes the recovery of the ideal. 
In the heroic age of Homer conflict is for the most part resolved through fighting. 
Warfare is glorified and the combatants are seen as heroes for their accomplishments in 
battle. Because the state of conflict and war is considered the norm, those who fight, and 
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even the fighting itself, are highly regarded as the means for restoring order and securing 
peace. In the Iron Age of Hesiod, however, reason and law are preferable to violence and 
war for resolving conflict. Hesiod argues that only hard work and compliance with the 
law will bring about the justice and order necessary to secure peace within the society. It 
is, on the one hand, a peace that is less than the ideal. But it does, on the other hand, 
provide some modicum of hope for peace in an otherwise hopelessly corrupt age and also 
provides hope for peace in this life, not just in the afterlife. 
In these early authors the tension between the ideal and the real, the principled 
and the pragmatic, is clearly evident. This tension attends the conceptions of peace in 
later Greek thought as well, and ultimately manifests itself in the thought and policies of 
the Roman Empire. 
The Philosophical Literature 
Subsequent to the period of heroic epics, Greek literature expands and diversifies 
to include history, philosophy, drama, essays, letters, and a variety of poetical forms. The 
sheer volume of material makes a comprehensive survey impractical for a study of this 
sort. Therefore, this section will evaluate the perspectives on peace from representative 
philosophers of the Pre-Socratic and Socratic eras. 
Presocratic Conceptions of Peace 
Presocratic philosophy is distinctive in two respects: its focus and its method. The 
Presocratic philosophers focused on the outer world of ultimate reality, particularly those 
questions dealing with the substance, nature, and source of the cosmos. This focus on the 
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outer world distinguished them from later philosophers that pondered questions regarding 
the inner world of ethics, morals, and the greatest good. The Presocratic focus was not 
new, however, as the epic literature already contained extensive treatments of cosmology 
long before the Presocratics. So the Presocratic distinction from the epic literature lay in 
its method. These early philosophers sought to understand the nature and substance of the 
cosmos from a scientific perspective without relying on the mythological and legendary 
explanations of Homer and Hesiod. 
Thales (c. 624–546 B.C.E.) first asserted that the ultimate underlying substance 
(ajrchv) of the cosmos was water.112  Thales is considered the first philosopher because he 
not only raised the foundational question of the one and the many, but he also postulated 
a reasoned solution: material unity arising from the underlying substance of water. Other 
hypotheses followed. Anaximenes (c. 545 B.C.E.) and Diogenes of Apollonia (late 5th c. 
B.C.E.) assumed that air was the basic substance, while Heraclitus of Ephesus (535–475 
B.C.E.) saw it as fire. 
Coincident with assertions of the unity of all things was the related problem of 
accounting for the development of diversity among secondary things from the one 
primary substance. This became another foundational issue in Presocratic philosophy, the 
question of being (stasis) and becoming (flux). In the formulations of Anaximenes and 
Heraclitus, the ultimate unity of the cosmos is preserved while explaining the observable 
diversity as changing forms of the original substance. 
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Other philosophers abandoned the premise of unity altogether and asserted instead 
a cosmos comprising many primary elements, referred to variously as aJplova swvmata 
(“simple bodies”), ajrcai ! (“first principles”), or later as stoicei!a (“basic elements”). 
Empedocles (490–430 B.C.E.) identifies four substances: water, air, fire, and earth. The 
two motivating forces in the cosmos are love tending to unity and harmony, and hate 
tending to separation and dissonance.
113
 Anaxagoras (500–428 B.C.E.), a contemporary of 
Empedocles, takes a similarly pluralistic view, but asserts that the primary elements are 
innumerable, rather than just the four, and that the motivating force in their flux between 
composition and separation is the immaterial force of nou:V (“mind, reason, thought”) 
operating rationally and purposefully to produce an intelligent design in the beauty, order, 
and harmony of the cosmos.
114
 
These tensions in Presocratic thought between the one and the many, being and 
becoming, and even in incipient form between the ideal and the real, are not ultimately 
resolved but do set the stage for the fuller flowering of philosophic thought in the 
subsequent Socratic and Hellenistic eras. These tensions also provide a necessary context 
for understanding the Presocratic conceptions of peace. Although direct references are 
few, a pragmatic understanding of peace as the antithesis to war and a philosophic thesis 
for the necessity of both war and peace are clearly evident in Presocratic thought. 
In a letter to Pythagoras (c. 570–490 B.C.E.), who had previously left Ionia for 
southern Italy, Anaximenes compares their respective states of peace and war. 
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You [Pythoagoras] were better advised than the rest of us when you left Samos 
for Croton, where you live in peace. For the sons of Aeaces work incessant 
mischief, and Miletus is never without tyrants. The king of the Medes is another 
terror to us, not indeed so long as we are willing to pay tribute; but the Ionians are 
on the point of going to war with the Medes to secure their common freedom, and 
once we are at war we have no more hope of safety. How then can Anaximenes 
any longer think of studying the heavens when threatened with destruction or 
slavery? Meanwhile you find favour with the people of Croton and with the other 
Greeks in Italy; and pupils come to you even from Sicily.
115
 
For Anaximenes war and peace are alternative and mutually exclusive states in 
which one lives. Insofar as the prelude to war is characterized by tyrannical rule, 
oppression from heavy tribute, and threats to safety, the prelude is more like war than 
peace. Once the war actually starts, particularly against the overpowering foe that the 
Ionians are facing in Cyrus the Great (547–545 B.C.E.), any hope of deliverance is lost 
and the only possible outcome for Anaximenes is either death or continued slavery. Like 
the farmer of the heroic age whose farm languished while he was away fighting, the 
scholar’s research and teaching is disrupted by the uncertainties of imminent war. 
In contrast to his own situation, Anaximenes imagines the young Pythagoras 
living in peace and enjoying the full security, prosperity, and well-being associated with 
peace. Not only is he free from the tyranny, tribute, and angst of an uncertain future, but 
he is free also to pursue his profession and enjoy the prosperity of his work. He is highly 
respected by the people around him, as any good teacher should be, but more than that, 
he draws students from afar on the strength of his reputation. Though the context is quite 
different, this idealized portrait of peace bears a distinct resemblance to the peace 
Achilles imagined as he envisioned what life might have been had he remained on his 
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farm instead of going to war. Both images of peace focus on physical safety from the 
threat of death, both assume a secure context for one’s vocation, both imply abundance 
and prosperity as the reward for one’s labor, both include references to an orderly and 
harmonious community, and both reflect an overall sense of well-being and contentment. 
In his response Pythagoras deflects the compliments from Anaximenes suggesting 
that each of them would have done just the same if their positions had been reversed. 
Pythagoras encourages Anaximenes to welcome the broadened political role forced upon 
him by the war as an equally appropriate aspect of his vocation as philosopher-scholar. 
Even you, O most excellent of men, were you no better born and famed than 
Pythagoras, would have risen and departed from Miletus. But now your ancestral 
glory has detained you as it had detained me were I Anaximenes’s peer. But if 
you, the best men, abandon your cities, then will their good order perish, and the 
peril from the Medes will increase. For always to scan the heavens is not well, but 
more seemly is it to be provident for one’s mother country. For I too am not 
altogether in my discourses but am found no less in the wars which the Italians 
wage with one another.
116
 
Pythagoras is a pragmatist in this respect, he recognizes the necessary relationship 
between social order and peace. By linking social order inextricably to peace, he implies 
that an ordered and orderly society is a prerequisite for peace, so that those establishing 
or maintaining social order are working to establish, restore, or preserve peace, or, in this 
case, to slow the movement toward outright war. Furthermore, Pythagoras sees the role of 
the philosopher—at least in part—as an influence for order. This role is consistent with 
his understanding of reality wherein the cosmos, like the pitches of a musical scale, can 
be expressed in terms of numbers and numerical ratios. Thus a philosopher with this 
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same awareness would be among those best prepared to resolve the conflict of opposites 
and restore harmony through numerical patterns.
117
  Finally, Pythagoras follows both 
Homer and Hesiod in the conviction that peace depends on an orderly social structure. 
These letters suggest that war and peace are mutually exclusive alternatives, that 
peace is the preferable state, that peace, both objectively in community and subjectively 
as peace of mind or sense of well-being, depends upon an orderly social context, and that 
war is an unfortunate reality of life everywhere. It would seem intuitive, then, to conclude 
that peace is good, war is bad, and that the world would be a better place if all strife could 
forever be eliminated. It hardly seems possible that anyone could argue with Achilles’ 
prayer of regret over his conflict with Agamemnon, “May strife perish from among the 
gods and men.”
118
  Yet, the Pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus does just that.
119
 
Heraclitus devises a solution to the dilemma of unity and diversity that allows for 
both. While he is a monist, believing that the cosmos derives from the one substance fire, 
he denies that the cosmos is static, insisting rather that all things are in a constant state of 
change, fluctuating between their opposite extremes. “Cold things become warm, a warm 
thing becomes cold; a moist thing becomes dry, a parched thing becomes moist.”
120
  
Matter is never static—it is always in flux—so that nothing ever settles into a static form. 
Everything exists in this oscillation between extremes, in this tension between opposites. 
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God [cosmos] is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and 
famine, and undergoes change in the way that [fire] whenever it is mixed with 
spices, gets called by the name that accords with the bouquet of each.
121
 
Heraclitus defines the cosmos using four basic antitheses that are not exhaustive, 
but in principle represent all antitheses. The most basic is day and night, which Hesiod 
personifies as the two individual gods, +Hme !rh (“Day”) and Nuvx (“Night”).122  However, 
Heraclitus contests such a distinction because in his view they are one and the same 
reality. “For very many people Hesiod is their teacher. They are certain he knew a great 
number of things—he who continually failed to recognize even day and night for what 
they are! For they are one.”
123
  In the unity of day and night Heraclitus sees the pattern of 
fluctuation from the warmer, brighter day to the cooler, darker night. Neither exists apart 
from the other, but as they exist in tension with one another, together they constitute the 
same entity. This is also true for war and peace, satiety and famine, and by extension for 
all other pairs as well. Neither can be defined, understood, or appreciated without the 
other, for “disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest.”
124
 
Heraclitus accords special significance to the antithesis of war and peace, for it is 
not just another in the series, but rather the quintessential antithesis that epitomizes his 
whole doctrine of opposition. “War is father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, 
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others men; he makes some slaves, others free.”
125
  He designates war as universal father 
and king: father as the procreative initiative and generating force of all things, and king as 
the supreme power for determining the destiny of all things, including life and death. He 
further explains the metaphor with two antitheses illustrating the consequences and 
determinative effects of war in the lives of the warriors. The first is drawn from warfare 
in the heroic age where any man might be esteemed as a god for his courageous exploits 
in battle. The second is true of any war: the winners are free and the losers enslaved. 
Ironically, Heraclitus does not mention the one antithesis that would seem to be 
more basic than war and peace: life and death. For Heraclitus, war, not life and death, is 
the ultimate determinant of status and destiny. Life or death is but a consequence of war, 
and that consequence can be ambiguous. Warriors in both armies will live and die, but it 
is the fortune of war, not the living or dying, that determines a warrior’s destiny. Those 
who survive are either free or enslaved, depending on the outcome of the war. Those who 
die in the war, on either side, will generally be honored. “Those slain by Ares, gods and 
mankind honour.”
126
  However, even then, the war is determinative, for the degree of 
honor is proportional to the glory with which one fought and died. “Greater deaths win 
greater destinies.”
127
 
Therefore, war is the ultimate generative and determinative force in human life 
and experience. For Heraclitus living and dying, like all paired opposites, are really one. 
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So living and dying are not the same as being and not being. Rather, life and death are 
two states of one existence. Heraclitus clearly assumes an afterlife when he asserts that 
“there await people when they die things they neither expect nor even imagine.”
128
  
Therefore, whether day or night, plenty or want, peace or war, or even life or death, 
human experience—no, all reality—consists in the tension between opposites, and that 
tension is a creative, not destructive, force in the cosmos. 
Heraclitus states this principle most definitively and plainly in a succinct fragment 
of four phrases. 
ei !de "nai de… crh; to;n povlemon e !ovnta xunovn, kai… di "khn e“rin, kai… ginovmena 
pavnta kat j e“rin kai… crewvmena. 
One must realize that war is common, and justice strife, and that all things come 
to be through strife and are so ordained.
129
 
By “common” in the first phrase he means universally experienced.
130
  As the foregoing 
metaphor has indicated, war, that is to say, the conflict of opposites, is the common 
experience of all and its effects determinative for all. 
The second phrase is grammatically ambiguous and translates either as “justice is 
strife” or “strife is justice.” The oddity of equating the two is that they seem contradictory 
and incompatible. The idea that justice in association with law, order, and peace can be 
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equated with strife that leads to conflict and war is certainly foreign to the earlier Greek 
thought of Homer and Hesiod.
131
  However, just as Heraclitus broadens his reference to 
war to mean the general principle of tension between opposites, so he broadens his idea 
of justice to encompass a sense of order and balance in the cosmos. “The sun will not 
transgress his measures. If he does, the Furies, ministers of Justice, will find him out.”
132
  
Thus Heraclitus sees a reciprocal identity between conflict that necessitates justice and 
justice that is generated by conflict, and this principle operates on a practical level with 
law and order in society and on a cosmic level with the system of dynamic antitheses. 
The third phrase states this basic concept of Heraclitus in its purest form. pavnta 
(“all things”) refers to the cosmos. Whatever Heraclitus may say using human metaphor, 
analogy, example, or illustration, he is ultimately addressing the nature of the cosmos. 
His specific use of gi !nomai (“become, come into being, be born or created”) in the 
present tense emphasizes the process of becoming rather than the resultant state of being. 
For Heraclitus the cosmos is always in flux and never settles into a static state of 
existence. Finally, the prepositional phrase shows the coincident role of conflict in 
effecting the generation of all things, whether nuanced instrumentally (“through strife”) 
or duratively (“in the course of the strife”). 
The text of the fourth phrase is uncertain,
133
 but as it stands it relates to that which 
is fated or ordained. Heraclitus sees this doctrine of opposition as inherent in the cosmos 
                                                
131
 Kahn, Art and Thought, 206. 
132
 Kahn, Art and Thought, Fragment 44. 
133
 Kahn, Art and Thought, 207. 
87 
itself, a feature that is part of its design and destiny. So then, within a cosmos that 
depends upon strife between opposites as a generative and determinate force, Heraclitus 
would indeed view the prayer of Achilles that the world be rid of strife as a threat to the 
very survival of the cosmos. 
Although Heraclitus holds to an uncharacteristically positive view of war because 
of its generative function in the cosmos, he does not manifestly dismiss peace as negative 
simply because it is antithetical to war. His attitude toward peace is actually mixed. The 
only three occurrences of ei!rhvnh (“peace”) in his work support respectively a neutral, a 
negative, and a positive opinion of peace. Unfortunately, only one of the references 
appears to be a direct citation from Heraclitus. The other two are interpretative accounts 
of his doctrine by later biographers and may not present the ideas of Heraclitus with the 
same precision as his own words. 
The first reference to peace occurs in the fragment mentioned above:  “God 
[cosmos] is . . . war and peace.” This statement by itself is quite neutral. It merely 
describes the cosmos as existing in the dynamic tension of opposites, without valuing 
either element over the other in this or any other antithetical pair. Although it is clear 
from other fragments that Heraclitus saw war as crucial to the integrity of the cosmos, 
neither his preference for war nor any prejudice against peace is discernable in this 
fragment, which is the only specific mention of peace by Heraclitus himself. 
The second reference presents peace more negatively as the antithesis of war 
within the cosmic cycle between one extreme and the other. 
All things come into being by [a process of] opposition and the sum of all things 
is in flux, like a river; what is more, all that is is limited, and constitutes a single 
88 
universe. This universe is born from fire and converted back again to fire in a 
process of cyclical alternation throughout all eternity; and this takes place in 
accordance with destiny. Of the opposites, that one which leads to birth is called 
war or strife, while the one that leads to destruction by fire is called concord or 
peace.
134
 
Inasmuch as war is identified with the generative force of birth and peace with the 
degenerative force of destruction, a negative nuance for peace seems unavoidable here. 
However, some latitude allowing for figurative uses of war and peace must be granted for 
this or any interpretation of Heraclitus. Although war is an apt metaphor for generative 
and determinative tension in the cosmos, one cannot assume that Heraclitus was arguing 
his preference for war over peace within the context of human society. While some have 
characterized Heraclitus as melancholy and aloof,
135
 to suggest he was so misanthropic as 
to prefer war to peace would be patently unfair. The pairing of war and peace with more 
general terms of strife and concord, suggest a metaphorical rather than literal use of war 
and peace. Such a reading is confirmed by the final reference to Heraclitus and peace. 
In arguing for simplicity and brevity in speech, Plutarch uses Heraclitus as an 
example of how the most admirable communication might involve no words at all. 
So Heraclitus, when his fellow citizens asked him to propose some opinion about 
concord, mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-
meal, stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed, thus demonstrating to 
them that to be satisfied with whatever they happen upon and not to want 
expensive things is to keep cities in peace and concord.
136
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War is not mentioned here, and the peace referred to is clearly the unity and 
harmony within a community that derive from like-mindedness (oJmonoi !a) among the 
citizens. This is practical and pragmatic peace in human relationships and represents an 
ethical aspect to the teachings of Heraclitus in contrast to his more speculative doctrines 
on the nature of the cosmos. In this brief anecdote Heraclitus implies that contentment 
with what one has fosters peace while the unchecked appetite for wealth jeopardizes 
peace. His practical wisdom elsewhere acknowledges such a liability as he forthrightly 
admits, “It is not better for people to get all they want!”
137
  In this respect, he echoes 
similar sentiments in Hesiod that caution his brother against manipulating, if not actually 
violating, the law to procure unearned wealth. Those warnings in Hesiod were part of a 
larger vision for peace in an orderly and just society. 
Other fragments in Heraclitus, although not specifically mentioning peace, imply 
that he likewise valued a just and orderly society based upon law as a context for peace. 
“There is greater need to extinguish hybris than there is a blazing fire.”
138
  By hybris 
Heraclitus means “any violence in a city, including that used by the rich and powerful, 
that disrupts good order.”
139
  Because such disruptive violence can be even more 
destructive to the infrastructure of a city than an uncontrolled fire, anything that 
encourages violence is a threat to the survival of the city, and anything that restrains 
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violence promotes the security of the city and is worth fighting for. Therefore, Heraclitus 
exhorts the people to defend the law as they would the very city itself. “The people 
should fight on behalf of the law as [they would] for [their] city wall.”
140
  Finally, 
Heraclitus considers human law to be a common, unifying factor within a city that 
functions according to the same principle as divine law in the cosmos. 
Those who would speak with insight must base themselves firmly on that which is 
common to all, as a city does upon <its> law—and much more firmly! For all 
human laws are nourished by one <law>, the divine <law>. For it holds sway to 
the extent that it wishes, and suffices for all, and is still left over.
141
 
As a footnote to Heraclitus, a brief word about Empedocles is appropriate. As a 
pluralist asserting four basic elements (fire, water, earth, and air), Empedocles differs 
from the monist Heraclitus (fire) but supports in principle his idea of the generative and 
destructive power of opposite forces in the cosmos. Rather than seeing that tension in 
every antithesis, however, Empedocles sees just one pair of opposing forces: the one 
tending to draw together and unite, the other to divide and separate. The unifying force he 
names as fili !a (“love, friendship”) or filovthV (“love, friendship”) under the influence of 
Aphrodite; the dividing force is e“cqra (“hatred, enmity”), neiæcoV (“strife”), or povlemoV 
(“war, fight, battle”) issuing from some sort of strife. The tendency to personify these 
forces of love and strife as gods recalls the mythology of Homer and Hesiod, but also 
supports the metaphorical understanding of war and peace within the cosmic tension of 
Heraclitus. However, Empedocles reverses the functions of war and peace. Heraclitus 
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views war as constructive and peace as destructive. Empedocles, however, considers war 
as the destructive force. He never identifies his constructive force as peace, but refers to it 
as friendship, a synonym for peace occurring as early as Homer. 
In summary, among the Presocratics war and peace are viewed at two levels: 
metaphorically as creative and destructive forces whose tension sustains the cosmos, and 
literally as two states of existence reflecting the stability and security of society. In the 
literal references to peace, the Presocratics recognize the pragmatic necessity of being 
able to live freely, practice one’s profession, and enjoy material and spiritual prosperity. 
They acknowledge the necessity of a just and orderly society to foster peace, and they 
describe that state in language recalling the paradise of the mythological Golden Age. 
Socratic Conceptions of Peace 
The Socratic period of philosophy redirects attention from the Presocratic interest 
in cosmic questions of the one and the many to the more personal questions of individual 
ethics, morals, and the greatest good. Inasmuch as humans are socially and economically 
interdependent, any consideration of personal ethics will necessarily involve the broader 
issue of the individual’s relationship to the community and the implications of individual 
behavior for the health and survivability of the community. The pervasiveness of this 
concern with community is evident in the extensive literature devoted to models and 
methods of governance and the requisite virtues, first for the individual and then for the 
state, to ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of the community.
142
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The Socratic period, generally the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.E., coincides with the 
Golden Age in Athens, the Peloponnesian War, and the troubled century that followed. 
This period marked a wearisome stretch of political turmoil in which the city-states failed 
to sustain peace. The philosophers tried to resolve the issues of human motivation and 
behavior at the individual level, as they tried to devise just laws and good government at 
the political level. Inasmuch as the philosophers that defined the Socratic period were 
Plato and Aristotle,
143
 this study will give primary consideration to their work. 
Plato’s Conceptions of Peace. 
Overwhelmingly, Plato refers to war and peace as alternative, mutually exclusive 
states of being, whether politically for the city-state or personally for the individual. This 
construct of war and peace reinforces the more general Greek conception from the earlier 
times and writers, but also allows for some nuancing of the qualitative nature of peace, 
and the means by which it may be secured and maintained. 
In Theaetetus Socrates and Theaetetus among others make a comparison of the 
lives of a lawyer (slavish) and a philosopher (free) as part of their larger discussion of 
knowledge and epistemology.
144
  Some philosophers like lawyers are always at war, 
                                                                                                                                            
and Xenophon’s Constitution of Sparta and Constitution of Athens (doubtful attribution). Even Herodotus 
included a discussion on the three types of governance (monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy) in his history 
of the Persian wars. Xenophon also wrote extensively about peace and peace-making in his histories, 
leaving a rich variety of vocabulary and idioms for peace with respect to Persian truces and treaties. 
143
 Socrates himself left no writings. Therefore, one cannot be sure whether Plato preserves the 
actual ideas of Socrates or uses him as the mouthpiece for his own ideas. This study will not attempt to 
distinguish all the voices of the Socratic period, but simply present a summary of the conceptions of peace 
from that era. 
144
 The specific references to peace are only three (Theaet. 172d5, 176a4, and 10b5), but taken 
together they provide considerable insight regarding Plato’s understanding of peace. 
93 
disputing ideas: the lawyer in pursuit of a victory in the courtroom and the philosopher in 
pursuit of truth. Neither can be at peace because both are driven by necessity imposed 
from the outside, not by their own choice. In that sense, both are slaves and the idea of 
slavery is incompatible with peace because of the external coercion, just as the idea of 
war is incompatible with peace because it allows no quiet, rest, or repose. Furthermore, 
war, or in this case the conflict of ideas, has a corrupting influence upon the character 
because of what the exigencies of the situation may force one to do in the pursuit of 
winning. Peace, however, arises from and is sustained by like-mindedness, that is, by 
holding the same convictions about truth, reality, and all that exists. 
This qualitative idea of peace as freedom from coercion comes out in Statesman 
as the unnamed philosopher from Elea
145
 suggests that peace in the city entails a quiet 
life, freedom to pursue one’s livelihood unhindered, and according the same to others.
146
  
Ironically, the visitor sees this as negative because such a life makes folks soft and thus 
susceptible to the enemy who is not committed to peace. Plato addresses this problem in 
Republic and Laws by designing the ideal city with a strong military, even in peacetime. 
In Symposium the three references to peace come in a speech by Agathon, the one 
in whose honor the symposium is held. His key contribution lies in his linking of ei!rhvnh 
(“peace”) and fili"a (“friendship”). Referring back to Hesiod’s description of heavenly 
violence among the early gods, Agathon asserts, “Not one of those violent deeds would 
have been—no castrations, no imprisonments—if Love [the god Eros] had been present 
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among them. There would have been peace [ei!rhvnh] and brotherhood [fili"a] instead.”147 
This inclusion of brotherhood or friendship as an element of peace anticipates Plato’s 
idea in Laws that an enemy can be eliminated and peace achieved in either of two ways: 
killing him or transforming him into a friend. Agathon’s reprise of Hesiod and the poetic 
paean to Eros suggest that the nostalgic, idealized conception of peace from a distant past 
is still present in the minds of people as a palpable, though unrealistic, emotional longing. 
In Menexenus Socrates recites to Menexenus a funeral oration, after the fashion of 
Pericles, in honor of the Athenian troops killed in the wars with Persia and with Sparta.
148
  
As might be expected the oration treats peace as the antithesis of war, but also highlights 
the history of tension between Athens and Sparta, emphasizing one of the nuances about 
peace, namely that it requires resolution of enmity, not just the cessation of warfare. 
Socrates initially comments on dying well in war and the honor accorded one who 
dies heroically regardless of one’s prior social status.
149
  He admits that he is emotionally 
transported by the exalted rhetoric of the euology and praise of the war dead. This annual 
oration in Athens functions much as the epics did centuries earlier: recalling the glorious 
deeds of the dead, recovering the heroic ethos—if only ceremonially, and maintaining 
continuity in Athens with the heroic militarism of the past. 
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Peace is the tranquility that comes to the city when the open warfare has ceased, 
but this peace does not necessarily restore normative relationships. Athens enjoyed peace 
after the war with Persia (barbarians), a worthy opponent whom they defeated. But their 
success generated jealousy and ill-will, so that they were then forced to fight with Sparta 
(fellow Greek speakers). To them they showed a measure of clemency. Athens spared the 
lives of Spartan leaders, sent them home rather than kill them, and ostensibly made peace 
with Sparta.
150
  However, although Athens had peace after the wars with Persia, they 
never did come to enduring peace with Sparta, for Sparta betrayed its Greek identity by 
allying itself with the barbarians to destroy Athens.
151
 
Socrates refers to another time when “tranquility reigned.” Athens was at peace 
with those all around, but torn by civil war within. Yet this war was resolved neither with 
the destruction of the enemy (Persia) nor with ineffective treaties (Sparta), but through 
friendship (fili!an) based upon kinship.152  In such a case citizens have an even greater 
responsibility to seek reconciliation with the living and the dead because they fought out 
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of misfortune, not wickedness or enmity. Socrates envisions prayers and sacrifices to the 
gods to effect reconciliation.
153
  The establishment of peace with friendship, both here 
and in the Odyssey,
154
 implies reconciliation along with a resolution of the enmity. 
In his two longer works, the Republic and the Laws, Plato explores peace as it 
pertains to the individual and to the society as a whole. Peace is for the most part the 
political state of concord within the community, the alternative state of existence to war. 
Peace is promoted by concord in values and attitudes within the community, but this 
concord can only be attained among individuals of a moderate, self-controlled, and 
courageous temperament. To live with this wise and rational balance, one must have 
inner peace, that is, a freedom from the tyranny of one’s own appetites and passions. So, 
a central concern for Plato is how one cultivates this inner peace. Plato’s whole structure 
of government and education is designed positively to train and negatively to restrain the 
citizens such that they live with this inner harmony that yields a peaceful community.
 
 At the beginning of his Republic Plato establishes a key point that passions create 
inner conflict.
155
  This idea derives from his view that the soul has three elements: mind, 
will, and emotion. He assigns a role to each: priority and ruling authority to the rational 
mind, support for the authority of the mind to the disciplined will, and cooperation with 
both the mind and the will to the emotion. For a soul to be just and therefore at peace, the 
three parts must fulfill their proper roles and not intrude on the prerogatives of another. 
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However, the emotion, that is, the passions driven by appetites, whether for sex, money, 
possessions, or power, create conflict with the mind and the will, trying to induce the will 
to betray the mind and support the appetites instead. Without resolving this inner conflict, 
no one can experience peace within the self or with others in the broader community. 
Plato sees the solution to this conflict as twofold: conditioning the temperament 
through education with music, and controlling the temperament through shame and fear 
with law. Music with its tone and rhythm can move a soul either toward war or toward 
peace.
156
 Similarly, laws will induce people to live at peace with one another because 
what the law forbids people will be ashamed to do, and if not ashamed, then they will 
fear the penalty imposed for their violations.
157
 
In the case of certain leaders a legally imposed communalism would also work in 
favor of peace by removing incentives to conflict. Possessing things in common would 
spare dissention, mutual accusations, and even lawsuits, that arise over money, family, 
children, and possessions.
158
  These are radical concepts to place before democratic 
Athens, but Plato’s goal is a city of peace, a city with enough food, clothing, shelter, 
prosperity and well-being that all the citizens will “live in peace and good health, and 
when they die at a ripe old age, they will bequeath a similar life to their children.”
159
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Aristotle’s Conceptions of Peace. 
The majority of Aristotle’s explicit references to peace occur in his treatises on 
politics and rhetoric. The first major element in the political process is deliberation and 
decision concerning matters of war and peace,
160
 and well-crafted, persuasive rhetoric is 
the means for carrying on the deliberation and arriving at a decision.
161
  In this context he 
treats peace simply as the alternative political state to war, so that, at any time, a political 
community is either at war or at peace. Peace is better, practically and philosophically, 
but peace is not the ultimate goal of the community. Peace is superior to war practically, 
because it promotes prosperity in business and productivity of the land,
162
 both being 
essential for happiness and well-being. Peace is also preferable philosophically, because 
it is more honorable than war. Yet, there is an even more honorable virtue than peace. 
In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that the happy life is one of excellence 
and such a life requires activity. Thus the greatest happiness (eujdaimoni!a “weal, well-
being, happiness”) lies in the activity that accords with the highest excellence (ajrethv 
“virtue”), and that most excellent activity is contemplation of the truth.
163
 “This activity 
alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the 
contemplating.”
164
  All other activities are valued more or less for what they produce 
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enroute to happiness, while contemplation is the end toward which all other activities 
move, for contemplation itself is happiness.
165
 
In the political community, the two major realms of activity are business and 
warfare. If one thinks that happiness consists of leisure, then one works intently at 
business in order to gain leisure. Similarly, if one thinks happiness resides in peace, then 
one wages war in order to gain the peace.
166
  However, neither leisure nor peace is 
ultimate, for they themselves serve the greatest good: both are necessary for the life of 
contemplation. Thus business and war are inferior to leisure and peace, and they in turn 
are inferior—absolutely requisite, but still inferior—to a life devoted to the contemplation 
of truth.
167
 
Aristotle gives considerable attention to the principle that wars are fought, not for 
their own sake, but to gain the peace, for the activities of peace are more honorable than 
the activities of making war. That is not to say the skills and activities of warfare become 
irrelevant once the peace has commenced. Those military skills necessary to win the war, 
as well as the virtues of courage, endurance, temperance, and justice, are also crucial to 
preserve the peace. Not only must the walls and gates continue to be defended, but the 
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citizens must be mustered and marshaled as well.
168
  More than that, however, these 
virtues must remain active and all the more influential upon the character of the citizens, 
lest the leisure, prosperity, and peace that follow the war, incline them to insolence or 
indolence, to the detriment of other virtues and pursuit of the life of contemplation.
169
 
From Aristotle’s perspective legislators need to frame their governments with this 
best end in view and provide their citizens with the necessary laws and education to live 
appropriately in times of peace. Such a life will recognize and pursue all the virtues.
170
  
The military states tend to falter at this point. They thrive in war because they excel in the 
skills and virtues of war, but they falter in peace because their legislators have failed to 
teach the citizens to lead the life of peace.
171
  Aristotle specifically warns against the error 
of the Spartans. Though they agree conceptually with the idea of seeking the greatest 
good, they mistakenly think they can achieve it simply by exercising themselves in their 
one virtue of waging war.
172
  Thus Aristotle clearly favors the Athenian approach and in 
his discussion of their constitution he provides one of the most poignant examples of 
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making a true peace, one that includes both the signing of a treaty to end the fighting and 
the reconciliation of the hostile parties to remove the enmity that precipitated the fighting. 
This is authentic peace that ends war, not some pretense that simply postpones war.
173
 
Aristotle’s first mention of peace in the Constitution of Athens occurs in reference 
to the Athenian Pisistratus, whose tyrannies (561, 559–556, 545–528 B.C.E.) were likened 
to the “Golden Age” when Cronos ruled. Pisistratus “cultivated peace” (ei !rhvnh) in 
Athens and kept the citizens “in all quietness” (hJsuci"a) on the strength of his personal 
character and wise leadership. Pisistratus was a humane, mild, and forgiving person, who 
spent lavishly from his personal funds to stimulate the economy, to make small business 
loans, and to minimize taxation.
174
  He wisely reduced the intrusion of government into 
the lives of the citizens, but did ensure that they had direct access to swift, capable justice 
whenever they had the need. The land was productive, the people were content, and the 
king was popular, not least because he even kept himself subject to the law. With 
Pisistratus Athens enjoyed civic and economic stability, material prosperity, and that 
sense of well-being that always attends true peace.
175
 
A century and a half later everything had changed. Sparta had defeated Athens in 
the Peloponnesian war, dismantled the democracy, and subjected the city to a brutal 
regime of thirty oligarchs, nicknamed the “Thirty Tyrants” for their reign of terror. They 
confiscated property, ignored or dispensed with the law, committed judicial murder, and 
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created such hostility toward the citizens that democratic sympathizers fled to Thebes and 
Piraeus rather than be killed. Eventually, the exiles with support from Thebes mounted a 
rebellion and deposed the Thirty Tyrants.
176
 
Thus Athens returned to democracy, but not yet to peace. Exiles outside the city 
still could not return. Oligarchs and their supporters inside Athens feared for their lives, 
just as any terrorist regime would. The city was in ruins, as many as 1500 influential 
citizens had died as victims of political purges, and resentment ran deep as the people 
sought vengeance against those who had perpetrated these atrocities in Athens. Tensions 
increased, so the democratic party appointed ten highly respected Athenians to address 
the situation. Two of them, Rhinon and Phayllus, began the process of reconciliation by 
initiating negotiations with the exiles in Piraeus.
177
 
However, it was not until Pausanias, the Spartan king, arrived with ten mediators 
that the treaty of reconciliation was finally enacted and its terms enforced. The treaty 
provided for the return of the exiles to Athens, the resettlement of the oligarchs and their 
sympathizers in Eleusis, an unprecedented general amnesty for all crimes, except capital 
crimes by the Thirty Tyrants and some others in the leadership circle, and the stipulation 
that each party must pay off its own war debts.
178
 
At least three aspects of this treaty stand out as dramatically different from other 
such treaties of its time. Aristotle praises these Athenians who suffered such outrageous 
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cruelty by the Spartan oligarchs and yet “behaved in the most unprecedentedly admirable 
and public-spirited ways with reference to the preceding troubles.”
179
 
First, the offended party initiated the reconciliation. Typically, the burden lay with 
the offending party to approach the offended party with conciliatory gifts or gestures to 
garner favor and be restored to good standing. Consider, for example, the length to which 
Agamemnon (offending party) extended himself to Achilles (offended party), in seeking 
reconciliation with Achilles.
180
  The Athenians did the opposite. Although they were both 
victor and offended party, they took the first steps toward reconciliation by opening the 
negotiations between the hostile parties. 
Second, the injured party yielded its right to retributive justice. By granting the 
amnesty, the Athenians released all but the most egregious offenders from culpability for 
their crimes. Essentially this meant that those who suffered the loss just had to absorb the 
loss themselves; they had no legal recourse for restitution. Apparently, this was more 
than one of the returning exiles could bear, because he violated the amnesty. The Council 
condemned the man to death without a trial as a deterrent to others that might be inclined 
to violate the amnesty or to test the resolve of the Council.
181
 
Third, and most dramatically, the defrauded party paid the war debts for the very 
ones who defrauded them. Although the treaty required that the deposed oligarchs repay 
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 This seems a radical step for Athens, a city-state that prided itself on justice, but Aristotle 
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Sparta for the money borrowed during the war, the Athenian people paid the debt from 
their own depleted state treasury. Aristotle continues his encomium to the Athenians: 
Not only did they blot out all memory of former offences, but they even repaid to 
the Lacedaemonians out of the public purse the money which the Thirty had 
borrowed for the war, although the treaty required each party, the party of the city 
and the party of Piraeus, to pay its own debts separately. They did this because 
they thought it was a necessary first step in the direction of restoring harmony 
[oJmonoi!aV “concord, harmony”]; but in other states, so far from the democratic 
parties making advances from their own possessions, they are rather in the habit 
of making a general redistribution of the land.
182
 
Taken together these three distinctives show the intent of the Athenians to secure 
a true and enduring peace by eliminating not only the physical conflict and fighting, but 
also the enmity that causes it. However, to accomplish all that, they had to undertake an 
unpopular, counter-cultural initiative with each distinctive. Within this Greek culture of 
glory, honor, and the heroic ideal, it is just not appropriate for the offended party to seek 
reconciliation with the offending party. Nor is it just or fitting that the injured party bear 
the loss without recompense, for the injured party is thereby deprived of what is due. 
Finally, when injury is financial and involves fraud, the defrauded party surely ought not 
to impoverish itself further by subsidizing the deceiver. However, that is exactly what the 
Athenians did to cultivate trust, like-mindedness, and friendship with former oppressors. 
They made peace in the only way that true peace can be achieved, that is, by transforming 
the enmity that divides to the friendship that unites. Nevertheless, this is no easy task and 
ultimately required over two years to implement fully.
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The Literature of Rome 
Despite the fact that Rome’s beginnings are roughly coincident with the earliest 
Olympic games and the writings of Homer (mid-8th c. B.C.E.),
184
 Latin literature did not 
begin until late in the Republic (mid-3rd c. B.C.E.).
185
 To that point Greece had been the 
dominant cultural force in the Mediterranean world and so most of the writing was done 
in Greek. All the literature represented Greek thought and reflected a Greek world view. 
While some early Latin inscriptions, songs, and legal materials still survive from the pre-
classical period, classical Latin literature begins to flourish in the 1st c. B.C.E. when the 
language is restructured with Attic (Classical) Greek as its prototype. The similarity of 
the languages facilitates the translation of Greek literary forms, as well as the literature 
itself, into Latin, and thus produces an incredible continuity in mythology, religion, 
education, and philosophy from Greece to Rome. By the New Testament period Rome 
has unified the Empire and adopted the Greco-Roman cultural tradition as the renewed 
lens for viewing and understanding the world. 
As a result of this unified cultural tradition, the Roman authors do not add much 
to the Greek conceptions of peace discussed previously. However, a brief survey of the 
writings of Virgil and Cicero will demonstrate how intentionally they appropriated Greek 
literary forms, the heroic ideal, and philosophic ideas, and then applied them to their own 
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context. In the process, they preserve and perpetuate the Greek conceptions of peace into 
the New Testament period. 
The Poetry of Virgil 
If Augustus was the architect of the Roman Empire, then Virgil was surely its 
poet laureate. His poem Aeneid intentionally mimics the epics of Homer and sets Rome’s 
history, character, and destiny in the legacy of the ancient Trojan hero Aeneas. The first 
six books of the Aeneid recount the heroic escape of Aeneas with his father and son from 
Troy as it is burning and then trace their adventures en route to Italy. The gods protect 
Aeneas and intervene, much as they did in the Odyssey, to ensure his safe arrival in Italy 
and his fulfillment of his destiny to found Rome. The last six books detail the intrigue 
and battles that Aeneas has to endure in order to establish his new home in Latium, unify 
the Trojan and Latin races, and secure the kingship in what will later become Rome. The 
battle scenes are vivid and violent, reminiscent of those in the Iliad, and the heroic ethos 
prevails as Aeneas defeats the Latin champion Turnus in their climactic battle. 
Aeneas personifies all of the most esteemed Roman qualities: faith, peace, honor, 
modesty, virtue, and plenty. Virgil intends to portray Augustus “as a new Aeneas with a 
thousand-year-old divine pedigree,” who will usher in a new Golden Age of peace and 
prosperity, and who will fulfill Rome’s destiny to rule the world.
186
  
Virgil had already anticipated this new age of peace and prosperity approximately 
two decades earlier in his Eclogues, where he foretells the birth of the child who will 
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usher in this glorious peace.
187
 While this passage is most noteworthy for its messianic 
allusions, the description of peace that follows is more relevant to this study. In this peace 
the untilled earth will produce its fruit, spices, and grain without danger from poison or 
thorn. Similarly, the flocks will graze freely without fear of lion or snake, and will return 
with udders full of milk. Even the wool of the sheep will take colors naturally and not 
require dyes. All lands will produce the same, a sufficiency for all, so that wars need not 
be fought, and even the plough animals will be released from the yoke.
188
 
In his portraits of peace, Virgil recapitulates the themes of Homer and Hesiod. 
Peace is the quiet and calm in the absence of war, but wars nevertheless must be fought to 
secure the peace. The future—though for Virgil, imminent—hope is for the return of the 
Golden Age when the earth sustains its people without the need for cultivation, when all 
are secure from any natural or human danger, when the sins of the past will be outgrown, 
and the world will get along in harmony with the gods, the self, nature, and others. 
The Prose of Cicero 
Cicero is best known for his political and forensic orations. Through them Cicero 
shaped and defined classical Latin and raised rhetoric to greater heights than any other 
Roman orator.
189
 Less well known, but no less significant, is the fact that during a hiatus 
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from political life Cicero translated the works of Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, and the 
Stoics into classical Latin. Inclined toward Stoicism himself, he promoted its virtues 
along with those of the other philosophical schools and brought into the Roman thought 
world the great treasures of Greek moral, ethical, political, and religious thought. 
Having lived through the most tumultuous period of civil war in Rome in more 
than three centuries, Cicero was certainly war-weary and not shy in his condemnation of 
war as “monstrous, like the actions of wild beasts.”
190
 His preference was clearly for an 
honorable peace: “In my opinion we should always plan for peace, peace which will 
involve no treachery.”
191
 Nevertheless, he did recognize the necessity for just war in the 
defense of Rome against an attacking enemy or in the punishment of wrong, and he saw 
just war as a means to peace. Negotiation was always preferable, but when that failed, 
recourse to war was justified.
192
 When fighting a war, Cicero makes the same qualitative 
distinction that the Greeks made between conflicts with insiders and those with outsiders. 
The former he considers as battles for control and rule, and they are to be fought with less 
bitterness. The latter are battles for existence and must be fought without reserve.
193
  
Apparently, Cicero was not opposed to Roman expansionism, for despite its faults 
Roman rule made “everlasting peace and tranquility” available to the surrounding nations 
                                                                                                                                            
language to create a style which nineteen centuries have not replaced, and in some respects have scarcely 
altered.  He stands in prose, like Virgil in poetry, as the bridge between the ancient and modern world.” 
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who paid their taxes.
194
 Nevertheless, he did maintain some ambivalence toward both war 
and peace, favoring the latter but accepting the inevitability of the former: “And I am not 
opposed to peace, but I fear war rolling upon us under the name of peace. So then, if we 
would enjoy peace, we must wage war; if we give up the war, we shall never enjoy 
peace.”
195
 Therefore, Cicero, the Roman politician, jurist, and philosopher, hardly departs 
from Aristotle’s dictum: “We make war that we may live in peace.”
196
 At the same time, 
however, the image of “war rolling upon us under the name of peace” also sounds like 
the bitter harangue against the onslaught of Imperial Rome and the so-called Pax Romana 
by Calagus, a Briton chieftain, nearly a century later: “to plunder, butcher, steal, these 
things they misname empire; they make a desolation and they call it peace.”
197
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a comprehensive study of Greco-Roman conceptions 
of peace from the earliest periods of Greek history through the first century of the Roman 
Empire. The most basic, most prevalent, most pragmatic conception of peace was as the 
antithesis of war. War was considered the normal state of relationship between nations or 
among the city-states, and periods of peace were viewed as an aberration, an interruption 
in the norm. Eventually, this normalization of conflict produced a history, mythology, 
religion, and philosophy that perpetuated the glory, necessity, and propriety of war. 
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This basic conception of peace as the opposite of war and conflict was refined in 
two directions. First, peace came to mean not only the absence of armed conflict, but also 
the elimination of the underlying enmity that created the conflict in the first place. It was 
not enough simply to end the violent, hostile, threatening behaviors that characterize open 
warfare, but the parties had to be reconciled as well. That is to say, the enmity that caused 
the conflict had to be fully resolved between them. Second, peace was defined positively 
as a thing in itself, not just negatively in terms of war. The idea of peace implied a calm, 
quiet, tranquil experience in five aspects of life: one’s relationship with the gods, with 
nature, with the inner self, with others belonging to one’s community (insiders), and with 
others not belonging to one’s community (outsiders). Being at peace meant that one had 
nothing to fear in any of these five relationships. More than that, peace meant that each 
relationship brought benefit and prosperity to one’s life, and that everything seemed to be 
as it should be. In the idealistic portrayal of peace, everyone enjoyed a utopian existence. 
They were favored, blessed, and prospered by the gods. Nature spontaneously produced 
the grains, fruit, and water necessary to feed everyone to satiety. There were no wild 
animals to fear, no weeds to pull, no inclement weather, and no threats from any enemy. 
Families remained intact and free from disease.  Aging and death were not painful or 
fearsome. In short, peace meant paradise. 
Unfortunately, however, experience never lived up to the ideal. Some attributed 
that inconsistency to the gods and mythological events and forces. Others saw it as a civil 
war in the soul, a power struggle between the mind, will, and emotion—a failure of the 
rational mind to control the other elements of the soul. The former sought a solution in 
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appeasement of the gods, oracles, omens, and signs in nature. The latter pursued change 
through the exercise of virtue, through education in the creative arts, through emulation 
of the heroes, and through contemplation of the highest good. Nevertheless, even in the 
periods of greatest cultural flowering, the ancient world was plagued by conflict, torn 
apart by war, and unable to overcome its causes or consequences. 
This chapter has also presented three models of conflict resolution from ancient 
literature representing alternative means for resolving enmity: the mediation of Nestor 
and Odysseus with Agamemnon and Achilles, the arbitration of Zeus with Odysseus and 
the kinsfolk of the suitors, and the mediation at Athens between the exiled Athenians and 
the Spartan oligarchs. The negotiation between Hesiod and his estranged brother was also 
mentioned but not explored in detail for lack of evidence. Hesiod’s basic approach was to 
reason his brother into remorse and restitution. The outcome was not clear. 
Against this background of Greco-Roman understandings of peace and examples 
of conflict resolution, this study now turns to Paul’s conceptions of peace and his solution 
to the dissonance between what is and what ought to be. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A PAULINE DEFINITION OF PEACE 
 
 
Though Paul uses the term ei!rhvnh (“peace”) in the salutation of all his letters, not 
one of them contains a succinct definition of peace.  Nevertheless, from his usage of the 
term in various contexts and his handling of relationships among believers, a distinctive 
Pauline conception of peace can be ascertained.  While Paul’s understanding of peace as 
the experience of security, contentment, tranquility, and felicity with respect to God, 
nature, self, and others did not differ substantially from other conceptions of peace in the 
Greco-Roman world, Paul’s ideas on the origin of peace, the basis for it, and the means 
of procuring and preserving it stood in sharp contrast to the common perspectives of his 
own day. 
This chapter will examine direct references to peace in the Pauline letters, as well 
as numerous indirect references that are implied by associated words and ideas without 
explicitly mentioning peace.  The intent is to set forth as full a statement as possible of 
Paul’s conception of peace, focusing particular attention on his tendency to link peace to 
the themes of justification (God’s gift of righteousness to all who will receive it by faith), 
reconciliation (God’s resolution of human enmity toward God and the establishment of 
an amicable relationship in its place), and glorification (Christ’s ultimate triumph and the 
resurrection of all believers). 
The main focus of the chapter is on Paul’s view of peace. The summary will 
compare Paul’s view with that of the Greco-Roman world to highlight their differences. 
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Direct References to Peace in the Pauline Epistles 
In the Pauline epistles the range of words sharing or derived from the root ei!rhn– 
(“peace”) is fairly narrow, consisting of only three: ei!rhvnh (“peace”), ei!rhneuvw (“I have 
peace, I am peaceful”), and ei!rhnopoievw (“I make peace”).  Of the three, the noun ei!rhvnh 
is used over ninety percent of the time (43 occurrences), while the two verbal forms 
barely occur at all (three times for ei!rhneuvw, but only once for ei!rhnopoievw).  Therefore, 
when Paul speaks of peace directly, he presents it as a state or condition, perhaps also as 
an abstract quality, but never as an action.  Even the verbal references reinforce the 
stative idea.  Peace is not something one does, but a state one seeks to establish (Rom 
12:18; cf. Col 1:20) or, having established it, a condition one seeks either to preserve or 
to recover whenever it may be lost (2 Cor 13:11; 1 Thess 5:13). 
These direct references to peace tend to occur within two broad contexts: either in 
the opening and closing formulations of the epistles or in the instruction, exhortation, and 
commands of the paranetic sections of the epistles. Both are considered in what follows. 
References to Peace in the Epistolary Openings and Closings 
Following a standard address (A to B) and salutation cai"rein (“greetings”),1 
ancient letters typically include the sender’s wish for the welfare and prosperity of the 
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114 
recipient(s).
2
 Paul modifies this traditional epistolary opening by expanding the address, 
rewording the greeting, and combining the greeting with a blessing for the congregation.  
Instead of the typical epistolary opening, A to B cai!rein (“greetings”), the Pauline letter 
expands the address A to B to include descriptive information about the sender(s), as well 
as some elaboration of the identity of the recipient(s).
3
 Paul also changes the standard 
greeting cai!rein (“greetings”) into a combination salutation/blessing as cavriV uJmiæn kai… 
eijrhvnh ajpo; qeou: patro;V hJmwÆn kai… kuri!ou =Ihsou: Cristou: (“grace to you and peace 
from God our father and the Lord Jesus Christ”), where cavriV (“grace”) puns cai!rein 
(“greetings”) and ei"rhvnh doubles as a Semitic greeting and blessing.4 The reason for 
                                                                                                                                                                               
of the greeting (cai !rein, 67). These alterations to the customary address and salutation indicate that these 
forms were not necessarily invariable and may thus account for Paul’s liberty to make his modifications. 
2
 Exler, Ancient Greek Letter, 101–111, considers these health wishes as initial phrases in the body 
of the letter. He does, however, cite a few examples where such wishes are combined with the greeting in 
the letter opening (64). John L. White, Light from Ancient Letters (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 
198–202, corroborates Exler’s findings but also adds that during the second and third century CE the health-
wish “was commonly written as a prayer, expressed especially as obeisance/supplication before the god(s) 
on the recipient’s behalf ” (201). Therefore, Paul’s adaptation of the greeting to include a blessing for the 
congregation did have a precedent of sorts in the ancient letters, but his reference to divinity and use of the 
blessing formula were clearly innovations that only caught on in secular letter writing a half-century or 
more after his death. 
3
 With the exception of the two Thessalonian epistles, which include only the names of the three 
senders (Paul, Sylvanus, and Timothy), the thirteen epistles attributed to Paul all expand the address by 
adding Paul’s title/authority as an apostle, his status as a prisoner, or even (as in Romans) his gospel and 
programmatic ministry strategy. Only in his letter to the Galatians, with whom he presumably has a strong 
personal relationship, does Paul limit his identity of the recipient to its simplest form: to the churches of 
Galatia. All other instances contain something about the recipient(s)’s spiritual identity, calling in Christ, or 
relationship with Paul. 
4
 This is the standard salutation in most of the Pauline letters (Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2; Gal 
1:3; Phil 1:2; Phlm 3; cf. Eph 1:2; 2 Thess 1:2).  However, the salutation is modified in the other letters. 
The salutation occurs in its most abbreviated form in 1 Thess 1:1 where the references to God and Jesus 
Christ are omitted: cavriV uJmiæn kai… eijrhvnh (“grace to you and peace”).  A slightly less abbreviated version 
in Col 1:2 mentions God, but not Jesus Christ: cavriV uJmiæn kai… eijrhvnh ajpo; qeou: patro;V hJmwÆn (“grace to 
you and peace from God our father”).  Both truncated versions are efforts to avoid awkward repetition of 
divine references in the preceding phrases. The variation in Titus 1:4 identifies Jesus as swth:roV (“Savior”) 
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Paul’s addition of ei!rhvnh (“peace”) to the salutation is explored below, but his use of 
peace in the form of a blessing provides insight to Paul’s basic conceptions about peace. 
Paul frames these salutations as blessings, that is, as implicit appeals to God to 
bestow peace upon the recipients of his letters. In so doing Paul acknowledges that peace 
has a divine source,
5
 whom he identifies as “our father” on the one hand and “the Lord 
Jesus Christ” on the other. Furthermore, inasmuch as peace originates with God, it can 
only come to someone from God and through God’s kindness and generosity. Therefore, 
Paul makes this appeal to God, the source, arbiter, and dispenser of peace, in order that 
his recipients may possess and experience peace as divine gift and blessing. 
This connection between peace and God’s blessing does not originate with Paul, 
but rather reflects the fundamental idea in Jewish religion and thought that peace is the 
blessing of God. The ancient priestly blessing, which Yahweh prescribes and guarantees, 
promises Yahweh’s protection, favor, and peace upon Israel (Num 6:22–27). To receive 
this blessing implies a favorable relationship with Yahweh and entitlement to all benefits 
that derive from that relationship. Such benefits constitute the blessings of the covenant 
and include protection from the enemy, progeny within the family, produce among the 
crops and livestock, prosperity in the Promised Land, and above all Yahweh’s presence 
                                                                                                                                                                               
rather than kuri "ou (“Lord”), and the two in Timothy (1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2) change the word order a little 
and add mercy to grace and peace: cavriV e[leoV kai… eijrhvnh ajpo; qeou: patro;V kai… Cristou: =Ihsou: 
kuri "ou: hJmwÆn (“grace, mercy, and peace from God the Father and Christ Jesus our Lord”). 
5
 The prepositional phrase ajpo; qeou: (“from God”) covers the nuances both of source (having its 
origin in God) and of separation (coming from God to humanity), BDAG, s.v. ajpov. The ideas of source, 
origin, and separation are closely related in Greek not only explicitly in expressions with the prepositions 
ajpov (“from, away from”) and ejk (“from, out of, out from”), but also implicitly by the genitive case alone. 
Further discussion follows below with consideration of the expression hJ ei!rhvnh tou: qeou: (Phil 4:7). 
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with the people (Deut 28:1–14). All of these blessings collectively are embraced by the 
single word MwølDv (sûaœlo®m, “peace”), so the promise of peace in the land entails necessary 
weather conditions for a productive harvest, an abundance of food, security from threat of 
war or savage beasts, the assurance of victory over enemies, favorable increases in the 
population, and Yahweh’s faithfulness and presence with the people (Lev 26:3–13). 
In addition to these broad, categorical connections with covenant blessings, peace 
also implies personal well-being, such as the safety and security that allows for blissful 
sleep (Ps 4:8; MT 4:9), the health that leads to long life (Gen 15:15), moral uprightness 
that promotes inner tranquility (Ps 38:3; MT 38:4),
6
 and peace of mind (Isa 26:3). Such a 
comprehensive idea of blessing and peace, touching as it does every aspect of health and 
prosperity in life, becomes the natural question to ask upon meeting someone as a general 
inquiry into one’s well-being. Therefore, “to ask with respect to one’s peace” is to greet 
someone (Judg 18:15; 1 Sam 10:4; 25:5; 30:21; 2 Sam 8:10; 11:7), while JKDl MwølDv (sûaœlo®m 
laœk!/ei !rhvnh soi, “peace to you”) is the greeting itself (Judg 19:20). The greeting may be 
truncated simply to MwølDv (sûaœlo®m/ei!rhvnh, “peace!”) implying either that one has come in 
peace or that one welcomes a visitor (1 Sam 16:4–5) depending on who speaks.
7
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 This curious turn of phrase, “no peace within one’s bones” because of sin, is actually a negative 
example of the relationship between righteousness and inner peace. In this context, peace metaphorically 
refers to physical health or wholeness, which is forfeited because of sin. The psalmist experiences a sense 
of inner turmoil—perhaps even a psychosomatic relationship between the effects of sin and one’s health—
as a result of being subject to God’s anger and wrath: a clear reference to the alienation from the self as the 
result of sin. This theme occurs elsewhere as well (Ps 32:1–5; 34:14; Isa 48:22), underscoring the necessity 
of being in right relationship with God to experience blessing and peace (Ps 85:10; Isa 32:17). 
7
 The greeting, often with an interrogative prefix MwølDvSh (h"sûaœlo®m), may also imply the question 
whether everything is all right (2 Sam 18:32; 2 Kings 4:26; cf. 2 Kings 4:23; 5:21). 
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Beyond these associations with blessing and verbal greeting in Hebrew scripture, 
references to peace also occur as written greetings in three official state documents: two 
letters (Ezra 4:17; 5:7) and a royal decree (Dan 4:1; MT 3:31). These uses of peace as a 
greeting in formal correspondence are especially noteworthy as they provide a possible 
precedent for Paul’s inclusion of peace in his modifications to the standard Greek letter 
opening.
8
 However, the three documents are written in Aramaic and reflect a Semitic, 
rather than Greco-Roman, epistolary tradition. Furthermore, they were written several 
centuries prior to Paul and the establishment of the letter-writing conventions of his day. 
Consequently, the validity of these texts as a precedent for Paul is questionable.
9
 
Nevertheless, the association of peace with blessing, or more precisely, peace as 
the blessing of Yahweh, and the established use of peace as a standard verbal and written 
greeting throughout Israel’s past cannot be denied. Having come from that tradition, Paul 
would have considered the identity of peace with covenant blessing as a commonplace 
and would have understood how essential the idea of peace was to Jewish life and culture 
from the national/religious identity as God’s covenant people to the daily routines of 
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 Judith M. Lieu, “‘Grace to You and Peace’: The Apostolic Greeting,” Bulletin of the John 
Rylands Library 68 (1985), 164–67, credits Tertullian for this observation. However, she cautions that the 
paucity of extant Hebrew and Aramaic letters, as well as their diverse geographical provenance, makes any 
comparisons with Greek letter conventions uncertain and imprecise. The biblical letters provide “a special 
aspect of the problem; the letters in the historical books of Samuel, Kings and Chronicles give the purport 
without the epistolary framework, while the Aramaic letters included in Ezra only in part conform to the 
non-Biblical patterns of the period” (164–65). 
9
 Lieu, “Apostolic Greeting,” 167, observes that when writing in Aramaic or Hebrew, Jews would 
follow Semitic patterns, but when writing in Greek, they would follow Greek conventions. On the basis of 
her extensive survey of biblical and non-biblical correspondence throughout the Persian and Hellenistic 
periods, she concludes, “If it seems probable that many Jews were practically bilingual, then it must also be 
recognised that this implies the knowledge of two sets of conventions as well as two languages.” 
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social intercourse in family, business, and governmental contexts. Therefore, without 
necessarily exhibiting direct dependence on specific scriptural texts, Paul draws upon his 
Jewish heritage for his conceptions of peace, particularly in locating its origin with God 
and in seeing it as a blessing from God. 
Just as Paul’s introductory blessing formula identifies God as the source of peace, 
so also it implies that the peace has a divine imprint on it. The peace that is from God has 
a divine quality about it because it is an expression or manifestation of the divine nature. 
Paul refers to hJ ei!rhvnh tou: qeou: (“the peace of God,” Phil 4:7) allowing the ambiguity 
of the genitive to embrace both the ideas that peace originates in God (genitive of source) 
and that this peace is distinctive because of its divine quality (attributive genitive).
10
 This 
idea that peace is inherent in the divine nature receives further expression as the genitive 
phrase is reversed to oJ qeo;ß th:ß ei!rhvnhß (“the God of peace,” Phil 4:9).11 Here again, the 
multiple nuances of the genitive case enable Paul in one short phrase to express several 
facets of his understanding of God and peace. 
With peace functioning as the attributive genitive, peace becomes an essential 
attribute ascribed to God. God is described not merely as qualitatively peaceful, but as 
                                                           
10
 In the classical period genitives of source, origin, relationship, and separation were expressed 
using the case alone. However, by the Koine period genitives of source, origin, and separation had for the 
most part been supplanted by ajpov and ejk. Nevertheless, examples without the prepositions did persist and 
the nuances of source, origin, and separation for the regular genitive continued into the NT era. See Smyth, 
§§1289–96, 1392, 1410; BDF, §§162, 180; and GGBB, 107–10. Similarly, attributive genitives specify a 
quality of the head noun as though it were an adjective instead of a genitive noun. This reflects the Hebrew 
usage of nouns in a construct chain instead of adjectives (Smyth, §1320; BDF, §165; GGBB, 86–88). 
11
 Paul employs this phrase or its equivalent with several other genitives, each of which represents 
a characteristic applied to God: elsewhere with peace (Rom 15:33; 16:20; 2 Cor 13:11; 1 Thess 5:23; cf. 
1 Cor 14:33; 2 Thess 3:16), with love (2 Cor 13:11), with hope (Rom 15:13), with comfort/encouragement 
(2 Cor 1:3). 
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one whose essence is peace. Peace is thus a defining and distinguishing characteristic of 
God. It would not go beyond Paul to say that without peace God would cease to be God, 
for in Paul’s Jewish heritage God was not merely peaceful, or peacemaker, or giver of 
peace, but peace itself.
12
 Therefore, the expression “the God of peace” means that peace 
is essential to the nature of God. 
However, this idea does not exhaust the nuance of that genitive phrase. For “the 
God of peace” also characterizes God as the one who produces peace.
13
 Because peace is 
in the nature of God, the activity of God will produce peace, even as the inner workings 
of the apple tree produce apples. Thus Paul can say that the fruit of the Spirit is peace 
(Gal 5:22).
14
 Inasmuch as the presence of God implies the peace of God and vice versa, 
Paul can affirm for the Philippians that through their prayers, their meditation on truth, 
purity, and virtue, and their living in accordance with the example and teaching of Paul, 
they will experience both the peace and the presence of God (Phil 4:6–9). 
                                                           
12
 This is nowhere more poignantly reflected than in Gideon’s theophany. Yahweh greets Gideon 
with the familiar ÔKVl MwølDv (sûaœlo®m l§k !aœ/ei !rhvnh soi, “peace to you”), and Gideon responds by building an 
altar that he calls MwølDv hDwh!y (yhwh sûaœlo®m, “Yahweh is peace,” Judg 6:23–24). Cf. Eph 2:14 for a similar 
identification where Christ is not only the sacrifice that makes peace, but he himself is peace. 
13
 GGBB, 106–107, lists “Genitive of Product” as a functional category similar to the objective 
genitive in which the head noun (in this instance, God) produces whatever is contained in the genitive noun 
(in this instance, peace). This is not a standard category in older grammars, but it does make good sense. 
Wallace illustrates the genitive of product using several of the Pauline examples mentioned above: the God 
of hope (Rom 15:13), the God of love (2 Cor 13:11), and the God of patience (Rom 15:5). Furthermore, the 
category is a refinement of the “Attributive Genitive.” The attributive genitive can be ambiguous between 
an active and passive nuance: the God of encouragement could be either the encouraging God (active: the 
God who encourages) or the encouraged God (passive: the God who is encouraged). This same ambiguity 
occurs in the subjective and objective genitives, where one has to decide whether the genitive substantive is 
doing (subjective) or receiving (objective) the action implied by the head noun. The Genitive of Product 
implies that the God of peace is the God who produces peace. 
14
 Cf. 2 Thess 3:16 where the Thessalonians are assured not only that the Lord will be with them, 
but that this one, the very Lord of peace who is with them, will also give them peace. 
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One additional implication of Paul’s use of the initial peace blessing/benediction 
in his letters deserves particular attention. While Paul distinguishes the Father from the 
Lord Jesus Christ, he acknowledges them equally as the source and conveyer of peace. 
Because they share the divine nature in which peace is an attribute, together they are the 
source of peace, and because they work in concert, together they convey that peace to the 
believers. Therefore, in these epistolary peace blessings, Paul presents God and Jesus as 
personally distinct, but functionally united. Elsewhere, however, Paul also differentiates 
them functionally, both broadly in cosmic terms and more narrowly in their roles in the 
peacemaking process. In the most general terms, Paul characterizes the role of the Father 
as source and the role of the Lord as intermediary agent. He juxtaposes the two roles in 
1 Cor 8:6 where God is oJ path;r e!x ou| ta˝ pa"nta (“the Father from whom are all 
things”) and the Lord is =Ihsou:ß Cristo;ß di= ou| ta˝ pa"nta (“Jesus Christ through whom 
are all things”). The breadth of Paul’s statement can better be appreciated as one realizes 
that Paul’s audience would not have understood ta˝ pa"nta merely as the myriad of things 
that exist, but rather as the totality of all that exists, the universe, the cosmos.
15
 Therefore, 
when focusing on the distinction of the roles across the broadest context, Paul separates 
source and agency and assigns them to the Father and Jesus Christ respectively.
16
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 LSJ, s.v. pa:V (B.II; D.III.b), shows that with the article, the neuter singular or plural forms can 
function as a substantive referring to the whole, the totality of all its parts, which in a philosophical context 
can denote the universe. 
16
 These distinctions bear an additional comment with respect to Paul’s christology. Although Paul 
clearly recognizes God as the Father of Jesus Christ (Rom 15:6; 2 Cor 1:3; 11:31; cf. Eph 1:3; Col 1:3) and 
Jesus as the Son of God (Rom 5:10; 8:3; 1 Cor 1:9; 2 Cor 1:19; Gal 2:20; cf. Eph 4:13), he never refers to 
them together using their respective familial titles of Father and Son, except for an oblique reference in Gal 
4:6. Paul seems to employ the titles of Lord and Christ in projecting the universal worship, acclaim, and 
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In the narrower context of peacemaking, Paul maintains that same separation of 
roles. Speaking about the new creation, Paul asserts that ta˝ pa!nta e "k tou: qeou: (“all 
things are from God”), where ta˝ pa!nta again denotes the new/renewed universe in its 
entirety, the whole of the new creation (2 Cor 5:17–18).  He further specifies that God is 
tou: katalla!xantoß hJmaÇß eÔautw/Ç dia˝ Cristou: (“the one who reconciled us to himself 
through Christ”). Thus God is the source and initiator of reconciliation,
17
 while Christ is 
the agent through whom God works. Paul is even more emphatic about the agency of 
Christ in Rom 5. He begins with the direct statement that we have peace with God dia˝ 
tou: kuri#ou hJmwÇn =Ihsou: Cristou: (“through our Lord Jesus Christ,” 5:1) and then 
stacks diav upon diav in detailing the role of Christ in reconciliation: salvation from God’s 
wrath through him (v. 9); reconciliation to God through his death (v. 10); rejoicing in 
God and receiving reconciliation through Jesus Christ (v. 11); grace, righteousness, and 
life through Jesus Christ (v. 17); and eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord (v. 21). 
Therefore, both the form and substance of the peace blessing/benediction at the 
opening of Paul’s letters provide crucial insights into Paul’s understanding of peace. His 
                                                                                                                                                                               
supremacy that will ultimately belong to Jesus (Phil 2:10–11; 1 Cor 15:27), but he reserves the language of 
Father and Son for the deference Jesus will show to God when, having defeated all his enemies and having 
secured all power and authority, he hands the kingdom over to the Father (1 Cor 15:24, 28). 
17
 Stanley E. Porter, !"#"$$!%%& in Ancient Greek Literature, with Reference to the Pauline 
Writings, Estudios De Filologia Neotestamentaria, edited by Juan Mateos (Cordoba: Ediciones El 
Almendro, 1994), 15–16, confirms that “Paul uses katallavssw in the active voice with the offended and 
hence angered party in a relationship (i.e., God) as (grammatical) subject taking the initiative in effecting 
reconciliation between himself and the offending party.” Porter’s work follows that of I. Howard Marshall, 
“The Meaning of Reconciliation,” Unity and Diversity in NT Theology, ed. R. A. Guelich (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1978), 121–22, who suggests that grammatical uses of katallavssw by Paul are distinctively 
his and “strongly suggest that it is God who takes the initiative in the act of reconciliation,” and that it is 
“primarily something done by God” that we receive from God. 
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use of the blessing formula links Paul to the ancient tradition in Judaism that associates 
peace with the blessing of God and then considers peace to be the very blessing itself. 
That blessing of peace, then for Israel and now for Paul’s churches, affects every aspect 
of personal and communal life including relationship with God, productivity, prosperity, 
personal health, safety, and the welfare and integrity of families across the generations. 
The blessing conveys Paul’s conviction that peace is an essential attribute of the divine 
nature and thus God is the source and giver of peace. The Father and the Lord work 
together in securing peace for humanity: God initiates the peace by reconciling the world 
to himself and Jesus Christ participates through his death and resurrection. 
These same insights to Paul’s concept of peace are reiterated and reinforced by 
the peace blessings/benedictions that conclude several of the epistles. Even as the ancient 
letters follow particular conventions for their openings, so too they manifest identifiable 
patterns in their closings. While the closings exhibit a wider range of more or less formal 
elements than the openings, three in particular stand out for their consistency in form and 
their frequency of occurrence: greetings, health wish, and final wish.
18
 
Ancient letters routinely identify the addressee and have an appropriate greeting 
in the opening, but they may also feature some additional greetings in the closing, usually 
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 The explanation of these elements follows Harry Gamble, Jr., The Textual History of the Letter 
to the Romans: A Study in Textual and Literary Criticism, Studies and Documents 42, ed. Irving Alan 
Sparks (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1977), 57–73. Exler, Ancient Greek Letter, 69–77, undertook 
the initial work of identifying and categorizing closing formulas. His work was refined by White, Ancient 
Letters, 198–203, who analyzed the openings and closings together and discovered various conventions in 
which certain elements of the openings were paired with particular elements in the closings. He identified 
characteristic phrases associated with particular historical periods and traced the stages of development of 
the more elaborate health wish from the simplicity of the standard final wish. 
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directed to the family or friends of the addressee. This concluding greeting tends to be a 
later development and does not occur with any regularity until the first century. However, 
Paul routinely includes final greetings
19
 and uses them with great effect, particularly in 
Romans, to maintain contact and strengthen personal relationships with and among the 
broader community of believers. 
Every greeting contains an implicit appeal and impetus toward peace. The words 
and gestures involved in conveying the greeting require an initiative of communication, 
friendship, and intimacy. Furthermore, a greeting is a means of acknowledging and even 
honoring someone.
20
 Three types of greeting appear in Pauline epistles, corresponding to 
the three persons of the verb.
21
 In the first person, the writer greets someone: a˙spa!zomai 
uJmaÇß e"gw˝ Te #rtioß oJ gra!yaß th;n e"pistolh;n e"n kuri#w/ (“I, Tertius, who wrote this 
letter greet you in the Lord,” Rom 16:22). In the second person, the writer directs the 
addressee(s) to greet someone else on the writer’s behalf: a˙spa!sasqe Mari#an, h{tiß 
polla˝ e"kopi#asen ei"ß uJmaÇß (“Greet Mary, who has worked so hard for you,” Rom 16:6). 
In the third person, the writer is conveying the greeting of a third party to the addressee(s) 
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 Among the epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul, only Galatians, Ephesians, and 1 Timothy lack 
an explicit final greeting, that is, a greeting using some form of ajspavzomai. However, insofar as a typical 
concluding greeting may consist of embracing, kissing, and the wishing of peace, one could argue that 
Galatians (ei "rhvnh e"p= aujtou;ß kai… e“leoß, “peace and mercy be upon them,” 6:16) and Ephesians (ei "rhvnh 
toiæß a˙delfoiæß, “peace be to the brothers,” 6:23) likewise include a final greeting—an actual greeting rather 
than a request to greet someone(s) on behalf of the writer, which is often the force of ajspavzomai. 
20
 TDNT, I:498–99. 
21
 Terence Y. Mullins, “Greeting as a New Testament Form,” Journal of Biblical Literature 87 
(1968), 418–22, identifies these three types and offers a brief description of each. His categories provide 
the framework for the following discussion of closing greetings. 
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and any others that may be specified: a˙spa!zontai uJmaÇß oiÔ su;n e"moi… a˙delfoi# (“the 
brothers with me greet you,” Phil 4:21). 
While each type of greeting honors those who are publicly named in the greeting, 
the second-person form, honors both the one greeted and the one who passes the greeting 
along in behalf of the writer. The one being greeted is doubly honored: first, by virtue of 
being publicly named, and second, by being specifically commended for some attribute 
or service rendered. In this respect, the second-person form is like a mini-commendation 
from the writer to the broader congregation concerning the one being greeted. Paul does 
this numerous times by adding a phrase to explain why the person he names for greeting 
ought to be esteemed.
22
 In the example from Rom 16:6, Mary merits the admiration of 
the churches because of her arduous work on their behalf. However, in the second-person 
greeting, it is not just the one being greeted who receives honor. The writer also honors 
the surrogate greeter by publicly entrusting the greeter to act as the writer’s agent in 
fulfilling the social custom of the greeting. Typically, the agent would be an individual, 
but Paul tasks the whole congregation to extend his greetings.  Therefore, this honoring 
of both congregation and individual signifies greater cordiality between the writer and the 
addressees, and “indicates a series of close and friendly bonds.”
23
 
The pragmatic value of the greeting for peacemaking is that one cannot extend a 
genuine greeting and harbor enmity at the same time. The cordiality, friendship, and even 
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 In Rom 16 Paul sends a dozen second-person greetings with an explanatory phrase or clause 
attached to the identity of those to be greeted. This is the only letter in which Paul sends a second-person 
greeting with the elaborating phrase. 
23
 Mullins, “Greeting,” 420. 
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intimacy inherent in the rituals of greeting completely contradict the “rules” for pursuing 
a public campaign of social or political enmity. The classic pattern for a failed friendship 
leading to the formal declaration of enmity included a public renunciation of friendship, 
exclusion from one’s home and hospitality, and the suspension of all social relations, 
even to the extent of not speaking to each other, making eye contact, or in any other way 
acknowledging the existence of the other.
24
 Therefore, Paul’s injunction to greet others in 
his behalf was, on the positive side, a stimulus to honor one another, to show appropriate 
deference, to promote genuine affection, and to strengthen bonds of fellowship within an 
individual community and among all his churches (Rom 16:16; 1 Thess 5:26). However, 
in a strained situation, Paul’s mandate to greet others could also have contained a more 
coercive nuance, punctuating ever-so-gently his forthright directives to restore things to 
proper order, that is, to restore peaceful relationships (2 Cor 13:11–12). 
Paul’s strategic use of the concluding greeting to promote relationships with and 
among the churches underscores his conviction that peace cannot sustain itself amid 
hostility. The hostility must be removed to make a way for peace. The opening peace 
blessing/benediction views peace in its vertical dimension: the enmity that exists between 
God and humanity because of sin is removed through the death of Jesus. Thus the way is 
open for reconciliation and peace with God. Similarly, the concluding greeting views 
peace in its horizontal dimension: inasmuch as enmity with God has been removed, the 
way is also open for reconciliation and peace with one another. Therefore, believers are 
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 Epstein, Enmity, 3–5. This theme of enmity will be developed more fully below. 
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to cultivate and maintain peace by responding to one another in humility, by honoring 
one another for their service to God and to the gospel, and by receiving one another 
warmly and cordially—all of which follows a genuine exchange of greetings. 
The second element of the closing that provides further insight into Paul’s view of 
peace is the health wish. Like the greeting, the health wish may occur in the opening as 
well as the closing of ancient letters. Regardless of placement the health wish expresses 
the sender’s desire for the health and well-being of the recipient of the letter. Just as Paul 
modifies the opening address and salutation to form a combined greeting/blessing for the 
congregation, he also transforms the closing health wish into a blessing as well. It is not 
unexpected that Paul would make his closing health wish a peace blessing because peace 
encompasses every aspect of one’s health and well-being. However, certain features of 
the closing blessing do contrast with Paul’s opening blessing/benediction. 
First, only seven of the thirteen letters traditionally ascribed to Paul have a closing 
peace statement at all. This rate (just over half) may seem low, but it compares favorably 
to the percentage of ancient letters that contain closing health wishes.
25
 Second, of those 
seven letters with a closing peace statement, four contain what may be considered actual 
peace blessings, that is, peace blessings with a traditional blessing/benediction formula.
26
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 Five undisputed letters (Romans, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, and 1 Thessalonians) 
and two disputed letters (2 Thessalonians and Ephesians) contain references to peace in statements near the 
end of the letter that might be considered as peace blessings. Romans has three such statements, while the 
other each have one. By way of comparison, all thirteen of the letters have the typical Pauline opening 
blessing/benediction (ca !riß uJmiæn kai… ei"rhvnh . . .) or some minor variant of it. 
26
 Traditionally, there are three forms of blessing/benediction in Hebrew scripture. First, the fullest 
form includes a reference to the one who blesses, a volitional form of the verb “bless” (Krb/eujlogevw), and 
a reference to the one blessed: hDwh !y ÔKVk®rDb !y / eujloghvsai se kuvrioß (“May Yahweh [the LORD] bless you,” 
127 
In those four letters, there are five examples of peace blessings: Rom 15:13; 15:33; Gal 
6:16; Eph 6:23; and 2 Thess 3:16.
27
 Finally, these five peace blessings bestow peace in 
two different ways. Four of them impart peace directly to the believers. God gives or fills 
them with peace (Rom 15:13; 2 Thess 3:16) or peace itself is to be their possession (Gal 
6:16; Eph 6:23). The fifth blessing imparts peace indirectly by focusing on the presence 
of God (Rom 15:33). Instead of mentioning peace directly, Paul wishes for the believers 
the presence of God. However, this blessing is in no respects inferior to the four direct 
peace blessings, because from Paul’s perspective the presence of God and the experience 
of peace are necessarily concomitant. 
The closing peace blessings express even more plainly than his opening blessings 
Paul’s conviction that peace not only comes from God but also depends on God’s active 
bestowal of it: +O de… qeo;ß th:ß e!lpi "doß plhrw #sai uJmaÇß pa#shß caraÇß kai… ei!rhvnhß 
(“Now, may the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace,” Rom 16:13). The use of the 
optative verb with God as subject leaves no doubt either that Paul desires the believers in 
Rome to enjoy as full an experience of peace as possible, or that God must act if they are 
to experience peace at all. Only God can give them that peace (cf. 2 Thess 3:16). At the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Num 6:24). Second, an alternative form is to substitute some other verb of impartation for the verb “bless” 
and include a reference to what is imparted: ÔKy®rDb !;d_tRa hÎwh "y MéqÎy / kuvrioß sthvsai to;n lovgon sou (“May 
Yahweh [the LORD] establish your word,” Jer 28:6 [LXX 35:6]). In these first two forms the Hebrew verb 
is jussive and the Greek verb is optative. Finally, the third form occurs as a volitional predication with the 
thing to be granted as the subject, an implied form of the verb “be,” and the recipient of the blessing as the 
subject complement: lEa#rVcˆy_lAo MwølDv / ei !rhvnh e!pi… to;n Israhl (“May peace [be] upon Israel,” Ps 128:6 
[LXX 127:6]). 
27
 None of the Pauline peace blessing/benedictions follow the first pattern with the volitional form 
of eujlogevw. Two blessings follow the second pattern with an alternative volitional verb of impartation and 
an object imparted (Rom 15:13; 2 Thess 3:16), and three blessings follow the third pattern in that they are 
volitional lacking an expressed verb (Rom 15:33; Gal 6:16; Eph 6:23). 
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same time, the peace is not granted in a vacuum but is linked to their faith. God fills them 
with joy and peace e !n tw/Ç pisteuvein (“as you believe,” Rom 16:13; cf. Rom 5:1). 
Paul deeply desires that all believers possess and experience peace. The verbless 
blessing/benediction formula reiterates both the intensity of his desire and the reality of 
their experience: ei!rhvnh e !p= aujtou;ß (“May peace be upon them,” Gal 6:16). Similarly, 
with its use of the dative of possession (ei !rhvnh toiæß a˙delfoiæß kai… ajgavph, literally “may 
peace and love be to the brothers”) and its restyling of the Pauline opening, Eph 6:23 
emphasizes the possession of peace, not as a material object, but as the experience of 
faith (meta˝ pi"stewß, “with faith”), and reaffirms that the Father and the Lord together are 
the source and providers of peace (a˙po; qeou: patro;ß kai… kuri"ou =Ihsou: Cristou:, 
“from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ”). 
Inasmuch as peace has its origin in God and comes to the believer through the 
agency of Jesus Christ, Paul can bless the Roman believers just as effectively by wishing 
them the presence of God as by blessing them with the peace itself (Rom 15:33). Peace 
and the presence of God are so intimately connected for Paul that he can urge conflicted 
Corinthians to live peacefully with one another and in so doing be certain that oJ qeo;ß th:ß 
a˙ga #phß kai… ei!rhvnhß e“stai meq= uJmwÇn (“the God of love and peace will be with you,” 
2 Cor 13:11). Thus what Paul expresses elsewhere in the volitional form of a blessing, 
namely, his sincerest desire that the churches possess and experience the fullness of peace 
in their community life, he promises here with the assurance of an indicative guarantee.  
Like the volitional blessing, the indicative promise works reciprocally as well. 
Paul can affirm with certainty both that the peace of God will protect the believers (Phil 
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4:7) and that the God of peace will be with them (Phil 4:9). The experience of peace is 
dependent upon the presence of God, and the presence of God must always result in the 
manifestation of the peace of God. The two cannot be separated, and so Paul desires and 
insists that believers know peace both as their possession in Christ and their experience in 
community. 
Finally, in addition to some closing greetings and a health wish, the ancient letters 
conclude with a final wish. Typically, this consists of a brief word of farewell ( e[rwsso) 
or good fortune (eujtuvcei) and “is so ubiquitous as to appear essential for the construction 
of the letter conclusion.”
28
 However, as he does with other elements of epistolary form, 
Paul adapts this one to his own purposes as well: he transforms it into a grace blessing. 
Unlike the closing peace blessing, which varies considerably from the opening blessing 
in style, wording, and frequency, Paul’s grace blessings are remarkably consistent in their 
style and wording. Furthermore, they occur in all the letters associated with Paul, as do 
the initial grace-peace blessings, with only minor variations.
29
 
Although these final grace blessings do not say anything specifically about peace, 
they do form a rhetorical structure that shows the over-arching significance of grace and 
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 Gamble, Textual History of Romans, 58. 
29
 All of the opening grace-peace blessings begin with ca !riß uJmiæn kai… ei"rhvnh (“grace to you and 
peace”) with the exception of the three pastoral epistles, which show minor variations: ca !riß e“leoß ei"rhvnh 
(“grace, mercy, peace,” twice in Timothy) and ca !riß kai… ei "rhvnh (“grace and peace,” in Titus). The closing 
grace blessings begin either with hJ ca !riß tou: kuri#ou (hJmwÆn) =Ihsou: (“the grace of the/our Lord Jesus”) 
in the undisputed letters and 2 Thessalonians or simply with hJ ca !riß (“the grace”) in the remaining letters. 
All the closing grace blessings conclude with meq= uJmwÇn (“with you”), meta˝ pa !ntwn uJmwÇn (“with you 
all”), or meta˝ tou: pneuvmatoß uJmwÇn (“with your spirit”) except for the slight modification in Ephesians: 
meta˝ pa !ntwn twÇn a˙gapw !ntwn to;n kuvrion hJmwÇn =Ihsou:n Cristo;n e"n a˙fqarsi #a/ (“with all who love 
our Lord Jesus Christ with an undying love”). 
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peace in Paul’s understanding of community life in Christ. All of the letters associated 
with Paul begin with a combined greeting and blessing paralleling the initial greeting and 
health wish in ancient letters. Using the rhetorical device paronomasia, a pun or play on 
words that sound alike, Paul changes the standard epistolary greeting from cai!rein to 
cavriV, thereby drawing attention to the word and theme of grace. Similarly, all the letters 
conclude with a grace blessing that parallels the final wish in the ancient letters. Thus all 
the letters associated with Paul begin and end with their focus on the grace of God. This 
repetition of the word cavriV in a blessing formula creates an inclusio, that is, a rhetorical 
structure framing the whole letter within the theme of grace. Therefore, all that the letter 
says—both literally and metaphorically—is encapsulated in grace, thereby establishing 
grace as a major Pauline theme.
30
 
The second element in the standard Pauline salutation is the peace blessing, so 
that all the letters open with the thematic pairing of grace and peace. Seven of the letters 
also conclude with a penultimate peace blessing where typical ancient letters would often 
have a penultimate health wish. Thus roughly half of the Pauline corpus not only begin 
with the double theme of grace and peace, but also conclude with the same two themes, 
just in reverse order: peace and grace. This effectively creates a double inclusio in these 
letters with an outer frame of grace and an inner frame of peace. The implications for the 
theme of peace are profound. Even as Paul considered grace to be an over-arching, all-
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 To be sure, it is not merely the use of grace in the inclusio that makes it a major Pauline theme. 
Its prominence throughout his letters establishes it as such. The use of the inclusio makes it clear to Paul’s 
hearers and readers that he intentionally accords this priority to grace and wants them to do likewise. 
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encompassing theme for his letters, he also gave peace that same place and priority. The 
key question is why. 
Paul’s motive for the change from cai!rein to cavriV seems obvious enough. The 
pun is a clever, rhetorical device and grace is a major theme. By combining the two, Paul 
is able to draw the attention of his audience to the centrality and significance that grace 
has in the community life of believers. The addition of peace to complement grace is not 
so obvious, but the explanation may be approached at three levels. 
The first and simplest explanation typically proffered is that Paul is writing to 
congregations containing Jewish as well as non-Jewish believers. This addition of a 
traditionally Jewish greeting to complement his rhetorical twist on the Greek greeting 
reinforces that his pun is in fact a greeting, lest that social nicety be lost, missed, or 
overlooked because of his use of figured speech. However, more to the point, the Jewish 
greeting establishes direct contact with his Jewish audience, identifying with them, 
addressing them as a legitimate subgroup within the congregation, according them the 
same status as the non-Jews, and perhaps also strengthening his ethos with them as a true 
and faithful Jew who has not betrayed his heritage despite his emphasis on faith rather 
than law as the means of being righteous before God.
31
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 This ethos building is especially necessary in Rome because Paul did not found those churches 
and thus cannot rely on the ethos that would derive from that prior relationship, the parent-child bond that 
he draws upon elsewhere (1 Cor 4:14–17; 1 Thess 2:7, 11–12). Furthermore, Paul is addressing potentially 
volatile issues in Rome directly related to Jew-Gentile identity (faith and works of the law; table discipline; 
spiritual history). However, the same Jew-Gentile issues also arise in Galatia, though his ethos with them is 
presumably strong already, in Philippi, though to a lesser degree, and possibly in Corinth. Therefore, Paul’s 
need to establish a bond with Jewish believers, while most pronounced in Rome, is important in the other 
churches as well. 
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To consider this as Paul’s only reason for adding the peace greeting, however, 
would be superficial. As mentioned above, peace as a greeting fits appropriately also as a 
blessing because it embraces the holistic welfare of the person. The peace blessing goes 
beyond greeting to form a comprehensive wish for another’s well-being, so that even in 
his greeting, Paul petitions God in behalf of his readers. Therefore, a second level for 
explaining Paul’s motive in adding peace to the grace blessing focuses on Paul’s heart for 
the people and his genuine concern that they learn, as he has, to look to the interests of 
others and not just to one’s own. With the addition of peace to his epistolary opening, 
Paul exemplifies in all his letters this “others orientation” that he features in his letter to 
Philippi, an orientation essential to unity and peace within the churches (Phil 2:1–5).
32
 
The third and most substantial explanation for Paul’s inclusion of peace with 
grace in his opening greeting/blessing lies in his recognition that grace and peace are the 
two definitive gifts and blessings of their coming salvation. As he writes to communities 
of believers, he greets and blesses them in terms of their defining characteristics. Grace 
and peace are definitive in the sense that they distinguish the community of believers 
from all other social, political, or familial identities that one might acquire in that first 
century Greco-Roman world. Furthermore, both grace and peace may be considered as 
gifts inasmuch as God gives them without respect to human worthiness or merit, and as 
blessings in that they provide for the fullest human satisfaction and well-being. 
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 The relationship of unity and peace will be explicated more completely below. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that Paul uses himself (Phil 1:23–26), Jesus Christ (2:5–8), Timothy (2:19–23), and 
Epaphroditus (2:25–30) as examples of how this “others orientation” works itself out in practical ways 
through the setting aside one’s own interests out of consideration for the best interests of others. 
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Therefore, the believing community that shares a common faith in Christ has now 
entered into grace and peace with God through Jesus Christ (Rom 5:1). Rather than being 
objects of God’s wrath, the believers enjoy the blessing of his favor; rather than living in 
hostility against God, they enjoy the blessing of peace with God. To be in Christ, then, is 
to be in a changed relationship with God because of Christ, a relationship governed by 
grace and peace (Rom 5:20–21; 6:14; cf. Col 3:15), not by law and enmity with all their 
implications of failure and death (Rom 8:1–7; cf. Col 1:19–23). Furthermore, the changed 
relationship with God is to redefine all other relationships, both within the community of 
believers and with those outside. 
Grace and peace are so essential to the identity of those in Christ that Paul can say 
the kingdom of God
33
 itself consists of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit 
(Rom 14:17). The righteousness, on the one hand, subsumes God’s initiative of love and 
grace (Rom 3:22–24; 5:8, 14; cf. Eph 2:4–5), as well as the believer’s response of faith 
leading to peace (Rom 3:25–26; 5:1), thereby inextricably linking grace and peace with 
justification as essential features of the kingdom of God. The peace and joy, on the other 
hand, as fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5:22–24), are the result of the new relationship with God 
                                                           
33
 Though kingdom terminology is not absent in Paul, neither does he use it extensively. The 
undisputed letters mention it only eight times. However, the contexts in which Paul uses kingdom language 
are instructive. He refers to the kingdom definitionally: the kingdom is righteousness, peace, and joy (Rom 
14:17) and it is power (1 Cor 4:20). He also speaks of it eschatologically: after the final victory and in 
conjunction with the resurrection (1 Cor 15:24, 50). Finally, Paul mentions the kingdom ethically: as the 
inheritance that will be denied to the wicked (1 Cor 6:9, 10; Gal 5:21) and as the basis for worthy living 
(1 Thess 2:12). Inasmuch as Paul speaks of the kingdom relation to the final victory and resurrection, he 
obviously views the kingdom as a future hope. At the same time, that future hope becomes the mandate for 
proper living in the present, thereby grounding Paul’s ethics in his eschatology. His sense of the already 
and the not yet leads him to the conviction that the ethics (including peace) that define the future kingdom 
must already be determinative in the church. 
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in Christ and are thus to be the experience and norm within the kingdom of God, which 
for Paul would certainly include all believers. Therefore, from Paul’s perspective and as 
exemplified by his teaching and personal behavior, all thoughts, words, and deeds among 
believers must be characterized by grace and peace (Rom 12:18; 2 Cor 1:12; cf. Eph 
4:29; Col 4:6). 
This brief survey of Paul’s explicit references to peace in the epistolary openings 
and closings demonstrates his understanding that the ultimate source of peace lies in the 
very nature of God and only comes to humanity as the gracious blessing of God through 
the agency of Jesus Christ and the transformative power of the Holy Spirit. Peace defines 
a new relationship with God in Christ and thus must also characterize relationships with 
others and within the self. As the blessing of God and fruit of the Spirit, peace affects all 
dimensions of one’s life: the inner emotional and thought life with freedom from anxiety, 
the vertical spiritual life with all its provisions of divine favor, including the satisfaction 
of all needs, whether material or spiritual, and the horizontal social life with kindness, 
selflessness, and unity in place of hostility, selfishness, and conflict. Although the 
fullness of peace socially and politically will come only in the future with Christ’s final 
victory over sin, death, and the enemies of God, Paul expects the believing communities 
to live at peace with one another now.  To the extent that communities are earmarked by 
grace, they are likewise to be characterized by peace. According to Paul’s understanding 
of community, peace within and among believers is the norm and conflict the aberration. 
However, this norm is scarcely ever achieved in the practical experience of Paul’s 
churches, and so Paul gives considerable attention in his letters to the cultivation of the 
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attitudes and behaviors that will promote unity and peace among the believers. Therefore, 
the second major concentration of Paul’s references to peace can be found among his 
many instructions, exhortations, and commands for the churches. 
References to Peace in Epistolary Paranesis 
In its broadest connotation, paranesis is moral instruction: how to live and not to 
live, given one’s set of moral values. Such instruction occurred routinely in Hellenistic 
philosophic literature and played a major role in childhood education.
34
 Similarly, Paul 
devotes considerable attention in his letters to teaching believers how to think and behave 
differently in respect to God, nature, themselves, and one another in light of the gospel. 
Paul uses the standard literary forms of his day to convey moral instruction: diatribes, 
virtue/vice lists, admonitions (brief series of imperatives on a variety of topics), maxims, 
apocalyptic pronouncements, and topoi (longer treatments of an ethical topic).
35
 While 
admonitions and topoi may more readily be identified as paranesis because of their use of 
imperatives, all the forms serve the broader purpose of paranesis, often extending beyond 
direct commands or prohibitions to include some rationale or discussion related to the 
various injunctions. 
In his analysis of the topos, one form of paranesis, Mullins identifies three 
essential elements that define the form and two others that may occur [emphases his]: 
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 Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 11–21. 
35
 James L. Bailey and Lyle D. Vander Broek, Literary Forms in the New Testament: A Handbook 
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 21–87, provides a detailed summary of these and other 
Pauline literary forms. Those listed here represent forms that Paul has adapted from the secular literature. 
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an injunction urging that a certain course of behavior be followed or avoided; a 
reason for the injunction; and a discussion of the logical or practical 
consequences of the behavior. An optional element is the citing of an analogous 
situation to the one dealt with in the Topos. . . . a fifth element sometimes 
appears, the refutation of a contrary way of thinking or acting.
36
 
Though Mullins applies these elements specifically to the topos, they do have relevance 
to the other forms of paranesis as well and thus provide a framework for discussing and 
understanding Pauline paranesis related to peace. 
Paul issues several direct injunctions to the churches regarding the restoration and 
maintenance of peace. Depending upon the situation to which he is writing, Paul may use 
a rhetorically forceful approach involving commands and imperatives (Rom 12:19; 2 Cor 
13:11; 1 Thess 5:13; cf. Col 3:15) or a more suggestive, less authoritarian approach in 
which he urges or exhorts his readers to join him in the pursuit of peace (Rom 14:19; cf. 
Eph 6:15).
37
 However direct or indirect his injunction may be, Paul expects the believers 
to extend themselves in their efforts to live in peace. 
Paul’s overarching command enjoins believers to live peacefully with all people 
(Rom 12:18).
38
 The scope of the command is expressed in the prepositional phrase meta˝ 
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 Terence y. Mullins, “Topos as a New Testament Form,” Journal of Biblical Literature 99 
(1980), 542–43. 
37
 The difference in the two approaches is conveyed grammatically with the more direct approach 
relying on second or third person imperatives and the more tactful approach using hortatory subjunctives 
(sometimes considered first person imperatives) to show Paul’s involvement with his readers both as their 
example and as their companion in following Christ. The use of parakalevw (“I urge”) with infinitives, 
followed by participles or prepositional phrases of manner and means, provides Paul another grammatical 
option for expressing an injunction in a rhetorically softer way (Rom 15:30–33; 16:17–20; cf. Eph 4:1–3). 
38
 This injunction is an imperative, though not immediately obvious as such because it occurs in 
the form of a participle (ei !rhneuvonteß, “live peacefully, be at peace”) rather than an imperative. The series 
of admonitions in 12:9–19 are mostly participles, with five genuine imperatives, two infinitives functioning 
as imperatives, and 19 imperatival participles. Rollin A. Ramsaran, “Paul and Maxims” in PGRW, 437, 
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pa !ntwn a˙nqrw !pwn (“with all persons”), where the adjective is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively all-inclusive and the generic noun embraces all human beings without any 
limiting or qualifying restrictions. Paul places this obligation on believers as the logical 
extension of the two immediately preceding commands: not to repay anyone evil for evil, 
but to give thoughtful consideration to the common good (12:17).
39
 Paul recognizes that 
believers, by virtue of the obligations of genuine love (12:9), must be consistent in their 
response to others, not only within but also outside the community of faith, by resisting 
the escalation of evil, by respecting the common good, and by making every effort to live 
peacefully with everyone (12:16–17). His other injunctions in this series of admonitions 
(12:18–21) detail ways in which expressions of love can ameliorate the effects of evil and 
even conquer it with good. 
However, Paul is also a realist and knows that the best intentions of believers to 
live in peace are not sufficient to guarantee peace in the broader community. From Paul’s 
perspective, peace in its fullest sense presupposes both faith and the leading of the Spirit 
among the parties involved. Because the broader community does not claim to have 
                                                                                                                                                                               
identifies 12:9–18 as a maxim stack, thereby confirming the paranetic nature of the passage and 
strengthening the case for classifying the participles as imperatival. 
39
 This second command is somewhat ambiguous in Greek and thus permits two different nuances 
in translation depending on what the prepositional phrase modifies: e"nw !pion pa !ntwn a˙nqrw !pwn (“before 
all persons” or “in the presence of all persons”). If taken with the imperatival participle pronoouvmenoi 
(“give thoughtful consideration to”), the implication is that the believers are under the scrutiny of everyone 
around them, not just within the community of faith, and so their deliberations on what is good are subject 
to the evaluation of the general public. Thus the believers must take care to think and act in a way generally 
consistent with the broader community values. If taken with the substantive kala; (“good”), the implication 
is that the believers have an obligation to discern and respect what the broader community considers to be 
good for the community. Either way the believers are obligated by their faith and genuine love to respond 
consistently to others whether within or outside the community of faith. 
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either faith or the Spirit, Paul qualifies his command for believers to live peacefully. The 
conditional clause ei ! dunato;n (“if it is possible”) and the adverbial phrase to; e !x uJmwÇn 
(“with respect to efforts from you”) imply that if the believer’s initiatives can make a 
difference, and in some situations they do, then the believer is obligated to make every 
possible effort to cultivate that peaceful existence. Although the result may fall short of 
peace because of dynamics beyond the believer’s control, the believer must nevertheless 
pursue the goal of living peacefully with everyone. The possibility, or even probability, 
of failure does not excuse the believer from using all means available to secure peaceful 
relations with others. 
Paul applies this same principle in his teaching on marriage and divorce. On the 
one hand, Paul prohibits mismatched partnering between believers and unbelievers citing 
the impossibility of agreement between such antitheses as righteousness and lawlessness, 
light and darkness, or Christ and Beliar (2 Cor 6:14–15).
40
 Thus, in Paul’s view, believers 
and unbelievers ought not to marry. On the other hand, Paul is a realist and knows that 
such marriages do occur and are already present in the church. Therefore, he offers 
instruction for those facing that situation (1 Cor 7:12–16). The believing spouse must 
make every effort to maintain a peaceful marriage, remaining in the marriage as long as 
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 Whether Beliar is understood as the proper name of a particular demon, a reference to the Devil, 
or another name for the Antichrist, the referent is clearly the antithesis of Christ. Note as well that although 
Paul does not specifically mention marriage in this context, he certainly views marriage as a partnership 
(1 Cor 6:15–20) and thus would include it under this prohibition. It must also be noted that this pericope 
(2 Cor 6:14–7:1) provokes numerous questions of authenticity because of its excessive number of hapax 
legomena, its exclusiveness grounded in cultic code, certain literary features typical of Qumran, and uses of 
flesh and spirit quite uncharacteristic of Paul. For further discussion of the issues, see Ralph P. Martin, 
2 Corinthians, WBC 40 (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986), 190–95, and Victor P. Furnish, II Corinthians: A 
New Translation and Commentary, AB 32A (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 375–83. 
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the unbelieving spouse consents. Paul grounds this instruction in the fact that a believer’s 
calling to God is also a calling to peace, not only peace with God, but peace with others 
as well. Though marriage with an unbeliever is not ideal, such a marriage does have a 
sanctifying effect for the unbelieving spouse and the children now, while maintaining the 
possibility for a redemptive result in the future. If, however, the unbelieving spouse 
wishes to divorce, the release is permitted on the same grounds, namely, that the believer 
is called to peace. 
To live peacefully with everyone is not a fruitless endeavor. The sanctifying and 
redemptive principles in the home are also at work in the broader society. The believer 
can stem the tide of evil, and with expressions of humility, sympathy, compassion, and 
generosity toward others, including especially one’s enemy, instead of self-serving 
retaliation, the believer may induce a sense of shame and remorse that leads to repentance 
and reconciliation—the overcoming of evil with good. 
Paul is realistic in acknowledging evil and its effects in the world, and he is also 
pragmatic in recognizing that virtuous behavior in response to evil can lead to redemptive 
results. However, he is not a pragmatist in the sense that he is motivated just by whatever 
beneficial consequences may ensue. Paul’s whole ethic, and especially his teaching on 
peace, is grounded in the gospel. He himself is motivated by his desire to be like Christ in 
his suffering, death, and resurrection (Phil 3:10–11). He urges the Philippians as citizens 
of heaven to live in a manner worthy of the gospel (1:27) and invites them to imitate him 
and others he has mentioned (Christ, Timothy, and Epaphroditus) in how they live (3:17). 
Paul encourages the Corinthians as well to imitate him as he imitates Christ (1 Cor 11:1). 
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Therefore, regardless whether a believer’s initiatives for peace with unbelievers 
are successful or not, Paul places this responsibility to live peacefully with everyone, 
including and especially one’s enemies, squarely on the shoulders of believers simply 
because that was the gospel and that followed the example of Christ. Christ demonstrated 
God’s love when he died for those described as the ungodly, as sinners, and as enemies of 
God (Rom 5:6–8, 10; cf. Col 1:21). Believers are likewise expected to express genuine 
love to their enemies by not exacting vengeance and by compassionately caring for their 
basic physical needs. For Paul and those with him, then, the message and the ministry 
always come back to the gospel and the appeal to be reconciled to God, and thus to an 
invitation to peace with God and with others. 
If this demand for peace in relationships between believers and unbelievers is so 
compelling, how much more insistent is the mandate for peace among believers? On this 
issue, Paul’s paranesis is clear. He speaks without equivocation, without qualification, 
and without condition: believers must live in peace with one another (Rom 14:19; 2 Cor 
13:11; 1 Thess 5:13). Paul does not require this peace on the basis of its benefit to the 
community, for then the community would be at liberty to set the standard of peace at an 
arbitrary level depending upon how much conflict they were willing to tolerate. Rather, 
Paul insists upon this peace because it is essential to the nature of God and thus essential 
to their new character as God’s children and their new identity in Christ. Peace among 
believers provides convincing proof that they belong to Christ and that they are living 
under the influence of the Spirit. 
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In an extended discussion of his rationale for living according to the Spirit (Rom 
8:1–17), Paul sets forth his basic paradigm of the opposed pair flesh (savrx) and spirit 
(pneu:ma), where flesh figuratively denotes human life under the influence and control of 
sin (Rom 7:14–25) and spirit (or better as Spirit) denotes human life in dependence upon 
God under the guidance and power of the Spirit (Rom 8:1–4; Gal 5:16, 25).
41
 As Paul 
elaborates the paradigm, he presents two antithetical patterns of thought, behavior, and 
relationship to God. Those living according to the flesh (kata; savrka) think about life 
from the perspective of self-interest, self-indulgence, and the irrelevance of God in this 
age or the age to come (Rom 8:5; Phil 3:19). This mindset is hostile to God (Rom 8:7–8) 
and therefore produces behavior that alienates one spiritually from God, mentally from 
the self, and socially from others (Rom 1:28–32; Gal 5:19–21). Furthermore, this sinful 
and rebellious conduct excludes one from the kingdom of God and leads ultimately to 
death (Rom 1:28–32; 8:6, 13; Gal 5:21; 6:7–8). However, those living according to the 
Spirit (kata; pneu:ma) are just the opposite. They occupy their minds with what pleases 
God and what the Spirit desires (Rom 8:5). They “follow the promptings and surrender to 
the control of the Spirit, . . . who now not only regenerates but also indwells the people of 
God.”
42
 Rather than succumbing to the consequences of hostility and rebellion against 
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savrx/pneu;ma antithesis as “two alternative and opposed drives which come to expression in the ethical 
character of everyday decisions and relationships.” He adds that the opposition is also expressed as the old 
and new epochs, so that there is an eschatological nuance to the antithesis as well. Furthermore, for Dunn, 
the old epoch is “characterized by an inability to live in accordance with God’s will,” while the new epoch 
is an experience of liberation whereby the Spirit is “both the power and the norm of the Christian life.” 
42
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God, they enjoy peace with God and peace within themselves, as they gain mastery over 
sin’s control of their thinking and behavior (Rom 5:1; 8:6, 13; Gal 5:24).  Their conduct 
is guided by the Spirit and leads to life (Rom 8:6; Gal 5:22–23, 25). 
This flesh/Spirit antithesis functions in Paul as a rubric for distinguishing all that 
belongs to or is associated with the old (a˙rcaiæa), which is passing away, from what is 
peculiar to or necessitated by the new (kaina!), which has already or is about to come 
(2 Cor 5:17). This clear distinction of old and new, whether aeons, covenants, codes of 
conduct, or community, is determined with respect first to the death and resurrection of 
Jesus as the beginning of the new and second to his future appearing as the end of the old. 
Therefore, the whole thrust of Paul’s paranesis is that those who are in Christ find the old 
way of thinking and behaving, which is no longer appropriate or acceptable among the 
people of God, replaced with the new way, which is now normative and necessary within 
the community of faith. 
This is especially evident in Paul’s references to peace, where he ascribes all 
behavior that is contrary to peace to the realm of the flesh and that which promotes peace 
to the realm of the Spirit. The former must be changed, put off, or put to death (Rom 
8:13; 13:12–13; Gal 5:24; cf. Eph 4:22; Col 3:5–9), while the latter must be adopted, 
pursued, or put on (Rom 13:12, 14; cf. Eph 4:23–24; Col 3:10, 12). 
Listing a series of scriptural texts,
43
 Paul describes all those under sin, that is, all 
who are living according to the old way, as unrighteous, unkind, devoid of understanding, 
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 This catena of texts in Rom 3:11–18 includes Eccl 7:20; Ps 14:1–3 (=53:2–4); Ps 5:10; 139:4; 
10:7; Isa 59:7–8; Ps 35:2. This assessment sums up Paul’s earlier discussion of irreverence (ajsevbeia) and 
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worthless, vile in their speech, and violent in their actions. They lack all reverence for 
God and have never known peace (Rom 3:11–18). To the extent that they persist in their 
rejection of the truth and give themselves to evil, they will never know peace, but rather 
they will experience only trouble and distress, as they are subject to the anger and wrath 
of God (Rom 2:8–9). The only ones who have any hope of peace at all are those who 
patiently and persistently do good (Rom 2:7, 10), and then that peace comes to them from 
God who rewards all according to their deeds (Rom 2:6 quoting Prov 24:12). 
However, the outcome is not simply a matter of choice whereby an individual 
decides to give up the evil in favor of the good. By setting the destiny of wrath or peace 
in the context of future judgment and within the framework of the flesh/Spirit antithesis 
(Gal 6:7–10), Paul takes any initiative for peace away from the individual and places it 
solely with God. For those who are under the influence of sin are hostile to God, they 
have turned away from God, they do not seek God, and even if they were inclined to 
obey God and do good, they are unable to do so. On the one hand, Paul gives the example 
of a person who knows what God requires and even desires to comply but is plagued with 
the constant inner conflict between a mind and will that are both under the control of sin 
(Rom 7:14–25).
44
 On the other hand, Paul also indicates that others have become inured 
                                                                                                                                                                               
injustice (ajdiki !a) that have resulted in hostility toward God, alienation from God and from the self, 
estrangement from nature, and conflict with others (Rom 1:18–32). 
44
 This inner conflict that Paul describes differs little from what Plato (Resp. 437b–444b) and 
Aristotle (Virt. Vit. 1249a31–b27) characterized as “civil war” among the three components of the soul: the 
rational (mind), the appetitive (emotion/passion), and the spirited (will). However, while the philosophers 
envisioned peace as emanating from within the individual and moving outward to others, nature, and finally 
the gods, Paul understands the process to be just the opposite. Peace arises from the character of God and is 
then graciously granted to those who believe. Through the power of the indwelling Spirit, they in turn are 
able to experience inner peace and to live at peace with nature and with others around them. 
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to the violence and strife of their rebellion. It has become a way of life that they welcome 
and applaud despite the irrationality and self-destructiveness it visits upon them and those 
around them (Rom 1:32). Therefore, Paul’s portrait of life according to the flesh is a life 
of hostility, strife, and conflict with God, within the self, and with others, and a life that 
one is powerless to change or overcome. 
From Paul’s vantage point, this life of conflict is the norm for all those under the 
influence of sin, that is to say, for all humanity (Rom 1:18; 3:9), and it is a desperate 
situation indeed. One can only look outside oneself for deliverance (Rom 7:24), and this 
deliverance comes to Paul through Jesus Christ (Rom 7:25). Paul describes this rescue 
using two different metaphors, a legal metaphor (justification) and a relational metaphor 
(reconciliation), both of which have a past and future dimension. Thus Paul can assert 
that having been justified by his blood, we shall be saved (Rom 8:9) and that having been 
reconciled to God through the death of his son, we shall be saved (Rom 8:10). The two 
metaphors denote the same reality: that through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
the enmity between God and humanity has been removed, so that those who are justified 
and reconciled are now at peace with God and will be delivered from the wrath of God 
(Rom 5:1, 9–10). 
In all of this, it is absolutely essential to recognize that Paul sees no other pathway 
to peace than reconciliation with God. Those living according to the flesh are hostile to 
God and incapable of peace. However, those who have been reconciled to God have as a 
result received the Spirit (Rom 5:5) and are no longer under the influence and control of 
the flesh (Rom 8:9). Rather, they are at peace with God, guided and empowered by the 
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Spirit, and thus able to live in peace with others as well. In fact, more than simply being 
able, those who have been reconciled to God must actually be reconciled to and live 
peacefully with one another, for the new life in Christ, in the Spirit, or in the kingdom of 
God—however Paul may express it—is peace (Rom 8:6; 14:17). Therefore, while Paul 
sees hostility and conflict as the inescapable norm for those living according to the flesh, 
he sees reconciliation and peace as the expected norm for those in Christ. 
Unfortunately, Paul is writing to believers who are not necessarily at peace with 
one another. Although they have been justified and reconciled to God, and although they 
have the Spirit, they do not always exhibit attitudes or behaviors conducive to peace. In 
his response to a conflict in Rome amid destructive judgmentalism, Paul has to remind 
believers of their obligation to pursue peace with one another. He also encourages them 
to engage only in those activities that build one another up (Rom 14:17, 19). 
Similarly, amid all the tensions in Corinth, Paul issues a mild rebuke to the 
believers for their attitude toward Timothy and urges them to extend hospitality for his 
departure as they ought to have done for the duration of his visit (1 Cor 16:11).
45
 Later, as 
his relationship with the Corinthians approaches a breaking point, Paul issues a more 
passionate rebuke and then concludes with an exhortation that they live in peace (2 Cor 
13:11a). On the heels of so harsh a rebuke, Paul’s injunction to peace may seem 
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disingenuous, but it stands at the conclusion of his letter (or letter fragment)
46
 as a 
reminder to them, and perhaps to Paul himself, that the final word for believers 
experiencing conflict must be the calling to peace by a God whose very essence is love 
and peace (2 Cor 13:11b; cf. Col 3:15). 
These same themes of love, peace, and mutual edification are also evident in the 
conclusion of Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians. He introduces his final section of 
admonitions by urging them to honor their leaders and live in peace among themselves 
(1 Thess 5:12–13). However, like all of Paul’s paranesis on peace, this injunction to live 
in peace does not stand as an isolated command, but rather is accompanied by a series of 
other exhortations that are concomitant to living in peace. A broad range of attitudes and 
behaviors are required for a diverse community of variously gifted individuals to preserve 
peaceful relationships within the group. The whole infrastructure of interdependencies 
that forms the social fabric of the community must be so maintained that love, respect, 
edification, and peace inform them all. Therefore, Paul’s paranesis on peace typically 
includes other instructions and exhortation intended to shore up the social infrastructure 
without necessarily addressing peace directly.
47
 
                                                           
46
 Considerable debate arises over the composition of 2 Corinthians. For a summary of the various 
theories, see Martin, 2 Corinthians, xxxviii–lii, and Furnish, II Corinthians, 29–48. 
47
 A classic illustration of this principle can be seen in a comparison of the marriage reforms under 
Augustus, which were a categorical failure at stabilizing the home and improving society, and the teaching 
espoused by Paul (1 Cor 7). The Roman laws were ineffectual and in some ways exacerbated the problems 
with divorce. Paul, by contrast, grounds his instruction in the principle that believers are called to peace. He 
mentions it only once, but the theme runs throughout his instruction. See O. Larry Yarbrough, “Paul, 
Marriage, and Divorce” in PGRW, 404–20. This principle is also evident in virtue lists where positive traits 
are catalogued with the implication that they are to be appropriated as part of one’s moral training. See 
Trols Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul, Virtues, and Vices” in PGRW, 608–24. 
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For example, Paul’s injunction to be at peace with all persons, including both the 
insiders and outsiders (Rom 12:18), lies in the midst of a long series of exhortations that 
address behavior within the community as well as conduct around those who are at least 
contrary if not outright enemies (Rom 12:9–21). Only a few of the exhortations relate 
specifically and directly to peace. The others address either character traits necessary for 
establishing and maintaining a climate of peace, such as, genuine love, honor, humility, 
patience, generosity, and empathy, or behavioral dynamics intended to counteract hostile 
behavior, such as, blessing instead of cursing enemies, providing instead of withholding 
basic needs from the enemy, and refusing to seek vengeance. Similarly, in concluding a 
lengthy paranesis concerning food restrictions, Paul urges the Romans to pursue peace 
and mutual edification (Rom 14:19). However, the expressions ta˝ th:ß ei!rhvnhß (literally 
“the things of peace”) and ta˝ th:ß oi!kodomh:ß th:ß ei!ß a˙llhvlouß (literally “the things of 
edifying one another”) make it clear that while peace and edification are ultimate goals, 
the command subsumes a range of accompanying attitudes and behaviors. 
The same pattern is evident in Paul’s paranesis on orderly worship, where many 
procedures must be put in place to sustain peaceful and orderly worship (1 Cor 14:26–
33a), in his little cluster of final instructions for the Corinthians (2 Cor 13:11–12), and in 
his lengthy closing exhortation for the Thessalonians (1 Thess 5:12–22). Without listing 
all the collateral exhortations in Paul’s extensive paranesis related to peace, it is enough 
to note that the typical Pauline pattern is to surround direct injunctions to peace with 
exhortations to other qualities of character and conduct that are necessary for maintaining 
peace in the community, even though the exhortations do not mention peace or relate 
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directly to it. The nature of the ancillary commands depends upon the specific occasion to 
which Paul is writing and reflects the particular needs of the communities addressed. 
Paul’s references to peace occur in a variety of literary forms. This diversity of 
expression gives a clearer sense of how thoroughly the calling to peace has captivated the 
mind of Paul and how pervasive is its claim on the mind and conduct of the believer. Paul 
recognizes both a vertical (Godward) and horizontal (social) dimension to peace, but he 
assigns priority to the vertical. Therefore, one cannot experience genuine peace in its 
social dimension until one is at peace with God, and one can only be at peace with God 
through reconciliation in Christ. From Paul’s perspective, peace as a divine characteristic 
originates in God and is granted to those who have faith. Yet, even then, peace endures 
only as those believers are led and empowered by the Spirit. 
Paul’s paranesis on peace typically includes other exhortations over a wide range 
of personal qualities and behaviors that support the cultivation of peace. The virtue/vice 
lists are collections of the attitudes and behaviors that believers are to pursue or avoid, 
and without exception the lists are replete with items that directly and indirectly pertain to 
peace. The following section will explore several of the more common synonyms and 
linkage words that Paul uses in his indirect discussions of peace, that is, the paranesis 
related to peace that does not necessarily mention peace itself. 
Indirect References to Peace in the Pauline Epistles 
In addition to the common term ei!rhvnh, Paul uses other terms and expressions in 
reference to peace. This group includes synonyms for peace, as well as those prominent 
concepts and qualities that are detrimental to peace and must be avoided. Fitzgerald refers 
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to such a collection of closely associated concepts as a “linkage group,” that is, the nexus 
of ideas, expressions, and words “that remain associated with one another through a 
number of generations.”
48
 A consideration of these terms in their paranetic context will 
demonstrate even more convincingly how the many strands of Paul’s paranesis on peace 
are woven into the social fabric of the believing community. 
The close synonym hJsuci!a, referring to the quietness and calm associated with a 
peaceful life, occurs five times in Paul, but only once in the undisputed letters—and that 
in its infinitive form hJsucavzein (1 Thess 4:11, “to live a quiet life”).49 The context 
suggests that the quiet life applies not only to the contemplative life of a philosopher or 
religious recluse, but also to the daily life of social, political, and economic intercourse 
where the effects will be noticed and assessed positively by outsiders (1 Thess 4:11–
12).
50
 The peace that Paul advocates, a peace grounded in faith and grace, does not 
depend, however, on the quietness of one’s surroundings or the circumstances of one’s 
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 John T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” in PGRW, 319–320. Fitzgerald adapts the term “from 
the field of genetics, in which it is used of the tendency of some genes to remain linked and to be inherited 
as a unit. Thus a linkage group is ‘a group of hereditary characteristics which remain associated with one 
another through a number of generations.’” 
49
 The noun hJsuciva (“undisturbed quietness”) reinforces the calm, responsible manner in which 
the believer should live (2 Thess 3:12), especially because such a life is conducive to reverence and piety 
(1 Tim 2:2). The other uses (1 Tim 2:11–12) seem to emphasize the idea of silence, as the absence of 
speech or noise, more than the restfulness of peace and quiet. 
50
 Philo considers the “most excellent thing” to be hJsuci!a (“silence”) and acknowledges that good 
people will withdraw from the troubles of business to solitude in order that they may escape agitation, 
confusion, tumults, seditions, and wars, and that they may rather cultivate a tranquil, quiet, stable, and 
peaceful life (Abr. 20–27). Paul, on the other hand, urges those in Thessalonica to live that quiet life, not by 
withdrawing from the fray, but by living honestly and independently amid the fray in such a way as to earn 
the respect of the outsiders. 
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life. Rather, it comes as a gift from the Spirit and has a transformative effect on the 
individual in spite of the surroundings.
51
 
Paul pairs another word with ei!rhvnh (“peace”), ajsfavleia (“personal safety, 
security, assurance from danger”), illustrating the idea that peace was inextricably bound 
to the idea of one’s own safety (1 Thess 5:3). Peace was not really peace unless one was 
free from the anxiety of sudden, unexpected attack from one’s enemies or from some 
other ruinous misfortune. The great irony in Paul’s depiction of the future is that just as 
circumstances seem to indicate that peace and security are well-established all around, 
the day of the Lord will come suddenly and violently, precipitating the climactic cosmic 
battle in which all the enemies of God are destroyed (1 Cor 15:24–28) and peace is fully 
and finally established. Those in darkness (the outsiders) will not escape the wrath of 
God (1 Thess 5:3), while the believers, that is, those of the light (the insiders), will be 
preserved through the salvation of Jesus Christ (1 Thess 5:9).
52
 
Paul lays out the antitheses night/day, darkness/light, war/peace, wrath/salvation, 
and death/life, and then links their resolution to the death of Christ. Those who have 
responded in faith will ultimately be saved and thus they are to encourage and edify one 
another in their present experience because of that future hope. Because they are 
associated with daylight, salvation, and life, they are to dress themselves in faith, love, 
and hope (1 Thess 5:8), which, like a soldier’s armor, will identify their allegiance and 
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 Later Pauline thought does concede that peaceful circumstances are advantageous for devotion 
and piety (1 Tim 2:1–2), but neither the inner calm nor the outward expressions of worship that belong to 
authentic peace may be surrendered because of contrary circumstances (Phil 4:6–7). 
52
 Paul uses similar imagery and metaphor in Rom 13:11–14. 
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protect them during the battle. The specific pieces of armor mentioned in 1 Thess 5:8, the 
helmet protecting the head and the breastplate protecting the heart and viscera, relate 
metaphorically to Paul’s treatment of peace in Phil 4:6–9 where he likewise uses military 
language
53
 and imagery in exhorting the believers to peace.
 54
 
In both texts, the concern is protection of the mind and the heart, where the mind 
represents right thinking and the heart appropriate passion or emotion. In order for the 
experience of peace to be authentic, a person must be free from physical danger as well 
as mental or emotional duress. Paul intimates that the circumstances in Thessalonica and 
Philippi do pose some threat to the physical well-being of the believers there (1 Thess 
2:14–15; 3:2–3; Phil 1:28–30), but his instruction is more directly concerned with correct 
thinking and understanding, in order that they may experience the peace and emotional 
encouragement inherent in the gospel despite the dangers. 
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 See further Edgar Krentz “Military Language and Metaphors in Philippians,” in Origins and 
Method: Towards a New Understanding of Judaism and Christianity, Essays in Honour of John C. Hurd, 
ed. Bradley H. McLean, JSNT Sup 96 (Sheffield: Academic Press, 1993), 105-27. 
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 This metaphor is developed in Eph 6:11–17, where the armor of a Roman soldier outfitted for 
battle is associated, piece by piece, with a corresponding spiritual quality: the belt is associated with truth, 
the breastplate with righteousness/justice, the shoes with the gospel of peace, the shield with faith, the 
helmet with salvation, and the sword with the word of God. The implication is that the believer must be 
ready for battle and equipped to withstand intense fighting, but both the armies and the battles are spiritual 
in nature. The opponents are identified as tou: diabovlou (v. 11, “the devil”), tou: ponhrou: (v. 16, “the evil 
one”), and otherwise as rulers, authorities, cosmic powers, and spiritual forces (v. 12). None of these 
opponents qualify as human, for they are not ai»ma kai… savrka (v. 12, “blood and flesh,” a Semiticism for 
human beings). Furthermore, while rulers and authorities may denote political leaders on earth (Luke 
12:11; cf. 20:20), the reference here to cosmic forces and spiritual powers seems to imply conflict in the 
heavenly realms (Eph 6:12; cf. Eph 3:10; Col 1:16). The reference to making a stand on the evil day (Eph 
6:13) suggests that although the battle rages now (v. 12), one puts the armor on with the expectation of 
enduring the final battle (v. 13). The association of shoes with the gospel of peace suggests that the good 
news of peace, that is, the announcement that victory over the enemy and thus peace have already been 
secured through the death and resurrection of Christ, provides sure footing both for holding ground gained 
and for advancing to secure all the territory that has been won. 
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In 1 Thess 4:13–17 Paul answers a question about how the coming of the Lord 
will benefit believers who have already died. Paul’s new teaching will enable those who 
remain to encourage one another (1 Thess 4:18) and transform their grief into hope for a 
future together again at the resurrection and coming of the Lord. Paul continues with a 
related matter concerning the day of the Lord (1 Thess 5:1–11). Some in the community 
need to be alert and vigilant, not fearful, in anticipation of the judgment associated with 
the day of the Lord. Paul provides the needed reminder and then urges them to encourage 
one another (1 Thess 4:18). Through paranesis Paul renews their thinking, reassures their 
passions, and brings them to peace personally and to a more unified and peaceful 
community. 
Similarly, in Phil 4:6–9 Paul addresses the matter of anxiety that distresses the 
mind and heart. The generality of his exhortation makes a broad range of applications the 
likely intent of his instruction. Paul’s antidote for any mental and emotional duress that 
disturbs one’s peace is threefold: comprehensive prayers of thanksgiving and petition, 
concentrated thought on what is true, virtuous, and praiseworthy, and consistent practice 
of all that has been seen, heard, and learned from him. 
As a result of these prayers, one experiences relief from and protection against the 
devastating effects of anxiety and worry. Peace comes as the divine remedy for those in 
mental and emotional distress. However, Paul’s prescription is not only remedial but also 
preventative. Proper thinking, that is, intentionally concentrating one’s thoughts on the 
virtues of truth, justice, goodness, and other such worthy qualities, displaces the anxious 
thoughts that occupy the mind with fear, discouragement, loss, conflict, frustration, and 
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all other ideas that are destructive to inner peace and the mental and emotional stability 
that attends it. These renewed thought processes must and will ultimately find expression 
in new behavioral patterns (cf. Rom 8:5–6; 12:1–2), and so Paul likewise exhorts 
community members to put into practice all that they have learned from his teaching and 
the example of his life.
55
 
In these two passages from the Thessalonian and Philippian letters, Paul relates 
peace more directly to mental and emotional tranquility than to physical security, though 
that too is important in his understanding of peace, especially in his conception of the 
eschatological peace in which all physical threats will be eliminated when all the enemies 
of God are finally conquered (1 Cor 15:24–26). The practicality of his desire that the 
believers be free from worry and concern finds further application in his teaching about 
singleness and marriage in 1 Cor 7:32–35. Paul expresses his wish that in principle the 
Corinthians be ajmeri!mnouV (“without distress, anxiety, worry”). Paul is not against 
marriage (1 Cor 7:28), but he does warn that those who do marry will find themselves in 
conflict over their desire to please their spouse on the one hand and the Lord on the 
other.
56
 This conflict will lead to a divided self where body and spirit are not fully unified 
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 In Paul, and in the Greco-Roman world as well, inner peace depended on concord at two levels. 
First, the harmony of mind, will, and emotion brought an inner consistency of thought and conduct that 
eliminated conflict within the soul. Thus the peace of mind was not disturbed from within. Second, the 
awareness of concord with God, nature, and others removed any external causes of conflict that might 
introduce distress, dissonance, fear, or strife from without and thereby disrupt the internal peace and order. 
The challenge for both Paul and his Greco-Roman counterparts was to find a means of preserving inner 
tranquility despite threatening circumstances externally. 
56
 This seems such an obvious truism as hardly to need mentioning. However, Paul’s emphasis and 
gravity on the matter is intensified by his convictions concerning the current constraints facing the church 
(1 Cor 7:26) and the foreshortened time (1 Cor 7:29), both suggesting that Paul feels the end is imminent. It 
is necessary, then, to understand his treatment of singleness and marriage, and particularly his warnings 
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in their devotion to pleasing the Lord (1 Cor 7:33–34). His preventative measure against 
such added trouble is that the unmarried not seek marriage at all. His own preference, and 
his exhortation—but not command—to others, is to be unmarried (1 Cor 7:6–7). 
Nevertheless, he also recognizes that the unmarried state, with its freedom for full and 
unconflicted devotion to God, is a gracious gift from God that is not given to all.  
With Paul’s clear concern for the individual’s peace of mind and freedom from 
anxiety, two balancing perspectives must be raised. First, suffering plays a significant 
role in Paul’s understanding of salvation and sanctification. All that may be said about 
Paul’s concern for peace of mind, tranquility of circumstance, and freedom from danger 
or calamity must not be misconstrued as somehow suggesting that the peace of God 
guarantees the believer a detour around suffering. Paul’s own ministry, both his teaching 
and his example, provides abundant evidence to the contrary.
57
 From Paul’s perspective, 
the peace of God is experienced in the midst of and in spite of circumstances of hardship 
and suffering (Phil 4:6–7; cf. 2 Thess 3:16). Second, Paul does not focus on 
individualism and self-fulfillment in his conception of life in Christ. Salvation and 
sanctification are gracious provisions through Jesus Christ and the Spirit along with peace 
with God, not merely for the individual, but also for the community, so that all in Christ 
                                                                                                                                                                               
about the qliæyin (“trouble, distress, hardship”) facing those who marry (1 Cor 7:28), in light of the special 
difficulties associated with the end, and not as difficulties inherent in all marriage. 
57
 Even the most cursory reading of Paul reveals a daunting record of his hardship and suffering 
for the sake of the gospel (Rom 8:35; 1 Cor 4:9–13; 2 Cor 4:8–9; 6:4–5; 11:23–29; 12:10). See further John 
T. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the 
Corinthian Correspondence, SBL Dissertation Series 99 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) and Scott J. 
Hafemann, Suffering and the Spirit: An Exegetical Study of 2 Cor. 2:14–3:3 within the Context of the 
Corinthian Correspondence, WUNT 2/19, (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986). 
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may together enjoy the blessings of peace with one another. This emphasis on 
community, or more specifically, on unity, is especially evident in the various 
expressions that Paul uses in his exhortations to peace. 
Several idioms employ the phrase to; aujtov (“the same” or “the same thing”). The 
most common and semantically rich of the expressions is to; aujto; froneiæn. In its plainest 
form, the imperative to; aujto; froneiæte (2 Cor 13:11) means literally “have the same 
mind/understanding” or “be like-minded.”
58
 The surrounding context confirms that this 
appeal for like-mindedness is essentially an injunction to peace. The exhortation that 
follows is the imperative ei!rheuvete (“live peaceably” or “maintain peace”).59 Finally, 
these imperatives are functioning as the protasis of an implicit conditional clause (“if you 
are like-minded and live peaceably”), followed by a future indicative verb in the apodosis 
promising peace (“then the God of love and of peace will be with you”).
60
 Therefore, 
from Paul’s perspective, as the community moves toward like-mindedness, it will also 
move toward peace, and to whatever extent that unity is disrupted, the peace will also be 
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 The variety of translations for the phrase derives from the semantic nuance of the verb fronevw. 
It may be seen as active (“to think”) or stative (“to have understanding, to be wise or prudent”). In some 
situations, usually involving and adjective or adverb, it may also mean to be minded in a certain way. LSJ 
translates the verb in this latter sense when occurring as the simple idiom to; aujto; froneiæte. 
59
 LSJ also lists “to bring to peace” and “reconcile” as meanings when used transitively. However, 
the imperative is just the one word here with no object(s) specified. The use of a present imperative implies 
that this is to be a continuing condition, characteristic, or state in the community. 
60
 See Smyth, §§ 1839, 2288, for imperatives as implicit conditions. Use of the indicative future 
e[stai (“will be”) instead of an optative verb form or the omission of the verb completely implies that this 
is essentially a third class condition (future more probable) and not a blessing/benediction that typically 
occurs at the end of Pauline letters (cf. Rom 15:33; 1 Cor 16:23–24; 2 Cor 13:13; Gal 6:18; Phil 4:23; 
1 Thess 5:28). 
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undermined. Consequently, Paul exhorts believers to adopt those attitudes and actions 
that will foster unity and peace, and to reject those that erode unity and peace. 
Paul uses the same expression in his letter to the believers in Philippi and thereby 
reaffirms the link between unity and peace. In keeping with his main theme of joy in the 
letter, Paul urges them to complete or fulfill his joy by maintaining their like-mindedness 
(Phil 2:2, i”na to; aujto; fronhæte).61 Paul then elaborates both positively and negatively 
what he means by like-mindedness. Following the i”na clause, three phrases show in a 
positive way the extent of the unity that Paul envisions for the community (Phil 2:2b) and 
then two characteristically Pauline adversative clauses (mhv . . . ajllav, “not this . . . but 
this,” Phil 2:3–4) show by contrast those attitudes, motives, and behaviors that either 
undermine or promote peaceful unity among the believers. 
The subjunctive verb fronhæte in the i”na clause governs the three phrases that 
follow, so they are best understood as adverbial and in some way modifying fronhæte. 
Two of the phrases consist of adverbial participles, while the third is elliptical, implying 
an adverbial participle. The first participial phrase th;n aujth;n ajgavphn e[conteV (“having 
the same love”) implies unity at an emotional level, as well as the cognitive level already 
implied by the fronhæte. This is not to suggest that Paul considers ajgavph (“love”) to be 
emotional and sentimentalized, as modern romantics may tend to do, but rather that the 
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 The use of the i”na clause here is somewhat awkward. The grammatical structure of i”na with a 
subjunctive verb does not typically indicate the means by which the action of the governing verb is carried 
out. Yet that is the sense the context requires and thus the reason that the NIV translates it as “make my joy 
complete by being like-minded.” The NRSV gets around the awkwardness of the expression by making it 
another imperative: “make my joy complete: be of the same mind.” It is more grammatically precise to say 
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love within the community of believers has a tender and compassionate side to it that gets 
expressed through the actions and deeds of love. Paul makes this same point in the 
preceding verse (Phil 2:1). Using a series of words that all imply a form of empathy, he 
portrays life in Christ as paravklhsiV (“encouragement”), paramuvqion (“consolation, 
comfort, solace”), splavgcna (“affections, compassion, tenderness”), and oi!ktirmoi" 
(“compassion, mercies, sympathy”). His phrase paramuvqion ajgavphV (“consolation from 
love”) associates that empathy with love, leading to a further implication that a loving 
community will be tender, compassionate, and sympathetic.
62
 Therefore, their being like-
minded and having the same love (Phil 2:2) suggest that the community would have a 
shared sense of compassion for one another with an instinct to comfort and encourage 
one another as circumstances may require. 
The second participial phrase governed by fronhæte repeats the same verb, but 
changes the object: to; e”n fronou:nteV (“having the unity in mind” or “thinking about the 
unity”). Grammatically, the object to; e{n may be understood either as a substantival 
adjective (“the one thing”), in which case one must decide just which particular “one 
thing” the believers are to have in mind, or as an abstract noun (“the one”), where the 
idea of unity itself is to be the focus of thought. Either way, the exhortation to like-
mindedness requires single-mindedness as well, and thus contains an intentional focus on 
                                                                                                                                                                               
that the i”na clause is explanatory and clarifies what it would take to fulfill, fill up, or complete Paul’s joy. 
The present tense subjunctive implies that like-mindedness is to be an enduring characteristic of the church. 
62
 Paul uses first class conditional clauses to introduce each of these words, thereby making clear 
his assumption that each of these qualities is true of the community life and fellowship in Christ. To bring 
out this nuance more clearly, one might translate the series of conditional clauses as follows: “If there is 
any [quality] and we assume that there is, then . . . .” 
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unity, that is, a self-consciousness among believers that their inclusion in Christ requires 
that they also maintain unity.
63
 
The third phrase modifying fronhæte is elliptical and consists of only one word, 
the adjective suvmyucoi (“of one mind, at unity”). The nominative adjective occurring 
without an explicit noun to modify suggests that it is a predicate adjective with implied 
participle of ei!mi" as its verb: o[nteV suvmyucoi (“being of one mind” or “being at unity”). 
The phrase clearly denotes unity, but implies more than that. It bears the nuance of unity 
to the very depths of one’s mind and soul. The basic root yuc- relates to breath as the 
animating element in one’s being, and thus by extension to the soul. In Greek thought, the 
soul as mind (rational thought), will (volition), and emotion (appetite, passion) defines a 
person’s character, nature, and value system. Therefore, to refer to unity in terms of the 
soul is to denote a deep, enduring, essential form of unity. Paul has this kind of unity in 
mind when he refers to Timothy as i!sovyucon (Phil 2:20, “having the same soul”) to 
illustrate what he means by this attitude, frame of mind, and unifying perspective that the 
believers are to share.
64
 
These three phrases function adverbially and modify the governing verb fronhæte. 
The way they modify the governing verb provides further insight to Paul’s understanding 
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 One should not mistakenly read the idea of uniformity into Pauline discussions of unity among 
believers. His other metaphors and explicit teaching about the nature of the community (Rom 12:4–8; 1 Cor 
12:12–27; cf. Eph 4:11–16) make clear his own distinction between uniformity where every part is the 
same and unity where there is a body comprising a diverse variety of parts. The challenge in reading Paul is 
to determine which matters he considers requisite for unity and which not. 
64
 After setting forth this exhortation to like-mindedness (2:1-4), Paul mentions three individuals 
who exemplify the appropriate attitude for the believers at Philippi to emulate: Jesus Christ (2:5–11), 
Timothy (2:19–24), and Epaphroditus (2:25–30). 
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of how the community cultivates this like-mindedness. All three phrases are participial, 
either explicitly in form or implicitly in function, they all follow the governing verb, and 
they all are in the present tense, that is, they represent action contemporaneous with the 
action of the governing verb. These factors suggest that the three phrases bear the nuance 
of means (instrument) and thus indicate not only characteristics of like-mindedness but 
also the means by which this like-mindedness develops within the community.
65
 
Therefore, like-minded communities will express their love for others in tender 
and compassionate ways because that quality of love is prerequisite to like-mindedness. 
By intentionally nurturing such sensitive and loving hearts, the community is providing 
common ground for the beliefs, values, and ethics that will inform their like-mindedness 
and enable them to make it a reality in their community experience. Similarly, believers 
will exhibit this like-mindedness because they have developed relational bonds that are 
essential rather than just functional—essential in the sense that they bind the community 
together in a mutuality of mind, will, and emotion, not just in some community project or 
function, as valuable as those may be.
66
 Finally, a like-minded community of believers 
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 GGBB, 622–40, presents structural and semantic criteria for the various nuances of adverbial 
participles. The tense of the participle and its location in the sentence with respect to the governing verb are 
two of the main criteria. Participles of means (instrument) are typically present tense and follow the 
governing verb. 
66
 For example, though it will be developed more fully below, note here that their partnership with 
Paul in the gospel ministry was not enough to keep Euodia and Syntyche from disagreement and conflict 
(Phil 4:2–3). Nor does Paul appeal to their ministry together as a basis for their conflict resolution. Rather, 
their agreement is to be grounded in the Lord, that is, in their status as sisters in Christ, with all that implies, 
including the reality that they share this same relationship with Paul and his other coworkers. To be sure, 
the survival of Paul’s gospel ministry depends in large measure on the resolution of their conflict, but the 
shared ministry is not the basis for that resolution. Their concord must come from the harmony of minds, 
wills, and emotions that have been transformed by virtue of their being in Christ and bearing the fruit of the 
Spirit (Gal 5:22–24). 
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will also have a self-conscious awareness of their unity. They will understand the need 
for it, the importance of it, and the pathways to it. No community can approach unity 
without first making an informed and understanding commitment to it. A significant part 
of that commitment is the realization that unity and peace within the community come 
ultimately as the gift of God through the Holy Spirit, but that members of the community 
are responsible to see that they themselves, as well as the community as a whole, make 
every effort to practice those attitudes and behaviors that lead to peace and to discourage 
those that weaken or diminish the unity and peace. 
Following this positive assessment of like-mindedness, that is, its characteristics, 
prerequisites, and means for attainment (Phil 2:1–2), Paul continues with two contrasts 
(Phil 2:3–4) in which he shows motives and behaviors that are incompatible with unity 
and peace over against those that cultivate unity and peace. The first contrast (Phil 2:3) 
addresses attitudes and motivations toward others, and provides criteria that disqualify 
certain behaviors from acceptability within the community. Anything that intentionally 
promotes ejriqei!a (“strife”) or kenodoxi!a (“vainglory”) within the community is patently 
inappropriate, whether attitude, word, or behavior. Most likely Paul has in mind those 
preachers whom he considers to be motivated by envy and strife (Phil 1:15) and whose 
proclamation arises from their desire to gain some political advantage or create a problem 
or disadvantage for Paul while he is in prison (Phil 1:17). However, underlying that 
immediate reference is a much deeper and broader cultural critique in which Paul denies 
any place in the believing community for those social and political dynamics within the 
Graeco-Roman culture that are so destructive to unity and peace. 
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Because the pursuit of personal honor and glory was a zero-sum game in Paul’s 
world, it was inevitable that his churches would have to contend with the same envy, 
rivalry, and conflict that the culture around them considered the standard strategy for 
success: discredit and tear down your opponents using any available means in order to 
promote and enhance your own reputation. This is precisely the attitude that Paul seeks to 
exclude. Self-aggrandizing kenodoxi!a (“vainglory”) is a cheap imitation, a counterfeit, of 
the true dovxa (“glory”) that belongs to everyone in Christ as an increasing reality in the 
present and a secure expectation for the future (2 Cor 3:18). Such empty glory has no 
place in the church. Furthermore, the jealousy, envy, lies, dirty tricks, and other political 
strategies that precipitate conflict in order to discredit or destroy the reputations of others 
are also inappropriate in any form within the community of believers. The term ejriqei!a, 
which can be rendered simply as “strife,” encompasses the broader range of nefarious 
activities intended to promote one’s own, usually political, advantage over another. Paul 
recognizes the danger to unity and peace posed by such a climate of discord, contention, 
quarreling, and strife, and warns against it in 1 Corinthians and throughout Philippians. 
However, his approach is not just negative with its warnings, rebukes, and prohibitions. 
Paul also offers an appropriate alternative that will promote unity and peace. 
Contrary to the conceit and hubris that drives the cultural pursuit of personal 
honor and glory, Paul enjoins the congregation to adopt an attitude of humility that will 
enable them genuinely to regard others as more prominent than themselves. A literal 
translation of tapeinofrosuvnh/ (“with lowered mind”) and u"perevcontaV (“holding a 
position above”) vividly portrays the drastic transformation that must take place in their 
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thinking about themselves and others. Instead of an inflated sense of self that inspires 
pride and motivates them to promote themselves at the expense of others, they are to 
exhibit the low-mindedness that enables them to humble themselves and promote others 
to a higher position, a place of greater honor and glory than theirs (cf. Rom 12:9–10). 
A dramatic reorientation of thinking is indispensable to unity and peace, because 
transformed thinking leads to transformed conduct. Without a proper sense of self in 
relation to God and others, one can neither worship appropriately nor serve humbly 
within the community of faith (cf. Rom 12:1–8). Furthermore, unless one undergoes this 
transformation in self-understanding, one’s behavior will not reflect the necessary change 
from a self- to an others-oriented frame of mind. 
Paul’s second contrast between unacceptable and acceptable behavior (Phil 2:4) 
relates to this others-orientation. However, Paul’s notion of others-orientation does not 
mean a concern for others to the exclusion of the self or an ignoring of one’s own life and 
needs. Rather, this others-orientation is an application of the summative command to love 
one’s neighbor as oneself (Rom 13:9–10; Gal 5:13–15). This others-orientation is an 
exhortation to a “both-and,” not an “either-or” consideration of self and others. This is 
substantiated in a subtle difference in the structure of the two contrasts (Phil 2:3–4). The 
first is formed using the adversative structure mhv . . . ajllav (“not this . . . but this”), while 
the second modifies it just slightly adding an adverbial kai!: mhv . . . ajlla; kai! (“not this . . 
. but also this”), thereby implying “not only . . . but also,” or positively, “both-and.”
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Therefore, in his second contrast, Paul indicates that another characteristic of the 
like-minded community is the expression of their love for one another by giving attention 
to matters that concern not only themselves (ta; eJautw:n) but others as well (ta; eJtevrwn). 
This second contrast both reinforces and moderates the first. It reinforces the first as it 
redirects the believer’s attentions from self to others, thereby also reinforcing Paul’s 
rejection of the cultural preoccupation with self-promotion. At the same time, the second 
contrast moderates the first by ensuring that the deference and honor accorded to the 
other is a positive, courteous, gracious affirmation of the other, and not simply a negative, 
devaluing of the self. This voluntary offering of one’s own status and entitlement in 
service to another is absolutely essential to Paul’s understanding of how grace operates in 
community, how freedom in Christ manifests itself responsibly in community, and how 
like-mindedness equates to unity and peace among believers within the community. 
Though Paul himself adopts this perspective and uses it to answer the question of 
idol meat (1 Cor 8:4–13), to defend his apostolic rights and privileges (1 Cor 9:1–18), 
and to resolve the matter of strong and weak (Rom 14:1–15:6), his quintessential example 
and authority for the principle is Jesus Christ (Phil 2:5–11; cf. Rom 15:2–3; 2 Cor 8:8–9). 
After his exhortation to like-mindedness (Phil 2:1–4), in which he uses three participial 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Cassiodorus. A few later MSS and Tertulian omit it (F G K). However, it is significant to note that although 
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and two contrastive clauses to define and refine the various nuances of like-mindedness, 
Paul sums it all up by relating this frame of mind to the attitude of Jesus Christ (Phil 2:5) 
that led to his incarnation, death, and resurrection (Phil 2:6–11), which in turn became the 
basis of peace with God and thus peace in all other aspects of life and relationship. Jesus 
had a clear sense of his identity and entitlement, but willingly released them, humbled 
himself, took on a lower status as a human being, and lower yet as a slave to other human 
beings, and ultimately died on their behalf. It was this death and resurrection that led to 
peace (Rom 5:1–11; 2 Cor 5:16–21; cf. Eph 2:14–17; Col 1:19–23). 
Inasmuch as this attitude and frame of mind enabled Jesus Christ to release his 
grasp on one identity and status in favor of a lower one, so too it empowers believers to 
do the same within their communities. Each one is to have this frame of mind, which is 
likewise to be the attitude that they embrace together: the like-mindedness that leads to a 
common unity in peace. 
Several other examples of Paul’s use of the idiom to; aujto; froneiæn (“have the 
same mind/understanding” or “be like-minded”) might be adduced (Rom 12:16; 15:5; 
Phil 4:2) to demonstrate that his exhortations to like-mindedness are in fact exhortations 
to unity, harmony, concord, and indeed to peace. However, an examination of a text with 
a slight variation of the idiom may be more enlightening and can conclude this survey of 
texts containing to; aujtov. 
Among Paul’s churches, Corinth is the one most obviously plagued by division 
and contention. Paul confronts this with an immediate exhortation to unity and agreement 
(1 Cor 1:10). Though the expression i”na to; aujto; levghte pavnteV (“that you all say the 
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same thing”), focuses on verbal agreement, it is clear from context that Paul envisions 
unity in their thinking and purpose. Paul desires not only that sci!smata (“divisions”) be 
eliminated, but also that the people be restored or strengthened ejn tw/Æ aujtw/Æ noi˘ kai… ejn 
th/: aujth/: gnwvmh/ (“to/in the same mind and to/in the same purpose”). 
Therefore, though several idioms and a range of different terms are used in this 
array of expressions with to; aujtov (“the same”), the exhortations—whether to the same 
mind, the same purpose, the same love, the same voice, or the same attitude—are all 
essentially injunctions to unity and peace. They call all believers to live in concord with 
one another so that their life together reflects both the peace that they have with God in 
Christ and the peace that they are to experience with one another through the presence, 
power, and productivity of the Spirit in them. 
Thus far, Paul’s vocabulary related to peace, that is, his linkage group for peace, 
has consisted primarily of synonymous terms and expressions: ei "rhvnh (“peace”), hJsuci!a 
(“quiet”), ajsfavleia (“security”), ajmevrimnoV (“freedom from worry”), and the to; aujtov 
group (“unity, harmony, concord, like-mindedness”). There is another category of terms 
representing antonyms of peace, that is, those terms or expressions that are the opposite 
of peace (war, hostility, enmity) and those that inhibit or erode peace (distress, anxiety, 
despair). The significance of this latter category is that they must be eliminated from the 
community in order to establish and maintain peace. Therefore, Paul’s prohibition of 
these attitudes and actions may not be direct injunctions to peace, but may nevertheless 
be necessary instruction to open the way to peace. 
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The quintessential location for these negative characteristics is the vice lists in 
Paul.
68
 Typically these are catalogues listing deeds associated with the believer’s old way 
of life (Rom 1:29–31; 1 Cor 5:10–11; 2 Cor 12:20–21). For example, when Paul deals 
with the civil court cases among believers in Corinth (1 Cor 6:1–8) that are disrupting the 
peace and unity of the congregation, he brackets his treatment of the court cases with vice 
lists noting the wrong attitudes/behavior of greed and fraud (1 Cor 5:10–11; 6:9–10). In 
the same vein, when talking about love, joy, and peace (Gal 5:22–23), Paul can juxtapose 
the prohibitions on enmity, discord, jealousy, and factions (Gal 5:19–21). 
Exhortation to appropriate behaviors and discouragement of injurious behaviors 
are two sides of the same paranetic coin in creating an atmosphere that promotes peace 
and reconciliation, without focusing on them directly. 
Chapter Summary and Analysis 
This chapter has presented Paul’s conception of peace as drawn from his explicit 
references to peace in letter openings and closings and in the paranetic sections of his 
letters. Along with these texts were included indirect references to peace consisting of 
synonymous words and expressions related to the idea of peace. 
Like the Greco-Roman culture around him, Paul understood peace to be a state or 
condition of calm, quiet security and felicitous relationships with God, with nature, with 
the inner self, and with others, whether they be within one’s own family and social sphere 
(insiders) or in communities beyond (outsiders). Furthermore, in concert with the Greco-
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Roman thought world, Paul also recognized that true peace required both the cessation of 
overt hostilities and the resolution of all underlying enmity.  However, Paul focused less 
than his Greco-Roman counterparts on external circumstances in defining peace. While 
they tended to think of peace primarily as the absence of war and thus as an objective, 
external experience, Paul was more inclined toward the inner experience of peace, 
security, and contentment irrespective of any personal circumstances of hardship, 
conflict, or anxiety. This distinction reflects their different understandings of the source 
of peace and the way of gaining and maintaining it. 
From a Greco-Roman cultural perspective, peace originates in the human soul. As 
the mind, will, and emotion achieve concord, the attitude and behavior of the individual 
change, enabling that person to live at peace with others and seek the favor and blessing 
of the gods. Within the Greco-Roman thought world, peace depends on the individual’s 
self-control, pursuit of virtue, and establishment of justice and order in society. 
From Paul’s perspective, however, peace originates as an attribute of God and is 
graciously given to those who are reconciled to God through Jesus Christ. Paul fully 
recognizes the reality of inner conflicts and alienation of the self that results from internal 
dissonance. He sees all that, however, not as the obstacle to peace, but as symptomatic of 
a deeper, more basic alienation, which is the real obstacle to peace: alienation from God 
because of sin. Therefore, the attainment of peace depends first upon reconciliation with 
God whereby the underlying enmity is removed through the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. Only after this peace with God is established, can the other enmity, hostility, 
and alienation in one’s life be addressed and resolved. 
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Both perspectives rely heavily on moral instruction as the means of transforming 
thought patterns and reforming attitudes and behavior. There is also considerable overlap 
in their respective definitions of virtue and vice and in their pedagogical approaches, as 
they both use exemplification, imitation, and rhetorical persuasion to effect the desired 
changes. However, while all this is important to Paul in training his churches in peace, 
the ability to change one’s attitudes and behaviors does not ultimately depend upon one’s 
efforts alone, but upon the power of the indwelling Spirit of God. 
In Paul’s day, the heroic ethos still permeated Greco-Roman thought and the epic 
heroes still exemplified the highest ideals for the individual and the state. Consequently, 
the pursuit of personal glory, honor, power, and immortality became the driving force in 
nearly every aspect of life. In contrast to this ideal, Paul presents Jesus Christ supremely, 
but himself and others as well, as better examples to imitate in the pursuit of peace—
heroes that were characterized by humility rather than hubris and that were oriented to the 
welfare and prosperity of others not just of themselves. 
Paul’s radical moral instruction was necessary for training those with a radically 
different conception of reality. Whereas war and conflict were considered the norm in the 
Greco-Roman thought world and the heroic ethos defined success in that world, Paul 
considered peace the norm for those in the community of faith. He recast the heroic ethos 
in the mold of Jesus Christ and trained the believers to seek peace instead of their own 
glory, honor, and power. Examples and details of how Paul pursued peace in his churches 
by applying his teaching to the resolution of conflict between believers are presented in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PAUL’S APPROACH TO PEACEMAKING AND 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
 
From Paul’s perspective God is the ultimate peacemaker, having provided a way, 
through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, for a hostile, alienated humanity under 
the power and influence of sin to be reconciled to the gracious, righteous, and holy God. 
This is peace in the vertical dimension, peace with God. As a result of this peace, which 
is given to all those who believe and are reconciled to God, the people of God, all their 
diversity notwithstanding, are to live peacefully with one another. This is peace in the 
horizontal, social dimension. 
For Paul, the two dimensions of peace are inseparable. Paul does give priority to 
peace with God, but neither is complete without the other. Although peace with God may 
be effected and experienced at an individual level, it must always be worked out and 
expressed within the context of diverse social, economic, and political realities in one’s 
culture. Therefore, Paul’s paranesis on peace leads to a practical, realistic, and effective 
expression of his moral values within the social framework and dynamics of the Roman 
Empire of the first century. 
This chapter will describe three of those social dynamics and then explore how 
Paul interacts with them in resolving conflict among believers. Four specific instances of 
conflict will be examined: the church leader Philemon and his runaway slave Onesimus, 
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two church leaders in Philippi Euodia and Syntyche, the exploitive court cases between 
believers in Corinth, and the public dispute between Peter and Paul in Antioch. 
Social Dynamics in Conflict Resolution 
One cannot fully appreciate the nuance of Paul’s approaches to conflict resolution 
without first understanding the interplay of three dualities of social organization within 
Greco-Roman culture: honor-shame, patron-client, and friendship-enmity. The primary 
pairing is honor-shame, while the other two provide the means for achieving honor and 
avoiding shame. Honor consisted in a person’s sense of self-value and the value accorded 
to the person by the society, based largely on the person’s status as determined by wealth, 
education, political power, social influence, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality.
1
 One 
gained honor by having the right pedigree and surpassing one’s peers in whatever areas 
measured status within one’s peer group. Paul’s self-commendations in Gal 1:13–14 and 
Phil 3:4–6 provide an apt illustration of how honor was reckoned in his earlier life as a 
Pharisee: the genealogical pedigree, the competition among his peers, and his ability to 
excel by comparison. 
Competition for honor offered no consolation prizes. One person’s gain (honor) 
was another’s loss (shame), so competition was intense, often ruthless, and sometimes 
even brutal, particularly when political power and influence were at stake. Consequently, 
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the society as a whole developed a high tolerance for competition and an acceptance, if 
not outright approval, of the excesses that often led to success in gaining honor. 
In the hierarchical society of the first century, the pursuit of honor required the 
help of others who occupied higher social positions and could use their influence to raise 
one’s status. This relationship for social advancement involved a patron (higher social 
status) and client (lower social status).
2
 The patron and client contracted together for their 
mutual benefit. The client was expected to honor and respect the patron, and to further 
the patron’s public interests with absolute loyalty, providing whatever services might 
enhance the patron’s reputation and activities in the community. In return, the patron 
would protect and support the client, and use influence and personal resources to raise the 
client’s social, political, or economic status. The client’s identity and status was linked to 
the patron: the more prestigious the patron, the more status the client gained. Therefore, 
clients eventually became known as belonging to this patron or being in that patron’s 
household. So, for example, Paul refers to Phoebe in Rom 16:2 as prosta!tiß pollwÇn (“a 
patron of many”) and without hesitation includes himself among her clients. 
While having this vertical dependency proved essential to upward social mobility, 
one needed to be horizontally connected as well. Only those with an extensive and well-
maintained network of political friendships could expect to attain the positions of greatest 
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honor and power. One had to be intentional, astute, and patient in cultivating friends, as 
well as attentive and responsive once a genuine friendship had been established.
3
 
Ideally, friendship was “an intimate relationship predicated on mutual affection 
and commitment.”
4
 Trustworthiness and loyalty marked the true friend. The mutuality 
and reciprocity associated with friendship ensured that good will would be acknowledged 
and exchanged among friends. Aristotle identified three grounds for friendship: utility, 
pleasure, and virtue.
5
 Because virtue endures, friendships grounded in a mutual respect 
for one another’s character last longer, are more stable, and ultimately prove to be both 
useful and pleasurable as well. Virtue friendships are also altruistic, so that attitudes and 
actions develop naturally with a genuine concern for the other’s best interest. By contrast, 
friendships based in utility and pleasure tend to be more self-serving. 
One of the most significant consequences of virtue and altruism in friendship was 
the freedom that friends had to speak frankly about inappropriate attitudes or conduct that 
they might observe in one another. Typically, in broader society, such sensitive matters 
would only be raised indirectly, if at all, and expressed using carefully crafted, figured 
speech, in the hope that the person would somehow manage to catch the point without 
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taking offense at the messenger.
6
 Between virtue friends, however, their shared ideals, 
mutual respect, and genuine desire for one another’s moral improvement gave them the 
security to speak directly—and even risk the friendship itself if necessary—to help the 
friend get on the right track to wholeness and maturity.
7
 
The concepts of friendship and peace/peacemaking overlap at points. Fitzgerald 
observes that the relationship of friends is 
marked by concord (oJmovnoia), equality (i!sovthV), intimacy (sunhvqeia), and 
confident trust in one another. Those who are friends are consequently “one soul” 
(mi"a yuchv), sharing not only material possessions but also joys and sorrows. In 
short, a friend is one’s alter ego [italics his], “another self” or “second self,” on 
whose behalf one is willing even to die.
8
 
Therefore, when Paul refers to Timothy in Phil 2:20–21 as one, literally, “of like soul or 
mind” (i!sovyucon), or commends him as one who will be genuinely concerned for 
(gnhsi"wß merimnhvsei) your welfare (ta˝ peri… uJmwÇn, literally “the issues concerning you 
all”) and the interests of Jesus Christ (ta˝ =Ihsou: Cristou:), Paul is using the language of 
ideal friendships and he is presenting Timothy as a virtue friend, not only of Paul himself, 
but also of the Philippians, and even of Jesus Christ. 
Similarly, when Paul enjoins those in his churches to love and honor one another 
(Rom 12:10), to think alike or have the same attitude (Rom 12:16; 15:5; Phil 2:2), to be 
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in one accord (Rom 15:6), and to have the same mind and purpose (1 Cor 1:10), he is 
simply urging them to relate to one another as virtue friends. He is cultivating a climate 
of friendship and peace, for the one cannot exist without the other. 
Regardless of how simple Paul’s urgings may have been, the reality of living at 
peace in altruistic friendships was anything but simple—even among believers. Despite 
the lofty ideals for friendship in the philosophy, literature, and art of preceding centuries, 
by the first century of the Empire the concept and context of friendship had changed. The 
change can be summarized as the politicization of friendships.
9
 
As the cities of the Empire became more cosmopolitan and transient, “unequal” 
friendships, that is, friendships between persons from different socioeconomic strata, 
proliferated. On the one hand, this change democratized friendships causing them to be 
based upon shared attitudes and goals, rather than social status markers. On the other 
hand, however, the mismatches in social status created yet another vehicle for raising 
one’s social status and garnering honor. Therefore, utilitarian friendships became the 
norm and loyalty lasted only as long as the friendship proved to be socially or politically 
expedient. Self-interest rather than altruism prevailed. Betrayal, intrigue, political games, 
and dirty tricks so dominated these so-called friendships that the second century Roman 
historian, Cassius Dio, observed, “most men’s friendships and enmities depend on their 
own self-interest and the degree of influence others hold.”
10
 
                                                
9
 Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” 328–31. 
10
 Cassius Dio 37.39.3, quoted in Epstein, Enmity, 5. 
175 
One of the casualties of this utilitarian friendship was frank speech (parrhsi!a). 
As the focus of friendship shifted from mutual betterment through a genuine concern for 
one another to self-aggrandizement through exploitation of friendship, frank speech gave 
way to flattery (kolakei!a). Rather than risk that “gentlest sting” that brings healing, the 
pretender resorts to flattery. Feigning praise, he manipulates his friend through insincere 
compliments and fawning adulation to secure some selfish gain, usually measured in 
terms of social climbing or financial gain.
11
 Whether in the households of patrons or in 
the intimacy of friendship, flatterers threatened the integrity of any social grouping they 
could insinuate themselves into. In this social setting, frank speech (parrhsi!a) “is what 
most clearly distinguishes a friend from a flatterer.”
12
 This is precisely Paul’s point when 
he rebukes the Galatians for toying with another gospel (Gal 1:6–9). If Paul merely 
wanted to curry favor with the people, he would never speak to them as bluntly as he did 
(1:10). His frank rebuke vindicates Paul before God (he is a faithful slave and messenger 
of Christ), and before the people (he is a genuine friend, willing to risk their friendship by 
telling them a painful truth in order to get them back on the right track).
13
 
The instability of these utilitarian friendships, shifting as they did with the social 
and political winds, transformed many friends into enemies. As it turned out, the ancient 
dictum attributed to Solon, “Be sweet to one’s friends and bitter to one’s enemies,” was 
                                                
11
 David Konstan, “Friendship, Frankness and Flattery” in FFFS, 7–13. Paul has to defend himself 
and his motives in ministry against this very accusation of being a flatterer (1 Thess 2:3–5). 
12
 Sampley, “Paul and Frank Speech,” 294. 
13
 See Sampley, “Paul and Frank Speech,” 299–304, for a brief survey of Paul’s use of frank 
speech in Galatians; or more extensively, Sampley, “Frank Speech” in Philodemus, 298–304. 
176 
appropriately revised, “They love as if they would one day hate, and hate as if they would 
one day love.”
14
 Consequently, just as the institution and canons of friendship developed 
over the years, so too enmity, that is, formalized personal hostility, likewise became an 
institution in Roman society.
15
 
Enmity was typically characterized by open displays of hostility, such as public 
renunciation of friendship; various forms of social ostracism, including both physical 
exclusion (shunning or more seriously exile) and non-communication (silent treatment); 
slanderous attacks on someone’s honor, whether through defamation of character or 
challenging the validity of military or public service; confiscation of property and denial 
of civil rights; prosecution in the courts; and in some instances even physical violence 
and death.
16
 Within these broader categories, an infinite variety of particular injustices 
and evils were inflicted upon the objects of enmity. These personal animosities became 
so extensive and pervasive in the society that enmity became the modus operandi within 
government and undermined every political office and state institution in Rome. Those 
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anecdotes, and court cases to support his assertion that enmity was its own institution. He does, however, 
make a distinction between friendship (amicitia/fi !lia) and enmity (inimicitia/e“cqra): “Amicitia in its 
ideal form conferred sacred obligations. Inimicitiae never did. They created only vague expectations of 
hostile activity” (2). 
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most obviously affected included the priesthood, the military, the courts, and the offices 
with the power of the imperium.
17
 
The causes of enmity ranged from personal insults or disagreements to political 
opposition. The animosity was particularly evident when there had been a breach of trust, 
such as the betrayal of a friendship, the violation of a patron-client relationship, or the 
compromise of a marriage. In the political arena, envy played a huge role in precipitating 
enmity: envy against those already in power, new-comers threatening the security of the 
incumbents, or individuals who seemed to be acquiring power too quickly. Among those 
who were not serious contenders for political power, greed incited enmity and lay behind 
many a betrayal. Finally, any effort to interfere with someone’s social advancement or to 
thwart someone’s career would be grounds for personal enmity.
18
 
Ultimately, however, the driving force behind this phenomenon of enmity was 
revenge: the desire to retaliate against those injuring one’s reputation or preventing one’s 
social advancement. “Inimici used a wide variety of weapons, but shared a burning desire 
for revenge and a unique commitment to the pursuit of private warfare.”
19
 In analyzing an 
abrupt shift in loyalty by Cicero, Epstein comments further that “a Roman experienced 
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particular satisfaction in taking revenge, and Roman society accepted such behavior.”
20
 
In his letter to Rome, Paul challenges this attitude, reminding the believers that revenge 
belongs to God alone. Rather than join the enmity game and return evil for evil, they are 
to love their enemies and make every effort to live peacefully with all (Rom 12:17–21). 
For believers, that “every effort” means resolution and reconciliation, an 
exchange of hostility for peace. For those who are genuinely in Christ, that exchange is 
not only possible, it is essential. When dealing with unbelievers, believers must still make 
that same effort for a resolution, but the sad reality, from Paul’s perspective, is that those 
without Christ and without the Spirit may be incapable of making that exchange. 
In either case, the basic approach to resolution is the same and follows principles 
that the Romans themselves used in trying to resolve their enmities, especially those that 
threatened the survival of the state.
21
 First, a mediator, that is, a third party not directly 
involved in the dispute, was often required to effect reconciliation. The mutual distrust of 
the hostile parties, as well as their avoidance of any social dealings with each other, made 
direct contact impracticable. A mediator would have to ease their mutual suspicions 
before even arranging a meeting of the parties. 
Second, because resolutions can unravel so easily over issues of honor and shame, 
the mediator must understand the dynamics of honor and shame at work in negotiations 
and resolution. The dignitas (honor) of the mediator suffers when a negotiation fails or a 
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 These principles are gleaned primarily from Epstein, 1–11. However, he does address the matter 
of resolution at various points throughout his book. 
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purported resolution falls apart and hostility breaks out anew. Therefore, the mediator is 
motivated to push for a resolution and to remain involved long enough to hold the parties 
accountable to whatever agreement is reached. However, the mediator’s sense of his own 
dignitas is not sufficient by itself to secure the resolution. Both of the antagonists must 
also respect the mediator and feel some sense of obligation to guard his dignitas. 
Otherwise, the mediator has no leverage to hold them to their agreement and they have no 
motivation to maintain what could be a difficult, and in some respects even unpalatable, 
resolution. Therefore, the disputing parties need to understand that if their mediator loses 
face because they fail to preserve a resolution, then ultimately they lose face as well. 
Thus their own honor is linked to preserving the mediator’s honor. 
Similarly, the mediator must uphold the dignitas of the antagonists lest they suffer 
humiliation and abandon the process. In political contexts especially, a person could lose 
considerable prestige, not to mention power and influence, if that person seemed to 
reconcile too quickly or too easily with the opponents. Therefore, the mediator had to 
ensure that the negotiations proceeded at a moderate, respectable pace and that the terms 
of agreement did not favor one party more than the other. As a result, the process could 
resemble the delicate negotiation of a formal treaty and was often celebrated by a banquet 
to reinforce the good faith and good will invested in the resolution of the enmity.
22
 
Mediators had several strategies available for resolving enmity that would at the 
same time enhance the ethos of the two antagonists. The first played to their respective 
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selfish ambitions. The mediator would convince the parties that pursuing their enmity 
with each other would conflict with other political opportunities to acquire power, wealth, 
honor, or any of several other aspirations the antagonists had. In this situation, personal 
honor was not at stake because each party could walk away from the enmity feeling that 
whatever prestige may have been lost in the process was really quite minor compared to 
the potential rewards to be gained in another direction. 
Another approach capitalized on the public’s opinion of the opponents, suggesting 
that the public would no longer tolerate their mutual enmity because it was threatening 
national interests. To persist in their open antagonism for one another would erode their 
public images and thus impair the progress of their political careers. While the resolution 
of enmity in such a case would be completely self-serving, a clever politician could still 
exploit the situation at least to restore, and perhaps even increase, his ethos. The public 
explanation might follow this reasoning: 
I have suffered much from this unwarranted assault by my opponent. He has 
sullied my name and unjustly impugned my public record. Although every 
instinct I have is to clear my name and restore your confidence in my integrity, I 
am letting all that go in order to devote myself fully to the interests of the state.
23
  
Such an appeal would play to the sympathies of the public, without the politician’s 
seeming to be weak or whiny and without revealing the politician’s selfish ambition. 
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 Epstein, Enmity, 22–23, shows that just as one can build ethos by laying down one’s enmity, 
one can likewise build ethos by taking up enmity. In fact, he considers the pursuit of enmity in the interest 
of the state to be a rhetorical topos and quotes Cicero, “Let those who might wish to corrupt the judiciary 
‘know that they will find me a great deal more persistent and more forcible against those men with whom I 
shall take up enmity in the interest of the welfare of the Roman people’” (Cicero Prov. Cons. 21).  
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Finally, a mediator could appeal to virtue and convince the antagonists to resolve 
their contention on the basis of their mutual commitment to some higher value, such as, 
friendship, patriotism, or justice. Resorting to the higher value brings a resolution that 
serves everyone well. The mediator does not have to bring the parties to an agreement on 
the original matter, which technically is left unresolved, thereby avoiding the awkward 
and unpleasant position of making a friend of one party and an enemy of the other. More 
importantly, however, neither party appears to have yielded to the other, so that there is 
no “winner” or “loser” in the competition for honor. They simply abandon their enmity. 
Ultimately, such a resolution has great appeal for the public as well. Despite a high 
tolerance for the competition and dirty tricks associated with enmity, and perhaps even an 
admiration for those shrewd and tough enough to survive in that political climate, the 
public ideally prefers to see virtue take precedence over expediency. 
In addition to these two principles of conflict resolution, that is, the use of a 
mediator and the management of honor and shame—both of which Paul applies freely to 
conflict resolution in his churches, a third principle emerges amid the pragmatism and 
cynicism associated with political friendships: the genuine resolution of conflict, not just 
the opportunistic flipping of political enmities and friendships. Among the aristocrats, 
political ambition trumps just about everything else. As mentioned above, this reality 
could be exploited by a mediator to persuade opponents to abandon their enmity and 
come to some resolution. They might even make a public display of reconciliation and 
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friendship, such as a banquet, and on some occasions, even a marriage.
24
 At the same 
time, however, raw political ambition blurred the distinction between true reconciliation 
and mere political expediency. One could never be truly certain whether a resolution was 
genuine or not. While such ambiguity may be tolerated in the culture, it has no legitimate 
place in the church. Therefore, the main thrust of Paul’s exhortation and exemplification 
regarding conflict resolution addresses the matters of attitude, motive, and sincerity in the 
resolution of conflict, even as he underscores the value of mediators and the importance 
of preserving the honor and integrity of those at odds with each other in the church. 
The remainder of this chapter will examine four situations where Paul deals with 
conflict between believers: Philemon and Onesimus (Philemon), Euodia and Syntyche 
(Philippians), civil lawsuits in Corinth (1 Corinthians), Paul and Peter (Galatians). The 
context and circumstances differ from one conflict to the next, and so Paul’s responses 
also differ, as he handles each situation individually. At the same time, however, certain 
principles apply in each situation. A comparison of the four will provide insights at two 
levels: how Paul’s approach to resolving conflict resembles or differs from the methods 
for dealing with personal enmity in the broader culture, and how Paul’s model might 
apply to conflict resolution in the modern church. 
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Philemon and Onesimus 
This conflict involves Philemon, a house-church leader in Colossae, and his slave 
Onesimus.
25
 While it is impossible to reconstruct the details of the conflict with certainty, 
the results are plain enough. Onesimus left Philemon under less than favorable conditions 
(v. 18) and has ended up with Paul. In the course of events, Onesimus has now become a 
believer (v. 10), he has developed a close relationship with Paul (v. 12), and he has 
served Paul during his imprisonment (vv. 11, 13). So great is Paul’s affection for him and 
the value of his ministry, that Paul is reluctant to send Onesimus back to Philemon (vv. 
13–14). However, Paul does send him back, presumably bearing this letter. 
The letter is Paul’s attempt to reconcile Philemon and his errant slave as brothers 
in Christ, lest Philemon punish him in accordance with the laws of the empire that would 
have allowed, though not necessarily required, capital punishment for the slave.
26
 More 
than just preserving the life of Onesimus, however, Paul desires to see a transformation in 
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 Paul addresses the letter first to Philemon, whom Paul refers to as his sunergovV (“coworker”) 
and in whose home the church assembles (v. 1). These factors, along with Philemon’s blessing so many 
other believers (v. 7), suggest that Philemon is the leader. However, Paul also mentions Apphia, Archippus, 
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follow. For more implications of the address and salutation, see Peter T. O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 
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Philemon’s attitude toward Onesimus, perhaps even to the point of granting him freedom 
or dispatching him to be with Paul on a more permanent basis.
27
 
Because Paul is appealing to Philemon on behalf of Onesimus, this is a “letter of 
mediation” and thus casts Paul in the role of mediator in this dispute between Philemon 
and Onesimus.
28
 However, Paul does not merely facilitate a negotiation between the two 
parties as an uninvolved third party might do. Rather, Paul advocates strongly in favor of 
Onesimus, and thus he serves in two roles: mediator and advocate. As mediator Paul is 
careful not to impose his decision upon either party, but as advocate Paul uses all means 
legitimately available to him to persuade Philemon to respond in a manner consistent 
with grace and faith. Paul’s apparent strategy is to appeal to Philemon based on the social 
obligation of their friendship, the spiritual obligation of his faith in Christ, and his public 
reputation before the church in order to secure a resolution of the conflict.
29
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keeping Onesimus as a slave. Paul leaves it for Philemon and the community to determine which course of 
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 Stanley K. Stowers, Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity, Library of Early Christianity 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 153–56, identifies the letter of mediation as a sub-type of the 
letter of introduction, or what Chan-Hie Kim, Form and Structure of the Familiar Greek Letter of 
Recommendation, SBL Dissertation Series 4 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1972), refers to as a letter of 
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wants the recipient to do” (Stowers, 156). 
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 Whether this was intended to be a public or private letter is a matter of continuing debate. The 
address to multiple parties (including the whole congregation), the custom of reading Paul’s letters in 
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To be an effective mediator, Paul must have the full trust and confidence of both 
parties. The strength and intimacy of the friendship between Paul and Philemon is evident 
immediately in the salutation (v. 1). Paul addresses him as ajgaphtw!Æ (literally “beloved 
one,” but more appropriately “dear friend”) and sunergwÆ! (“coworker”), a category 
reserved for those in Paul’s traveling entourage or in prominent leadership roles in local 
congregations. That designation as coworker is closely related to his status as Paul’s 
koinwnovn (v. 17), meaning either “companion,” suggesting that he had accompanied Paul 
at some point, or “partner,” implying that they were engaged in some kind of enterprise 
together. Either way, the term is indicative of a close friendship. Paul also addresses him 
twice using the vocative ajdelfev (“brother,” vv. 7, 20).30  
More significantly still, Paul alludes to the fact that Philemon owes him his very 
self (v. 19). This likely means that Philemon was converted through his association with 
Paul, but there is no way to confirm that. Nevertheless, whether that is the case or not, 
Paul’s use of that expression means that Philemon was deeply indebted to him for some 
                                                                                                                                            
public worship, certain technical legal vocabulary that would be associated with public documents, and the 
use of rhetorical devices that would only have effect publicly suggest that Paul sent this as an apostolic 
letter to a church with the intent of a public reading. For the opposing view that the personal appeal, the 
avoidance of authoritarian tone, and Paul’s delicacy in presenting his request suggest that this was strictly a 
private letter not meant to be read to the congregation, see F. F. Bruce The Epistles to the Colossians, to 
Philemon, and to the Ephesians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: 1984), 198–202. 
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 The use of ajdelfovV (“brother”) is common in Paul. He uses it frequently in the vocative plural 
as a generic term of address for the believers, both women and men, to whom he is writing (Rom 1:13; 
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person that Paul addresses directly as brother, thus indicating an intimate, friendly relationship that is 
unique among all of Paul’s other acquaintances. 
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reason that could not easily be requited. Finally, Paul knows Philemon well enough to 
invite himself for a visit to Philemon’s home, but only on the expectation of the prayers 
of Philemon’s group and the deliverance of God (v. 22).
31
 
Despite the brevity of the letter, there is abundant evidence of a close and strong 
friendship between Paul and Philemon, and with that friendship would come certain 
social obligations. Not least is the indebtedness that Philemon has to Paul “for his very 
life,” which would require that he be responsive to any requests that Paul may make of 
him. Furthermore, Paul’s friends would be his friends and Paul’s enemies his enemies. 
Therefore, by promoting Onesimus as his child (v. 10) and his very heart and soul (v. 12), 
Paul makes Philemon’s social obligation to Paul, and thus to Onesimus as well, evident. 
The cultural rules of friendship and hospitality leave Philemon with few if any other 
options than to accede to Paul’s request that he receive Onesimus as he would receive 
Paul himself (v. 17). To do otherwise would be to jeopardize the friendship with Paul. 
Therefore, one must assert that from a purely social and cultural perspective, Paul has the 
more powerful position.  
On top of that advantage, Paul also brings the power of public opinion to bear 
upon Philemon and his decision regarding Onesimus. The public reading of the letter sets 
before the whole congregation the nature of the dispute, Philemon’s character, and his 
reputation for spiritual largesse toward the believing community (v. 7). Paul’s appeal to 
public opinion features as elegant a display as one will find in the subtle art of building 
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ethos. However, it is not just his own ethos, but that of Philemon and Onesimus as well, 
that Paul bolsters in swaying public opinion in support of his request of Philemon on 
behalf of Onesimus. 
The thanksgiving section of the letter (vv. 4–7) can be read at one level as an 
encomium on Philemon’s faith and love, that is, on his devotion to the Lord and his 
service to the saints. This positive focus on Philemon raises his own sense of ethos as his 
dear friend praises him publicly, but more than that, it raises his esteem within the house 
church community. Rhetorically speaking, there are no losers in that thanksgiving, for the 
kind and generous comments by Paul would favorably dispose the community toward 
Paul as well. Thus, everyone’s ethos is raised. However, even as Philemon’s reputation is 
increased, so is the expectation for his behavior in the future. The community now has 
every reason to expect Philemon to act consistently with his reputation as Paul puts the 
matter with Onesimus before them all. Therefore, in this praise, before the main issue has 
even been presented, Paul is already increasing the pressure on Philemon to comply with 
his request—the pressure of public opinion. 
Paul’s greatest challenge in swaying public opinion is to present the errant slave 
Onesimus in a positive light. Considering that the suasion of a mediatory letter depends 
heavily on the ethos and authority of the mediator, Paul must not only raise his own ethos 
in the eyes of the community, but even more particularly remind them of his authority. 
Even though Paul does not intend to exploit his authority, strategically he does need to 
make a point of it. Showing his authority without resorting to it provides yet another 
means for Paul to promote a favorable attitude among the people toward his request. 
188 
Paul specifically mentions his status as a prisoner four times (vv. 1, 9, 10, 13), and 
three of the four he relates to Jesus Christ or the gospel. In the social hierarchy of Paul’s 
day, being a slave or a prisoner did not enhance one’s standing. Yet, for Paul, identifying 
himself as a slave or prisoner for the sake of Christ or the gospel becomes a badge of 
honor, and so against all social intuition, his imprisonment raises his ethos among the 
believers.
32
 Paul’s imprisonment, and probably his suffering in general, would have 
drawn the sympathies of his audience at two levels: first, suffering increases one’s pathos 
and that naturally evokes sympathy, and second, suffering specifically for Christ bolsters 
one’s ethos and that too creates a sympathetic disposition within the audience.
33
 
Along that same line, Paul refers to himself as presbuvthV (“old man”)—itself a 
term that invites sympathy for the raft of troubles that accompany the encroachments of 
age. However, the term is far more rhetorically potent than that. In that culture, the “old 
men” bore the authority in the government and in the church. Thus, presbuvteroi were 
the Roman Senators, the Council of Elders, and the ruling officers in the church. Thus in 
calling himself presbuvthV (“old man”), Paul nudges his readers with a reminder of his 
own authority among them. Even more poignantly, presbuvteroi were ambassadors sent 
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on behalf of the king to negotiate peace treaties among warring parties. What more fitting 
metaphor could Paul have invoked to bolster his own authority to broker a peace between 
Philemon and Onesimus: Paul the apostle, slave, prisoner, and ambassador for Christ? All 
of these terms are commonplaces for Paul’s self-identification and they are masterfully 
woven into the rhetoric of his letter—just enough to nudge, but not to exploit. 
In this way Paul has raised his own ethos: saying just enough to remind the people 
of his authority, but not so much that they resent his authority or resent him for boasting 
inappropriately. However, Paul does not secure his ethos for its own sake, but that he 
may expend it in building the ethos of Onesimus with both Philemon and the community. 
This is necessary, for Philemon has lost money, productivity, and perhaps even public 
reputation within and without the community because of the misbehavior of Onesimus. 
Therefore, Paul must convince Philemon and the believers of the inherent value of this 
“useless” slave.
34
 Paul proposes to do this in three ways: by showing his love for 
Onesimus and the value of their relationship, by showing his value to the Lord, and 
finally by showing his value to Philemon. 
The first two sections of a letter of mediation typically focus on the relationship 
between the mediator and the offending individual, emphasizing the familial-like bond 
that unites them.
35
 This pattern emerges in the letter to Philemon as well and underscores 
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the strong bond of friendship, trust, and loyalty between Paul and Onesimus. Thus on the 
strength of his relationships with both Philemon and Onesimus, Paul proves to be the 
ideal mediator for such a dispute. The paternal nature of his relationship with Onesimus 
also makes Paul a credible advocate for Onesimus. 
Before even naming Onesimus as the subject of the mediation, Paul introduces 
him as tou: ejmou: tevknou (“my child,” the emphasis is in the emphatic form of the Greek 
pronoun). He adds to the pathos by referring to Onesimus as the child o}n ejgevnnhsa ejn 
toiæV desmoiæV (“whom I bore while in chains”)36 and later as ta; ejma; splavgcna (“my very 
heart,” again the emphatic pronoun). Such is Paul’s love for Onesimus. 
However, this love is not based on emotional or familial bond alone, but it is also 
founded on the ministry that Paul has received from Onesimus (v. 13). Paul again uses a 
pathos-rich image to draw upon the sympathies of Philemon and the community in his 
effort to raise the ethos of Onesimus. Here is the slave that Philemon considers of no 
value at all fulfilling a spiritual ministry of great value to Paul in the context of a most 
pathetic imprisonment. What is more, despite Philemon’s ignorance of it, Paul construes 
this ministry an extension of Philemon’s own ministry to the saints. The very thing that 
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brought Paul such great joy, namely, Philemon’s loving refreshment of the saints, is now 
being continued and carried on by Philemon’s so-called “useless” slave (vv. 7, 13). That 
Onesimus is doing the same thing for which Philemon was commended constitutes a tacit 
commendation of Onesimus as well, and that can only enhance his ethos. 
Throughout his appeal to Philemon, Paul promotes his beloved child from useless 
slave (v. 11), to useful minister (v. 13), to beloved brother (v. 16), and ultimately he asks 
Philemon to receive him back as a partner and companion (v. 17). One can scarcely grasp 
the impact this must have had on Philemon. Paul has taken Onesimus from the lowest 
stratum of society and accepted him as a peer. Paul has welcomed him into the same 
intimacy that he has shared with Philemon. Paul and Philemon were ajdelfoi! (“brothers”) 
and koinwnoi! (“partners”), and now Paul wants Philemon to receive Onesimus as he 
would receive Paul. All of the social obligations of friendship with Paul, all of the public 
pressure of the community, and all of the rhetorical ethos building notwithstanding, could 
the social climate of the day sustain that kind of radical demand upon Philemon? 
In all likelihood, no. Even if Paul had fully exploited his power over Philemon 
derived from their friendship (which he did not), and even if Paul had brought all the 
pressure that he could have generated from the community to bear upon Philemon (which 
he did not), it is improbable that Philemon could have or would have fulfilled Paul’s 
request. The very audacity of such a request would have violated the canons of friendship 
and nullified any obligation that Philemon would otherwise have had. 
Paul realizes this and therefore includes his third avenue of persuasion, namely, 
Philemon’s spiritual obligation to Christ, as the central thrust of his strategy for resolving 
192 
the conflict between Philemon and Onesimus. Despite the persuasive value of rhetoric, 
the social obligations of friendship, and the political power of community pressure, Paul 
recognizes that only faith expressing itself in love can bring rest and refreshment to the 
human heart (vv. 5–7; cf. Gal 5:6), and so he makes his appeal on behalf of Onesimus 
and encourages Philemon to respond on the basis of love (v. 9). 
In his multifaceted identity as apostle, slave, prisoner, and ambassador of Christ, 
Paul recognizes what authority he has. He alludes to this in speaking of the considerable 
parrhsi!an (“boldness, confidence, frank speech”) that he has in Christ, so much in fact 
that he could order Philemon to do what is expected of him in Christ, that is, to receive 
Onesimus back as a brother in the Lord with the same status as Paul himself (vv. 8, 16–
17).
37
 However, Paul does not press his apostolic authority any more than he exploited 
his advantage in the friendship. Rhetorically, Paul “shows,” but does not “play,” his 
apostolic authority card. Rather, he encourages Philemon to respond to Onesimus, as he 
has to all the saints, in faith (implicitly) and love (explicitly). Therefore, one might 
imagine Paul to be saying that despite his great confidence in his authority to speak as an 
apostle of Christ and order Philemon to comply with his request, he would rather that 
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 The expression pollh;n ejn Cristw:" parrhsi!an e[cwn has multiple valences because of two 
possible nuances of parrhsi!an (“boldness, frank speech”) and the question of what the prepositional 
phrase ejn Cristw:" (“in Christ”) is modifying. The latter is more easily determined. Because the phrase is 
sandwiched between the adjective pollh;n (“much, great”) and the noun parrhsi!an (“boldness, frank 
speech”), it is modifying the noun. Thus, Paul can say that he has great boldness or frank speech in Christ. 
David E. Fredrickson “PARRHSIA in the Pauline Epistles” in FFFS, 165–71, grounds frank speech in 
freedom and friendship, and in this context sees the association of friendship and frank speech as the focus. 
Although one concedes that the association is there, it seems that Paul is intentionally shifting Philemon’s 
sense of obligation from Paul, whether as friend or as authoritative apostle, to the Lord.  
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Philemon respond to Onesimus on the basis of the charitable spirit he has consistently 
shown to all believers—the charitable spirit that derives from his faith in the Lord Jesus. 
By redirecting Philemon to the obligations of faith and love, Paul reinforces two 
important aspects of effective mediation among believers: individuals must be treated 
with the respect they merit as brothers and sisters in Christ and the ultimate authority for 
attitudes, actions, behaviors, and choices must be grounded in the Lord. All of the ethos 
building that Paul did for Philemon, that is, the encomium on his faith and love, the 
references to their friendship and work as partners, the deference Paul shows in not acting 
on his own wishes with respect to Onesimus but seeking the consent of Philemon, all of 
that would have been wasted, or more regrettably, viewed as insincere, as mere flattery, if 
Paul had finally dealt with Philemon as a subordinate rather than as a peer. By muting his 
apostolic authority, Paul accords Philemon a measure of freedom to choose for himself 
what form his response of love would take. It allows Philemon the dignity of determining 
and doing the loving thing on his own, rather than being compelled to do it by someone 
else (v. 14). Now, to be sure, Paul makes some use of all the tools of persuasion that he 
has available in order to incline Philemon in the right direction, but in the end, he appeals 
to Philemon as a peer and does not order him as a subordinate. 
That is not to say, however, that Philemon is free to make any choice that he 
wants. He is still under authority, but under the authority of Christ rather than that of 
Paul, the congregation, or the culture. Again, this shift in authority to Christ does not 
mean that Paul, the congregation, and the culture become irrelevant to his decision, for all 
three to one extent or another will reinforce the claims, demands, and expectations that 
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come from being in Christ. In fact, that very relevance enables Paul to use the three to 
encourage Philemon to make the appropriate choice before God. Rather, the shift in 
authority forces Philemon to consider God’s initiatives and purposes in all that has 
happened even as he forms his own perspectives and decides how he will choose to 
respond to Onesimus. 
The significant consequence of Paul’s approach, then, is not to remove other 
influences, but to establish ultimate authority in the Lord and to affect the interpersonal 
dynamic of the mediation process. Practically speaking, the approach taken with the 
parties in a conflict, whether highly directive, demanding, and insistent on the one hand, 
or advisory, exhortational, and suggestive on the other, sets the tone for their attitude and 
demeanor in approaching a resolution. As Paul acknowledges throughout his letter to 
Philemon, it is always preferred that one should act out of the voluntary initiative of faith 
and love, than out of a sense of compulsion by a higher authority (vv. 5, 7, 9, 14). 
Paul does not disrespect Philemon by denying or excusing what Onesimus has 
done or by minimizing the loss that Philemon has suffered as a result. He addresses the 
matter immediately and directly, but also with beguiling rhetorical finesse in order to ease 
the tension over the offense. After initiating his appeal on behalf of “his child born in 
prison” (v. 10), Paul acknowledges Philemon’s grievance by affirming that Onesimus, 
contrary to his name “useful,” was in fact at one time “useless” to Philemon. Paul hastens 
to add, however, that Onesimus—now that he is in Christ—has been restored to his true 
identity and has been most “useful” to Paul. By making this humorous play on words for 
the name Onesimus and by following it immediately with a positive word that Onesimus 
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has changed, Paul lessens the tension and negativity bound to arise with the reminder of 
the offenses and moves the audience to something more favorable lest they have time to 
dwell on the negative. Thus, Paul is able to face the harsh reality of the offenses without 
in turn generating more harshness toward Onesimus. 
Paul then suggests another way to view this whole situation. He takes the focus 
off Philemon’s grievance with Onesimus and places it instead on the redemptive work of 
God in Onesimus, which ultimately benefits all three of them (vv. 15–16). The benefit to 
Onesimus is most dramatic and most obvious. Through his association with Paul, he has 
become a believer, so that his status as slave, which had been true spiritually (in Pauline 
terms he was a slave to sin) and socially (in human terms he was a slave to Philemon), 
has now been changed. In Christ, he has been set free from his enslavement to sin (yet 
still a slave to God), and if Philemon catches the redemptive vision that Paul intimates, 
then Onesimus might also be set free from his enslavement to Philemon. Regardless of 
whether Philemon retains him as a slave or sets him free, Onesimus is now a beloved 
brother and ought to be received as such both by Philemon and within the community. 
The benefit to Paul lies in the joy of the relationship and in the particular ministry 
that Onesimus has provided to him. Furthermore, depending upon Philemon’s response, 
Paul may yet retain the services of Onesimus on a more extended basis.  
The benefit to Philemon may not be so obvious. After all, if Philemon were to 
free Onesimus, he would have to bear not only the losses originally suffered from the 
misconduct of Onesimus, but also the cost of replacing, or not replacing, him in the work 
force of his household. Moreover, his public reputation could suffer for being so lenient 
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with his slaves and his household could be thrown into chaos by the resentment of his 
other slaves. While Paul reckons the benefit to Philemon in terms of increasing his 
generosity and extending his ministry, he is not totally insensitive to the personal costs 
either. 
As early in the letter as the thanksgiving (vv.4–6), Paul implies in his petition that 
Philemon may have yet another dimension to discover in ministry among the saints. Paul 
prays that Philemon’s generosity, that is, his expressions of love toward all the saints, 
might become effective in leading him to a deeper understanding of the full extent of 
good things that belong to him in Christ, and not to him alone, but to every believer 
(v. 6).
38
 The expression ei !V Cristovn (“in/into Christ”) is a bit awkward. One might have 
expected the preposition ejn (“in”) to express the locative (place where), but O’Brien 
suggests that Paul used ei !V as the equivalent of ejn to avoid a harsh doubling of the ejn in 
the resulting phrase ejn hJmiæn ejn Cristw "Æ (“in us in Christ”).39 However, the ei!V Cristovn 
could also express purpose and be rendered “for Christ,” thereby implying that Philemon, 
and all other believers as well, have much good in them still to be done for the sake of 
Christ. Thus the thrust of Paul’s petition, which makes eminent sense in light of what 
Paul believes Philemon ought to do in respect to Onesimus, is that Philemon would come 
to understand that the love he has for the saints and the good that he has done for them 
ought to be extended to Onesimus as well for the sake of Christ. 
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 On the grammatical and interpretative complexities of this verse, see O’Brien, Colossians, 
Philemon, 279–81. 
39
 O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 281. 
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Even as the thanksgiving anticipates Paul’s request that Philemon take his former 
slave back as a beloved brother in the Lord (spiritually free) and in the flesh (socially 
free), Paul recognizes that Philemon still has a right to expect restitution for his losses. 
Paul the mediator acknowledges this to Philemon and offers to pay whatever Onesimus 
owes him. With a dramatic flourish, Paul then signs the letter as one would sign an IOU 
to guarantee payment (vv. 18–19). The symbolism here is not to be missed: the mediator 
paying the debt on behalf of the offender in order that the offender may be set free from 
the consequences of the offense and that the offended party might be satisfied. This is the 
very heart of Paul’s gospel and this is what must always occur for conflicting parties to 
find peace.  
The Athenian peacemakers took a similar approach with their Spartan oppressors 
when Athens paid the war debts for the deposed Spartan oligarchs. However, Paul’s offer 
to pay what Onesimus owes to Philemon goes even one step further than the Athenians, 
for Philemon himself is indebted to the mediator. Paul calls this to his attention (v. 19) 
with the implication that even as Paul has not demanded repayment from Philemon, so 
Philemon ought not demand repayment from Onesimus. Therefore, though Philemon may 
be entitled to restitution, he need not insist upon it if the gospel, reconciliation, and peace 
are better served by his absorbing the loss.
40
 
Paul concludes the mediatory portion of the letter with two statements of 
confidence (vv. 21–22). First, Paul is confident in Philemon’s obedience and knows that 
                                                
40
 While this may seem counter-intuitive to justice, which must be served if there is to be peace, 
Paul makes essentially this same point with the Corinthians whose lawsuits with one another have made a 
mockery of the gospel, reconciliation, and peace in the church there (1 Cor 6:6–8). 
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he will respond by doing even more than what Paul has said. On the one hand, this may 
simply be another tactic on Paul’s part to create a greater public expectation for Philemon 
to comply, which will in turn put more social pressure on him to do as Paul has asked. 
However, on the other hand, this may be a genuine expression of Paul’s confidence in his 
friend’s devotion to the Lord and his commitment to conduct himself honorably before 
God and the congregation in his home. The text suggests the latter. The two participles in 
verse 21, pepoiqw;V (“having been fully persuaded and thus now confident”) and ei!dw;V 
(“having come to know and thus now knowing”), both express the basis upon which Paul 
wrote what he did. They both represent Paul’s state of mind when he wrote the letter, not 
after he wrote. In other words, Paul was already confident when he wrote, and that very 
confidence is what prompted him to write. Paul is not saying that his confidence came as 
a result of what he wrote, but rather that his confidence was already in place when he 
wrote. This may seem too fine a point to focus upon, but it does speak directly to Paul’s 
mediatory role and strategy. 
Though Paul employed rhetoric, friendship, and public pressure to help move 
Philemon toward a proper acceptance of Onesimus, he did not consider those to be the 
deciding factors in Philemon’s decision. Rather, he wrote with full confidence that the 
gospel would motivate Philemon to respond appropriately, just as it should for every 
believer in every circumstance. 
Paul’s second statement of confidence is that he would soon be released from his 
own imprisonment and able to visit Philemon, so he instructs him to prepare the guest 
room (v. 22). Again, one may see this simply as a rhetorical tactic to put more pressure 
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on Philemon, and that element is surely present. After all, if Philemon does not comply 
with Paul’s request, then he would face the uncomfortable prospect of having to explain 
himself directly to Paul and the church during the visit. Furthermore, as a mediator with a 
vested interest in the outcome, Paul will want to remain involved to oversee compliance. 
However, Paul has just affirmed his confidence that Philemon is going to respond beyond 
what Paul has asked (v. 21), and that because of Christ, not because of Paul. It would be 
most disingenuous of Paul to follow that immediately with any suggestion, however 
subtle or mild, of a threatened accountability. That would not only undermine rhetorically 
all the positive ethos building for Philemon, but would also contradict the spirit and 
strategy of his letter in making Philemon ultimately accountable to the Lord. 
This proposed visit is rather to be understood as a reaffirmation of his confidence 
that Philemon will respond appropriately before the Lord. At the end of the thanksgiving 
Paul praises Philemon for his loving ministry to the saints (v. 7): ta; splavgcna tw:n 
aJgi !wn ajnapevpautai dia; sou: (“the hearts of the saints have been refreshed through 
you,” Greek pronoun is emphatic). Then, using virtually the same expression, Paul urges 
Philemon to do the same for him (v. 20): ajnavpausovn mou ta; splavgcna ejn Kuri!w " 
(“refresh my heart in the Lord”).
41
 Paul follows with his two statements of confidence 
(vv. 21–22) implying that Philemon’s obedience and Paul’s release and subsequent 
reunion with Philemon are the two ways that Paul, like the other saints, will be the 
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 It should be noted that ajnapauvw (“to rest, refresh”) has as its root pauvw (“to end, stop, cease, 
cause to rest”), so that the rest and refreshment offered by Philemon includes the idea of relief from noise, 
trouble, and turmoil—all of which have major implications relating to the conventions of hospitality in the 
ancient world, which in turn would have implications for peace. However, those connections extend well 
beyond the purview of this particular study. 
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recipient of refreshment through Philemon. Given the harsh conditions of ancient 
imprisonment, even if somewhat alleviated as house arrest, and the quality of friendship 
between Philemon and Paul, a visit such as Paul anticipates would indeed excite genuine 
enthusiasm at the prospects of relief from his current circumstances,
42
 not to mention the 
opportunity to celebrate the reconciliation of Philemon and Onesimus with all the joy and 
feasting appropriate to a declaration of peace. 
In conclusion to this extended analysis of Paul’s mediation between Philemon and 
Onesimus, several general observations can be made about conflict among believers and 
the Pauline principles and procedures for resolving it. The first observation is that conflict 
is a community matter. Even if the conflict focuses on just two individuals, conflict 
disrupts the unity of the whole body and thus no longer qualifies as a private matter.
43
 
The second observation is that each person in a conflict is a responsible party 
before God and must be treated as such. Each must be granted the dignity and freedom to 
make moral choices, and then held accountable for the choices. The further assumption 
that the individual is actually a believer may or may not be true. Despite what a person 
may think or profess, Paul indicates that people can be deceived and that certain attitudes 
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 Whether this is the same imprisonment reflected in Paul’s letter to Philippi or not is a contested 
matter among scholars. Most major commentaries on the so-called prison epistles cover the question in 
detail. However, all that notwithstanding, one cannot miss the similarities in the two letters with regard to 
Paul’s expectations of release from prison, the instrumentality of his supporters’ prayers, and his eagerness 
for a joyful reunion (Phil 1:19–26). 
43
 Considerable care is needed in formalizing this observation into a principle or procedure for 
conflict resolution. The premise of an apostolic letter is to address public matters in the local church(es). It 
is sent as an alternative to the apostle’s own visit, which for any number of reasons is impossible at the 
time. Therefore, by default, all the conflicts in Paul’s letters are public issues. This leaves completely open 
the question whether Paul himself may have considered some issues private, or how he may have handled 
certain conflicts that occurred during his stay with the various congregations. 
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and behaviors are unacceptable within the community (1 Cor 5:11; 6:9–10; Gal 5:19–21). 
Such offenders are to be dissociated from the church and unless they are restored, they 
will have no inheritance in the kingdom of God. 
The third observation is that the process of resolving conflict between believers 
must follow the same pattern as reconciling individuals to God. That is to say, the gospel 
must be at work in both situations, for the gospel has the transformative power necessary 
to effect reconciliation (Rom 1:16; 2 Cor 5:14–21). Furthermore, that same power is 
available to each believer, and to the community as a whole, as the indwelling Spirit of 
God, who produces the love, peace, gentleness, patience, kindness, and so on—all the 
qualities or characteristics necessary for resolving conflict and living in peace within the 
community (Gal 5:22–24). 
The fourth observation is that Paul used cultural conventions of friendship, public 
opinion, or perhaps more precisely honor-shame, patron-client, and rhetoric—not to 
mention hints of his apostolic authority—to persuade Philemon of the right path. All the 
same, the right path was not defined by those cultural conventions, nor was it expected 
that they would convince Philemon in making his decision. In the end, the decisive 
authority, influence, and power were spiritual, not social, or cultural. Paul’s conviction of 
this reality determined his approach to Philemon, his strategy in creating the letter, and 
his confidence in its effectiveness. 
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Euodia and Syntyche 
As Paul’s first church in Europe, Philippi became a stable and faithful support to 
Paul in his gospel ministry and in his collection for Jerusalem.
44
 Nevertheless, the church 
experienced conflict that not only threatened the continuation of their partnership with 
Paul,
45
 but perhaps even their viability as a church. Paul never identifies the specific 
issue, but the tone of his letter implies that the problem is serious and has already caused 
a breach between Paul’s coworkers Euodia and Syntyche (Phil 4:2–3). The implication is 
that the tension between them is rippling through the church and polarizing the rest of the 
congregation as well. This sense of disunity is evident from the beginning of the letter. 
Paul typically addresses his letters to include all the “saints” in a city or the larger 
surrounding area (Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:2; 2 Cor 1:1; 1 Thess 1:2). However, in this letter to 
Philippi, he names more specifically the church leaders, e!piskovpoiV (“overseers”) and 
diakovnoiV (“deacons”), as recipients of the letter along with paÇsin toiæß aÓgi"oiß (“all the 
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 Paul says little about the founding and early history of the church. He mentions that Philippi 
alone supported him financially at the beginning of his ministry in Macedonia by repeatedly sending aid 
during his stay in Thessalonica (Phil 4:15–16). Therefore, his reference to the generosity of the churches of 
Macedonia (Rom 15:26; 2 Cor 8:1–4) surely includes Philippi, and perhaps even denotes that church 
primarily. The rest of the history and general information concerning Philippi, particularly as a Roman 
colony, derives from the accounts of Luke (Acts 16:10–40) and other historians who recorded the key 
events in Rome from the civil wars of the late Republic through the first century of the Empire. Paul’s 
allusions to his suffering and outrageous mistreatment in Philippi (1 Thess 2:2), the apparent prominence of 
women in leading roles at Philippi (Phil 4:2–3), and the metaphors related to citizenship (Phil 1:27; 3:20) 
are all consistent with Luke’s report of the events in Philippi and thus encourage confidence in the value of 
Luke’s account as background to Paul’s letter. 
45
 See J. Paul Sampley, “Societas Christi: Roman Law and Paul’s Conception of the Christian 
Community,” in God’s Christ and His People: Studies in Honour of Nils Alstrup Dahl, ed. Jacob Jerval and 
Wayne A. Meeks (Oslo: Universitetforlaget, 1977), 166–69, on the partnership as an informal, though 
legally recognized, agreement for mutual involvement in the promulgation of the gospel. Paul’s assurance 
that the gospel ministry continues despite his imprisonment (1:12–14) suggests that he has to shore up his 
support within the church lest the people lose confidence in him and withdraw from the partnership (1:5–6). 
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saints,” Phil 1:1). This singling out of the leadership suggests that they may be the cause 
or the victim of disunity, or perhaps that they are allies on whom Paul can depend to help 
resolve conflict and restore unity. In any case, Paul’s repeated references to “all of you” 
(1:4, 7, 8, 25; 2:17), which reinforce his concern, his prayer, his partnership, and his love 
for them all, imply that some estrangement or tension requires that Paul remind and 
reassure them of their unity. These nudges toward unity in the greeting and thanksgiving 
anticipate Paul’s direct exhortations to unity and like-mindedness later in the letter (Phil 
1:27–28; 2:1–5; 4:2–3). 
Most of the details concerning the conflict between Euodia and Syntyche are not 
known.
46
 However, in Paul’s mind, a failure to resolve their dispute would threaten the 
completion of the work God has begun in Philippi and undermine further promulgation of 
the gospel. Therefore, Paul addresses the conflict directly and appeals to each party in the 
dispute to come to resolution (4:2–3). 
As in the situation with Philemon and Onesimus, Paul fulfills the criteria for an 
ideal mediator. He is well-known, appreciated, and trusted by all the parties involved. He 
also knows the situation and understands the dynamics of shame and honor that would be 
at work. As the founder/patron of the church he also has the requisite authority to call the 
disputants to resolution. However, in this conflict, Paul is not advocating for either of the 
                                                
46
 The dispute between Euodia and Syntyche is not the only instance of conflict in Philippi. There 
seem to be others including rival preachers with the right message but wrong motives (1:15–18), a threat of 
suffering and possibly persecution (1:29–30), and probably Judaizers (3:2). For a survey of the opinions 
about Paul’s opponents and false teachers at Philippi, see Peter T. O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians: 
A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 26–35. 
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parties, nor overtly offering suggestions as to what form the resolution might take. He is 
functioning strictly as mediator.
47
 
Following a sobering reminder of the consequences of living as “enemies of the 
cross of Christ” (3:18–19) and an appeal to follow his example and “stand firm in the 
Lord” (3:17; 4:1), Paul pleads with Euodia and Syntyche to come to agreement in the 
Lord (4:2).
48
 This direct address to them is the culmination of his previous exhortations to 
unity and leaves the impression that the preceding instruction was to establish the proper 
frame of mind for the whole church to address this dispute between Euodia and Syntyche. 
The church is right to make a sharp distinction between those living as enemies of the 
cross (3:18–19) and those living as citizens of heaven (3:20–21). However, conflicts such 
as this one between Euodia and Syntyche are simply not appropriate among believers.  
All those who are in Christ (1:1) must live according to the pattern Paul has given them, 
the same pattern of love, humility, and concern for others that has been exemplified by 
Christ, Timothy, and Epaphroditus. The Philippian believers can and must find unity in 
the Lord. For them to live otherwise is to live as an enemy of the cross, and thus of the 
gospel, and to merit a destiny of shame and destruction (3:18–19). 
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 Both his imprisonment and the complexity of the situation in Philippi make it impossible for 
Paul to be involved in the same way with Euodia and Syntyche as he was with Philemon and Onesimus. 
48
 As previously indicated, the idiom to; aujto; froneiæn (literally “to think the same thing,”) 
belongs within the larger range of Pauline vocabulary related to peace and peacemaking. Depending on the 
context, this idiom may imply unity of mind, harmonious living, or shared system of values. True peace 
cannot exist without this mutuality or agreement, but the idiom does not necessarily imply uniformity in 
thinking. In Pauline thought unity can exist without uniformity. Paul sees no contradiction between the 
ideas of unity and diversity, and in fact he argues for unity despite diversity in his conception of the one 
and the many: one spirit with many gifts and one body with many parts (1 Cor 12). 
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R. A. Culpepper convincingly argues that the central message of Philippians is the 
“denial of self-interest” and that the examples of Jesus, Epaphroditus, and Timothy model 
the appropriate pattern of discipleship for the whole church to follow.
49
 Paul urges the 
believers to live in self-denial and humility, even to the point of death if required, as they 
adopt the attitude of Christ (2:5), just as Paul, Timothy, and Epaphroditus have done. In 
this context, Paul finally addresses the specific conflict between Euodia and Syntyche, 
applying from afar some of the same principles of mediation that he employed more 
directly with Philemon and Onesimus. 
Paul astutely addresses each woman individually.
50
 In so doing, he acknowledges 
their respective leadership roles and addresses by extension any who may have aligned 
themselves with either woman. Furthermore, he acknowledges that a genuine conflict has 
arisen between these two women, both of whom are believers and both of whom have 
together struggled alongside him in the gospel ministry (4:3). If Paul had directed his plea 
for unity to them together, using the verb only once (“I urge Euodia and Syntyche”), he 
would have sent three counterproductive messages and undermined the whole initiative 
for reconciliation. 
First, Paul would have changed the focus of the dispute from the disagreement 
between the two women, which they had to resolve themselves, to a confrontation setting 
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 R. A. Culpepper, “Co-Workers in Suffering: Philippians 2:19–30,” Review and Expositor 77 
(1980), 352–53. See also note 53 below. 
50
 Note Paul’s repetition of the verb: Eujodi!an parakalwÇ kai… Suntuvchn parakalwÇ (“I urge 
Euodia and I urge Syntyche,” 4:2). It would have been grammatically, but not rhetorically, sufficient to use 
the verb only once: Eujodi!an kai… Suntuvchn parakalwÇ (“I urge Euodia and Syntyche”). 
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the two of them on one side and Paul on the other. Second, instead of taking the role of a 
mediator and assisting the two women to come to agreement, Paul would have asserted 
himself as an authority figure demanding, perhaps even dictating terms of, a resolution 
without showing any regard for the dignity and responsibility vested in the leaders. Third, 
Paul would have taken the process of resolution and reconciliation out of the hands of the 
two women and the congregation, thereby depriving them of their responsibility and 
accountability before God. Therefore, in this seemingly minor matter of personal address, 
Paul shows keen pastoral wisdom, rhetorical subtlety, and confidence that they can and 
will succeed in resolving their differences and come to a full reconciliation. 
Paul continues to demonstrate his savvy as a mediator as he urges them toward 
resolution without dishonoring either of the women publicly, without undermining their 
leadership, and without ever having to sort through the details of their enmity. Instead of 
appealing to their selfish ambitions or capitalizing on public opinion—two strategies used 
in resolving political enmity—Paul seeks resolution in their mutual commitment to a 
higher value. He calls them to reconciliation and agreement on the basis of their shared 
identity and mission, namely, their unity in Christ and the gospel. 
Paul recognizes that these women will need resources beyond themselves to effect 
the reconciliation, and so he directs their attention first to the Lord and second to the 
community. Paul’s addition of the phrase e!n kuri"w # (“in the Lord,” 4:2) to his plea for 
their agreement reminds the women—indeed all those to whom the letter is read—that 
finding concord amidst deep disagreements with community-wide implications requires 
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the wisdom and power of God: wisdom to know what change needs to occur and power 
to overcome the selfishness that resists the necessary change.  
Paul prays specifically that the Philippians will have the knowledge and judgment 
to discern what really matters in the long run (1:9–11), but their lack of knowledge is not 
the primary problem. Rather, most of the letter addresses their selfishness, ego, and pride. 
With varying levels of rhetorical directness—frank speech being the mark of genuine 
friendship—Paul challenges their arrogance and self-centeredness using illustrations of 
some bad examples (preachers with wrong motives, Judaizers whose confidence lies in 
fulfilling the Law, and his own attitudes before knowing Christ) and some good examples 
(the preachers with right motives, Christ, Timothy, Epaphroditus, and himself as he now 
follows Christ). Along with these illustrations, Paul includes direct exhortations to unity, 
steadfastness, and Christlikeness. 
The tag line e!n kuri"w # (“in the Lord,” 4:2), which here equates to e!n CristwÆ# (“in 
Christ”),
51
 points back to four realities that Paul has mentioned previously in the letter,
52
 
four realities that all believers, including especially these women, have experienced by 
virtue of being in Christ (2:1–2).
53
 Paul asserts that all those in Christ have experienced 
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 The two are equated in the series of appositives in 3:20: swth:ra, kuvrion, =Ihsou:n Cristovn 
(“savior, Lord, Jesus Christ”). 
52
 These were discussed at length in chapter three and will just be briefly revisited here, though the 
subsequent footnotes contribute further information on how 2:1–2 and 4:2–3 relate structurally. 
53
 This parallel between 2:1–2 and 4:2–3 is part of a larger literary parallel within the letter. In one 
block of text (1:27–2:4), Paul exhorts the people to “discharge their obligations as citizens” (politeuvesqe) 
and to “stand firm” (sthvkete) as they “struggle alongside one another” for the gospel (1:27). He goes on to 
distinguish between those who oppose them and are heading for destruction (ajpolei"aV) and the Philippians 
themselves who are to receive salvation (swthri "aV, 1:28). Then, following a reminder that they are “in 
Christ” (2:1), Paul urges them to “think the same thing” (to; aujto; fronh:te, 2:2). Thus Paul enjoins them to 
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encouragement, comfort, affection, and compassion through their association with Christ 
and their mutual participation with the Holy Spirit.
54
 Therefore, these realities should 
unify the women, lead them to be like-minded, loving, and united (2:2), and facilitate 
their reconciliation, as well as the reconciliation of all those who are in Christ. Paul’s 
direct rebuke of strife, conceit, and selfishness in the verses immediately following   
(2:3–4)
55
 also suggests that the whole community in general, and Euodia and Syntyche in 
particular (4:2), needs to deal with these divisive attitudes, using the resources available 
in the Lord. 
In addition to the resources in the Lord, Paul involves community resources as 
well. To facilitate the process of resolution between Euodia and Syntyche, Paul drafts his 
                                                                                                                                            
unity in the face of a common enemy on the outside and to unity with one another on the inside, simply 
because of what they have experienced and shared together in Christ. In the parallel block of text (3:17–
4:3), Paul likewise calls the people to live in a particular manner as citizens of heaven (poli !teuma e"n 
oujranoiæV, 3:20) and to “stand firm in the Lord” (sthvkete e"n kuri !ou, 4:1). Again, he distinguishes between 
those living as enemies of the cross whose destiny is destruction (ajpolei!a, 3:19) and the Philippians who 
are awaiting their savior (swth:ra, 3:20), the Lord Jesus Christ. Then, with another reminder that they are 
“in the Lord,” Paul urges the two leaders, Euodia and Syntyche, to “think the same thing” (to; aujto; 
froneiæn, 4:2). Therefore, the same broad pattern occurs again: unity against opponents from the outside and 
unity with one another on the inside, simply on the basis of their common identity and experiences in the 
Lord. 
54
 Phil 2:1–2 contains an elaborate first-class condition, with four if-clauses and one then-clause, 
followed by several dependent clauses. Using a first-class condition, Paul presents his four premises in a 
manner requiring the hearer to deliberate on their validity, while rhetorically leaving no doubt of their 
certainty. Stated more directly, Paul’s four premises assert that there is encouragement in Christ, there is 
comfort from love, there is participation with the Spirit, and there is affection and compassion. When 
applied, these factors will provide the motivation, ability, and opportunity for resolution of the conflict. 
55
 The reality of the selfishness and individuality is emphasized rhetorically by the repeated uses 
of eJautwÆn (“yourselves”) and e[kastoV (“each one”) in 2:3–4 in Paul’s rebuke and corrective, even as the 
cooperation and unity are stressed by the ubiquity of the prepositional prefix sun- (“with, together with”) 
in 4:3: suvzuge (“yoke-fellow, comrade,” literally, one who is yoked together with another), sullambavnou 
(“support, aid, help,” literally, take hold of together), sunhvqlhsavn (“contend along with”), and sunergwÆn 
(“helper, fellow-worker,” literally, one who works along with another). 
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“genuine yokefellow” (gnhvsie suvzuge) to provide assistance for these women (4:3).56 
Paul is essentially deputizing this trusted friend to mediate in his place.
57
 Even as Paul 
himself is careful not to mandate any particular resolution of the conflict but only to call 
for some resolution, so also he words his directive carefully lest “genuine yokefellow” err 
by making authoritative demands of his own for a particular solution. The imperative 
sullamba!nou aujtaiæß (“help, assist, support, or aid them”) implies cooperative support, 
rather than directive authority. Nevertheless, the fact that Paul specifically names the 
women and the mediator implies their status as peers and reinforces the gravity and 
urgency of the matter. Therefore, “genuine yokefellow” is to assist the women to come to 
resolution rather than arbitrate the matter himself, but his assistance is not to be viewed 
by him or the community as either casual or optional. Rather, he is acting as Paul’s 
deputy, in Paul’s stead, and with Paul’s blessing, authority, and trust. 
Paul’s reference to his deputy using the epithet “genuine yokefellow” instead of 
his name carries significant rhetorical freight. The name would have sufficed to identify 
the mediator for the church and to invest him with what added authority and good will the 
appointment by Paul would convey. However, a mediator’s authority is always grounded 
in his ethos, in the people’s respect for him. Therefore, Paul uses this epithet, or perhaps 
                                                
56
 While much speculation has attended the question of who this deputy mediator might have been, 
the true identity simply cannot be confirmed. Obviously, however, the identity was plain to the Philippians. 
For a detailed consideration of the many intriguing possibilities, see O’Brien, Philippians, 480, and Gordon 
D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 392–95. 
57
 The term “mediate” is applied provisionally to “genuine yokefellow” because that seems to be 
the role Paul assigned to him.  However, it is not possible to know what his role actually was in the conflict 
resolution, whether negotiator, mediator, arbitrator, or some other type of facilitator. 
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nickname if that is what it actually is, to raise the mediator’s ethos in hope that they will 
treat the mediator fairly and respect him enough to work hard at a resolution so that no 
one—not the mediator, they, the community, or Paul—would be dishonored by failure.
58
 
Therefore, in calling the mediator “genuine yokefellow,” Paul not only identifies 
the individual to the church—for they surely knew to whom Paul was referring—but he 
also raises yokefellow’s ethos by the epithet. The adjective “genuine” (gnhvsie) is well-
chosen, for this is one who Paul believes can be trusted—just as he could trust Timothy—
to take a genuine (genhsi!wV) interest in their welfare (2:20).59 This is someone who Paul 
thinks will put their concerns above his own; someone who is a true friend and can be 
trusted to speak frankly when the welfare of his friends is at stake. This is someone who 
really understands and lives according to the model that Christ exemplifies and that Paul 
has been trying to impart to the believers in Philippi. They already do trust “genuine 
yokefellow,” otherwise Paul could never have drafted him. However, this kind of public 
endorsement from Paul will reinforce the man’s ethos and increase his moral suasion in 
dealing with Euodia, Syntyche, the other leaders, and the rest of the believers there. 
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 If the believers continue their grumbling and disputes, Paul fears that he may end up having run 
in vain (2:14–16). The metaphor is the runner who either wins the race and garners the glory of the victor’s 
laurel wreath, or loses and endures the shame of defeat. Although the church supports Paul financially and 
in that sense functions as his patron, Paul founded the church and thus is patron to the church. On that 
basis, the church is the client of Paul and must do all it can to honor him and make him effective, especially 
as Paul will one day stand under the scrutiny of his and their common patron, Jesus Christ. Therefore, Paul, 
the mediator, the two women, and indeed the whole church are all linked with respect to honor-shame and 
will all succeed or fail together depending on the resolution of the conflict between Euodia and Syntyche. 
59
 O’Brien, Philippians, 480, suggests that Timothy may in fact be the yokefellow because of the 
coincidence of the epithet “genuine” (gnhvsie) and the earlier description of Timothy as taking a “genuine” 
(gnhsi !wV) interest in their welfare (2:20). He might also have noted that the adjective gnhvsioV can mean 
true or loyal as well as genuine, and when combined with yokefellow (suvzugoV) implies “the closest kind 
of relationship—indeed partnership,” something akin to companion or intimate friend, as well as coworker. 
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The reasons for Paul’s angst over this dispute between Euodia and Syntyche and 
his reasons for exhorting them to a timely resolution become clearer in his description of 
the women and other community members (4:3). Together they provided consistent, 
long-term support for his ministry. Paul begins the description of the women with the 
indefinite relative pronoun ai”tineß (“whoever”) instead of the simpler, and more 
common, relative ai” (“who”). Functionally, the words are equivalent for introducing 
descriptive clauses, but semantically ai”tineß denotes the character or quality of the 
antecedent, rather than simply the identity.
60
 These women are capable, valued, and 
significant leaders because they contended alongside Paul in his proclamation of the 
gospel.
61
 Their stature in the church, the visibility of their dispute, and its potential 
consequences for the church and Paul’s ministry heighten the urgency for a resolution. 
However, Euodia and Syntyche are not Paul’s only co-contestants in the gospel, 
for he mentions Clement and twÇn loipwÇn sunergwÇn mou (“the rest of my coworkers”) 
as well. Again, little is known of these other workers except what may be inferred from 
the brief context. However, the designation of coworker does accord significant 
distinction to the women, as well as to Clement and the others. The term is common 
enough, but Paul uses it somewhat reservedly of those who have traveled with him or 
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 Smyth, §§ 2496. 
61
 The verb sunhvqlhsa !n moi (“they contended together with me”) is typically used of an arduous 
athletic or gladiatorial battle and is thus appropriately applied to the gospel enterprise that both he and the 
Philippians are engaged in together (cf. 1:27). His imprisonment and their hardships and persecutions (1:7, 
12–14, 27–30) are all part of their struggle together in proclaiming the gospel, a struggle in which Euodia 
and Syntyche were fully involved. Fitzgerald, Cracks, 199, recognizes that psychic, just as much as 
physical, hardship is a consequence of [one’s] diakonia. He cites both types of hardship in Philippians, but 
treats them both more extensively in the hardship catalogues of 1 Cor 4, 2 Cor 4, and 2 Cor 6. 
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have exercised prominent leadership in the house churches and beyond. However, not all 
who traveled with Paul or led house churches were necessarily identified as Paul’s 
coworkers.
62
 These two women probably received the designation as coworker for their 
distinction as church leaders rather than as travelers, and for their strategic involvement 
in Paul’s proclamation of the gospel. 
While Paul had more coworkers among his churches than he mentions by name in 
his letters, it was still a fairly limited category. The fact that Paul specifically names five 
coworkers at Philippi
63
 and mentions others without naming them emphasizes just how 
strategic the church in Philippi was for Paul’s ministry. Any potential disruption in the 
integrity of this support would also threaten the stability of his ministry.
64
 Therefore, his 
concern over the conflict with Euodia and Syntyche is understandable, but that was not 
the only factor in Paul’s sense of urgency in the matter. 
Paul asserts that the names of all the coworkers, including the women and 
“genuine yokefellow,” had been included in the heavenly record, that is, “in the book of 
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 Those specifically identified as sunergovV (coworker) who traveled with Paul include Timothy 
(Rom 16:21; cf. 1 Thess 3:2); Titus (2 Cor 8:23); Priscilla and Aquila (Rom 16:3; cf. Acts 18:18–19); 
Mark, Luke, Aristarchus, and Demas (Phlm 24); and possibly Apollos (1 Cor 3:5–9). Apollos may not have 
actually traveled with Paul, though he did travel for the sake of the gospel. Similarly, Epaphroditus traveled 
in service to Paul and the gospel, though the record does not explicitly indicate that he traveled in Paul’s 
immediate coterie (Phil 2:25; 4:18). Church leaders include Urbanus (Rom 16:9) and Philemon (Phlm 1). 
63
 If one considers “genuine yokefellow” as “named,” then the number is five. “Yokefellow” 
(suvzugoV) does not occur as a proper noun in the ancient literature. However, because the designation 
“genuine yokefellow” certainly was enough to identify him to the Philippians, he can be considered as 
“named.” Thus the list of coworkers in Philippi includes Euodia, Syntyche, “genuine yokefellow,” 
Clement, and Epaphroditus. 
64
 It is true that Paul knew how to be content with little or much (Phil 4:11–12), but by his own 
testimony, his life was marked by hardship, deprivation, and material needs to replace resources lost to 
robbers, shipwreck, and exposure (2 Cor 11:21–33). 
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life” (e!n bi"blw/ zwh:ß, 4:3). The phrase “book of life” occurs just this once in Paul’s 
letters. It is used more typically in apocalyptic literature to denote the record of those who 
will receive eternal life (Rev 3:5; 13:8; 17:8; 21:27), with particular reference to those 
who will be preserved at the final judgment (Rev 20:12, 15). Paul’s use of the term with 
respect to his coworkers suggests both a record of their names and what they have done. 
Though the term is not prominent in Paul, the idea of a final judgment with an accounting 
of deeds done, a reckoning of rewards, and an ultimate destiny of life or death surely is.
65
 
With this reference to the final judgment, Paul has effectively sandwiched his 
exhortation to Euodia and Syntyche between two words of warning about their future and 
the need to behave in accordance with their true identity. Paul has prefaced his appeal to 
the women with a clear reference to the final judgment. He distinguishes between the 
destruction of those living as the enemies of the cross and the glorification of those 
awaiting the coming of the heavenly savior (Phil 3:17–21). Paul then follows his appeal 
for unity with a reminder that the Lord is near (4:5), and so too is the eschatological 
judgment that will coincide with his coming. As Paul writes to the Philippians of that 
event, what will matter most is whether one is living as an enemy of the cross or as a 
citizen of heaven. From Paul’s perspective, conflict and hostility within the community of 
believers is tantamount to enmity toward God, while harmony, concord, and unity 
bespeak heavenly citizenship.
66
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 Rom 2:1–11; 6:21–23; 14:10–12; 1 Cor 3:12–15; 15:17–18; 2 Cor 5:10.  
66
 Paul uses a similar rubric in Romans. He announces that God’s judgment has begun (Rom 1:18) 
and concludes that the final judgment is about to fall as Satan is crushed (16:20). His final exhortations to 
unity and peace occur just prior to the warning about the end (16:17–18). This implication in Romans, as it 
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Therefore, Paul’s urgency that the dispute be settled and the women reconciled 
arises from his three-fold concern: that the women not fail to win the prize for which 
they, with Paul and all believers, are striving, that the community live in peace and unity 
as they ought, and that the proclamation of the gospel not falter because of their disunity. 
Ultimately, the three concerns are inextricably linked together and come down to the 
matter of peace with God. These women who are ostensibly at peace with God must 
likewise be at peace with one another because being at peace with God also requires that 
they be at peace with each other, and with the whole community as well. Furthermore, 
the gospel enterprise depends upon it. Earlier in the letter, Paul links their ability to live 
in harmony, that is, without grumbling or disputing, to their effectiveness in proclaiming 
the “word of life” in the midst of a bent and twisted generation (2:14–17). If they can 
express no joy and graciousness among themselves, they will contradict the working of 
God in them (1:6; 2:13) and fail to manifest the gospel to outsiders (“all persons,” 4:5). 
To describe and define the common goal of all believers, Paul uses an athletic 
metaphor whereby he likens living life properly to running and winning a foot race 
(3:12–14).
67
 Paul, the model runner, urges others to join him in the race (3:17). The prize 
he pursues is not the laurel wreath of the games, but simply “knowing Christ” (3:8). As 
Paul elaborates this goal, he uses the language of righteousness (3:9) and resurrection 
                                                                                                                                            
is in Philippians, is that those who disturb the peace through divisions, stumbling blocks, and clever speech 
are in danger of the same punishment as Satan and the rest of God’s enemies. 
67
 For a general treatment of Paul’s use of athletic and military images, see Edgar Krentz, “Paul, 
Games, and the Military,” in PGRW, 344–83. For particular reference to Philippians, see also his “Military 
Language and Metaphors in Philippians,” in Origins and Method: Towards a New Understanding of 
Judaism and Christianity: Essays in Honor of  John C. Hurd, ed. Bradley H. McLean, JSNTSS 96 
(Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 105–27. 
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(3:10–11).
68
 To gain Christ is to be found righteous in him, with a righteousness that is 
from God on the basis of faith.
69
 However, this status is not an end in itself, for it 
provides the basis for further knowledge, fellowship, and identification with Christ in his 
suffering and death that will ultimately lead to similar participation with Christ in his 
resurrection. This relationship unites all believers to Christ and to one another.  Euodia 
and Syntyche share this in common. In Christ, they are at peace with God and thus must 
be at peace with each other, and so they are to live in that reality. 
Even as Paul sets himself as an example and invites other to join him (3:17), he 
admits that he has not fully reached the goal (3:12).  However, he is focused on the goal 
and is moving toward it (3:13–14). This, for Paul, is the mature way to think and live 
(3:15), but he does not pretend to be the only mature one among them. He exhorts all 
who are mature, presumably all the leaders, but especially Euodia and Syntyche, to be 
thinking and living this way too (3:15). However, Paul also realizes—the conflicts are 
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 The grammatical structure of 3:8–11 consists of a series of purpose clauses explaining why Paul 
has made the radical reevaluation of his past and given it all up for the summum bonum of knowing Christ. 
Each clause elaborates the previous one and steps toward the final climax of attaining resurrection. 
69
 While righteousness and justification do not play a major role in Paul’s letter to Philippi, as they 
do in Romans and Galatians, they are nevertheless evident and a significant concern to Paul. His prayer is 
that the Philippians will abound with karpo;n dikaiosuvnhß (“the fruit of righteousness”), that is, the to;n 
dia˝ =Ihsou: Cristou: (“though Jesus Christ”) fruit, when he comes (1:11). Furthermore, at the heart of 
Paul’s devaluation of his former life in favor of his present life is his exchange of righteousness e!n novmw/ 
(“in/by the law,” 3:6) and e!k novmou (“from/by the law,” 3:9) for a righteousness that is dia˝ pi "stewß 
Cristou: (“through faith in/of Christ,” 3:9) and e!k qeou: (“from God,” 3:9). Whether Paul intends “faith in” 
or “faithfulness of ” is not at issue here. Rather, the significant matter lies in Paul’s distinction between 
novmoV and pi "stiV as the basis for the righteousness. While Paul does not use the verb dikaiovw (“I justify, 
declare righteous”), which is so prevalent in Romans and Galatians, his circumlocution with euJreqwÇ (“that 
I may be found”) amounts to the same thing. LSJ cites Sophocles Trachiniae 411 with euJri "skw (passive 
with di "kaioV) denoting a judicial determination, that is, the findings of a judicial investigation. Therefore, 
Paul’s expressed desire of being found in Christ, having the righteousness that is through faith and from 
God on the basis of faith, is essentially periphrasis for being declared righteous. 
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prima facie evidence—that not all the “mature” ones are necessarily thinking maturely 
and living consistently. They have lost clarity that they once had as his mature coworkers 
and have reverted to a selfish, self-serving way of life in which conflict can flourish. Paul 
is confident that God can and will make their error plain to them (3:15) and urges them to 
maintain the progress they have already made toward full maturity (3:16). 
Therefore, Paul’s exhortation that Euodia and Syntyche be reconciled challenges 
them to live up to what they have already been granted and attained and thus demonstrate 
the authenticity of their faith, all with the ultimate goal of gaining Christ and participating 
in his resurrection. By living in unresolved conflict with one another, they risk being like 
those who are enemies of the gospel and destined for destruction. 
The contradiction between their true identity in Christ and their behavior is 
monumental. For Paul, it is inevitable that those who are truly in Christ are righteous 
through faith, they have the Holy Spirit to empower them, and their righteousness will 
produce fruit. Among that fruit will be love, joy, and peace, and the rest (Gal 5:22–23), 
the first three of which are lacking in some respect at Philippi. Paul’s point for them, and 
for the believers in Rome and Corinth as well, is that the absence of fruit calls into 
question their righteousness, their relationship in Christ, and their possession of the 
Spirit. Inasmuch as love, joy, and peace are the expectation and norm for life in Christ, it 
is absolutely and unquestionably necessary for believers to manifest those qualities in the 
way they live and relate to one another—even if it costs them their very lives. Paul has 
emphasized by the example of his own life (1:20–26; 2:17–18) and that of Epaphroditus 
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(2:25–30) that those who are in Christ and engage in the work of Christ must be prepared 
to give their lives in the cause.  
Therefore, if Euodia and Syntyche are truly in Christ—and they are, then they 
must respond to Paul’s plea for reconciliation. Otherwise, they cannot be fruitful in 
righteousness, joyful in relationship, and steadfast in proclaiming the gospel. Simply put, 
from Paul’s perspective, there is just no other way to live in Christ and to manifest the 
reality of the gospel. 
As serious and profound a concern as this is, Paul does not appeal to the two 
women with a sense of desperation. As in his letter to Philemon (Phlm 21), so too in his 
letter to the Philippians (Phil 1:6, 25–26; 2:12–13; 3:15): Paul exudes confidence that the 
present conflicts will be resolved and will result in reconciliation. However, Paul does 
not base this confidence on Euodia, Syntyche, or any of his other coworkers in Philippi, 
but on the conviction that God has begun and will complete the good work in them (1:6) 
and that God continues to work in them (2:12–13) as they work out swthri!an (“victory”) 
for themselves.
70
 With respect to the conflict, the “working out” means that “genuine 
yokefellow” must assist the two women and the community as they determine how to 
come to agreement in light of Paul’s exhortation, his examples of others-oriented life and 
service, and his expression of all that hangs in the balance. 
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 Krentz, “Paul, Games, Military,” 356, has rightly observed that in context swthri !an “cannot 
mean religious salvation at the eschaton, but must mean ‘victory,’ as is normal in a military context.” Not 
only does this military nuance fit the broader context well, but it also avoids the awkward, un-Pauline idea 
that individuals could somehow produce their own salvation. 
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In addition to Paul’s confidence in a positive outcome for his mediation, other 
similarities can be seen in Philemon and Philippians. Paul accords respect and dignity to 
the parties in the dispute, even when social conventions may not require it, as in the case 
of the errant slave Onesimus. Despite the strong feelings, broad implications, and critical 
consequences attending the disputes, Paul maintains decorum and pursues a reasonable 
and righteous resolution to the conflicts. While “reasonable and righteous” may seem 
rather subjective and open to debate, from Paul’s perspective the two are defined by the 
character of God and the quality of life befitting those living together in Christ and in the 
power and unity of the Spirit. Paul does not compromise that ethic in the way he treats 
the disputants at any stage in the resolution. Furthermore, from Paul’s perspective, the 
conflicts always have solutions and those solutions always consist in having the parties 
modify their thinking and living so as to produce the “fruit of righteousness.” 
While Paul always maintains decorum, he does not hesitate to use rhetoric and 
social pressure from within the church community to steer the resolution in a particular 
direction. This tactic is perhaps more obvious in Philemon, where the conflict between 
Philemon and Onesimus is more clearly defined and limited in scope. That is not to say 
their conflict had no ramifications for the community—indeed it did and that is why Paul 
addressed it publicly—but rather that the issue lay between Philemon and Onesimus and 
does not seem to have polarized the community or drawn others into the dispute. Paul 
also knows the parties and the details of the dispute well. Therefore, he is able to be more 
directly involved in the mediation. 
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By comparison, the conflict in Philippi is more extensive and far more complex. 
Several leaders are involved; the dispute has cast a shadow over the church such that the 
whole church needs rehabilitation mentally, spiritually, and emotionally; and Paul has 
been distant from the situation for some time, dependent primarily on Epaphroditus, or 
those in his travel group, for his news from Philippi.
71
 With these circumstances before 
him, Paul is not in a position to assume the role of mediator or even facilitator for the 
conflict in Philippi. Instead Paul appoints someone on the scene, that is, someone who 
knows the circumstances, issues, and individuals well, and can be trusted to handle the 
delicate matters of honor-shame, the interests of Christ, and the welfare of the church 
with genuine humility and dedicated service. While Paul mentions other coworkers, he 
assigns only “genuine yokefellow” to mediate.
72
 By his clear delineation of one facilitator 
from among the many other leaders in the church, Paul provides a safeguard against 
disorder and against the pronounced tendency to self-interest and selfish ambition that is 
already a widespread problem and could easily derail efforts at reconciliation. 
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 Epaphroditus brought both gifts and news from Philippi (4:18). If the imprisonments mentioned 
in the letters to Philippi and Philemon were not the same, the different contexts may have affected Paul’s 
access to news from the churches and influenced how directly he intervened in the respective situations. 
For discussion of Paul’s various imprisonments and the provenance of the letters, see O’Brien, Philippians, 
19–26; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, xlix–liv, 269; and Fee, Philippians, 34–37. 
72
 There is a question whether the phrase meta˝ kai… Klhvmentoß kai… twÇn loipwÇn sunergwÇn mou 
(“with Clement also and the rest of my coworkers,” 4:3) modifies the imperative sullamba !nou (“provide 
assistance to”) implying that the facilitator is to employ the help of Clement and Paul’s other coworkers in 
mediating the dispute, or modifies the indicative sunhvqlhsa !n moi (“they struggled along with me”) 
implying that Clement and the others were included, along with the two women, among those who labored 
with Paul in the proclamation of the gospel. The more natural reading of the phrase is the latter for two 
reasons: first, the imperative sullamba !nou (“provide assistance to”) is singular and thus pertains to the 
genuine yokefellow whom Paul addresses directly, and second, under the conventions of word order in 
Greek, adverbial prepositional phrases tend to modify the nearest verb, which here would be sunhvqlhsa !n 
moi (“they struggled along with me”). While not impossible, the less natural reading has the added burden 
of being separated from its governing verb by an intervening relative clause. 
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Finally, in neither letter does Paul rule or overrule by fiat, nor does he empower 
his surrogate mediator at Philippi to do so either. Paul’s request of “genuine yokefellow” 
is to “help, aid, support.” Paul bolsters “genuine yokefellow’s” ethos, not his authority, 
and makes no demand that the women yield to “genuine yokefellow’s” authority. Even in 
the situation with Philemon, where the options for resolution are more obvious and Paul 
is even bold enough to intimate his own hopes for the solution, he does not demand that 
Philemon accede to his wishes. While Paul does not hesitate rhetorically to steer him in 
what he considers the right direction, Paul stops short of heavy-handed, authoritarian 
demands that Philemon do as he says. He simply sets forth the standard obligation of 
friendship—treat Onesimus as you would treat me—and allow Philemon and his fellow 
believers to figure out what that will mean in their situation. Similarly, in Philippi Paul’s 
approach for himself and for the mediator is to guide the women to agreement, but not to 
demand that they agree to an imposed or pre-determined settlement. In short, Paul’s 
strategy in both letters involves persuasion rather than compulsion, and his ultimate 
argument is that the believers behave according to their true identity in Christ. 
Civil Court Cases Between Believers 
In contrast to the conflicts in Philemon and Philippians where the individuals are 
specifically named, Paul does not provide details of any interpersonal conflicts in his 
Corinthian letters. Individuals and their problems are mentioned, but not as interpersonal 
conflicts. For example, in the case of the incestuous man (1 Cor 5:1–13), Paul is not 
resolving a conflict between two individuals, but addressing the church’s mishandling of 
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an impropriety that should have resulted in some form of church discipline. Similarly, 
Paul speaks of another incident involving two men: the one has wronged the other, and 
the offense has grieved the whole community (2 Cor 2:5–11; 7:5–16). Again, no names 
or details of the offense are given, though both were clearly known to the church.
73
 
Moreover, Paul treats the matter not as an interpersonal conflict to be resolved, but as a 
case for forgiveness and restoration following what may have been an overly-severe 
punishment imposed by the church. Therefore, the record of interpersonal conflicts at 
Corinth is sparse at best. 
Nevertheless, even though individuals are not named, nor case details given, the 
Corinthians did suffer considerable interpersonal conflict—so much so, that their disputes 
flowed into the civil courts (1 Cor 6:1–6). Paul is simply aghast at this and considers the 
situation absolutely unacceptable for believers. Their litigation against each other in civil 
court signifies their complete failure to live together as they have been called to live in 
Christ (6:7; cf. 1:2). 
From the outset of the letter (1:2) Paul addresses those in Corinth as hJgiasme!noiß 
e "n Cristw #Ç =Ihsou: (“those who are sanctified in Christ”)74 and as klhtoiæß aÓgi!oiß (“those 
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 J. Paul Sampley, The Second Letter to the Corinthians, NIB 11, ed. Leander E. Keck 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000), 52–53, argues that Paul himself may very well have been the offended 
party, but the whole community was also offended. Therefore, this is not strictly an interpersonal conflict 
between two persons. 
74
 The participle hJgiasme!noiß is in the perfect tense indicating that the Corinthians were sanctified 
at some point in the past and continue in that condition or state even as they receive and read the letter. By 
his use of the perfect tense Paul has intentionally chosen to represent their sanctification as complete and 
enduring.  
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called to be holy”).
75
 His point is that the Corinthian believers have been called by God to 
be holy and now, in Christ, they ought to be exhibiting attitudes and actions consistent 
with that calling.
76
 This calling determines their identity, distinguishing them from those 
in the culture around them, and should also determine how they live, communicate, and 
behave together, unifying them with the other believers in their community. At the core 
of that life together is to be unity and peace, not the divisions, contentions (1:10–11), 
jealousy, discord (3:3), and litigation (6:1–6) that they are experiencing.
77
 
Therefore, Paul exhorts the believers to unity in the name of Jesus Christ, because 
their common calling to sanctification in Christ not only provides the basis for their unity, 
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 The phrase klhtoiæß aÓgi!oiß is open to several possible translations depending on how aÓgi !oiß is 
understood grammatically. As translated above, it is taken as a predicate adjective modifying klhtoiæß , a 
substantival adjective itself referring to the Corinthian believers as “the called ones.” Taking aÓgi !oiß also as 
a substantival adjective allows two possibilities: a naming convention (“those called by the name ‘saints’”) 
or a predicate nominative (“those called to be saints”). The naming convention is unlikely as Paul always 
uses the passive verbal adjective klhtovß (“having been called”) with respect to the calling of an individual 
by God to some position, function, or role in relation or service to God. Therefore, either the predicate noun 
(“called to be saints”) or predicate adjective (“called to be holy”) is acceptable. 
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 For Paul holiness has both the cultic sense of being set apart for ritual purposes and the moral 
sense of being pure, upright, and just. Therefore, on the basis of their sanctification, Paul can echo the 
cultic language of Israel’s prophet and call the Corinthians to a consecrated life, “Come out from their 
midst and be separate” (2 Cor 6:17 quoting Isa 52:14), and he can remind them that their sanctified lives 
are to be morally pure, that is, free of sexual immorality, idolatry, greed, theft, and other unrighteous 
behavior (1 Cor 6:9–11). 
77
 The language of sci !smata (“divisions, dissentions, schisms,” 1:10) and e“rideß (“strife, discord, 
contention,” 1:11), as well as the clear call to agreement and unity in mind, thought, and speech, seems to 
indicate that the Corinthian church labored under the burden of significant internal conflict. This tends to be 
the general consensus among commentators, though they differ considerably as to the cause, nature, and 
implication of the conflict. The priority Paul gives to these conflicts (his first order of business in the letter) 
and the intensity of his rhetoric further suggest the gravity of the situation in Paul’s mind. For a survey of 
interpretations of 1:10–12, which Fee considers “a crux in terms of how one is going to understand 
1 Corinthians as a whole and especially the historical situation of the church to which Paul is writing” (55), 
see Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 51–61; 
Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 111–133; and J. Paul Sampley, The First Letter to the Corinthians, NIB 
10, ed. Leander E. Keck (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 800–809. 
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but also obligates them to it (1:10).
78
 Paul uses four phrases to drive home the necessity 
for this unity: i”na to; aujto; le!ghte pa"nteß (“that you all say the same thing”), mh; h#\ e $n 
uJmiæn sci!smata (“that there be no divisions”), h\te de… kathrtisme!noi e $n tw/Ç aujtw/Ç noi> 
(“but that you be brought back together in the same mind”), and e$n th#: aujth#: gnw "mh# (“in 
the same opinion”). Mitchell argues persuasively that each of these four expressions 
contains “a stock phrase in Greek literature for political order and peace.”
79
 Paul makes 
use of these familiar expressions characterizing political alliances and friendships in the 
Greco-Roman world to urge the Corinthian believers to set aside their factions and be 
reconciled for peace and unity in the church. 
By addressing this need for reconciliation as his first concern in the letter, Paul 
establishes a theme that will recur throughout the letter. He takes it up again in context of 
the court cases between believers (1 Cor 6:1–11). Despite his concern for reconciliation 
and peace among the Corinthians, Paul abruptly, even accusingly, challenges them for 
resorting to the civil courts to resolve conflicts they have with one another (1 Cor 6:1). 
Paul indicts them on two levels for using the civil courts. 
First, Paul addresses the problem with the civil judges: they are unjust (ajdi!kwn, 
6:1). This term could be describing them as unrighteous or as wrongdoers, but in this 
context of courts and legal matters a meaning of unjust is most fitting. The point is that 
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 Fee, Corinthians, 53, and Sampley, First Corinthians, 804, see an allusion to the unifying rite of 
baptism in Paul’s appeal to unity “in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1:10), even as Paul anticipates his 
argument related to baptism in 1:13–17. 
79
 Margaret M. Mitchell, The Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the 
Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), 68. For her 
full argument and rich substantiation from ancient literature, see pp. 68–80. 
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these putative guardians of justice cannot render just judgments because they themselves 
are unjust. If someone is seeking a fair settlement in a matter, the civil courts are not the 
place to find it. Sampley points out that despite the vaunted legal system of the Empire “it 
was a commonplace of the times . . . that civil courts were not to be trusted for justice. 
Even Roman citizens did not have equal opportunity before the law.  Wealth, position, 
and standing . . . were the best assurance of favorable judgment in the courts.”
80
 
However, the judges are not only unjust, they are also unbelievers (ajpi!stwn, 6:6). 
Therefore, they are also disqualified to judge these cases because they lack the wisdom to 
render decisions according to God’s standards for the believing community. 
Second, Paul addresses the problem with the cases themselves: they too are unjust 
(6:8). These are not legitimate grievances between believers, but rather frivolous cases 
exploiting the corruption of the civil courts in order to injure and defraud the poor. 
Thiselton sees the basis for Paul’s outrage over these court cases in the fact that the wise 
and strong in the church were using the injustice of the courts to defraud their weak and 
powerless fellow-believers.
81
 Citing Mitchell and Welborn, Thiselton elaborates that “the 
same competitive concern for power and status marks the church life at Corinth as that 
found in much secular life in Greek or Roman city-states.”
82
 Thiselton further agrees with 
Mitchell and others that “the initiation of litigation in secular courts [is] aligning 
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 J. Paul Sampley, Pauline Partnership in Christ: Christian Commitment and Community in Light 
of Roman Law (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 3. 
81
 Thiselton, Corinthians, 420–21. His title for this section of the commentary sums up his thesis: 
“Legal Action by the Socially Influential as an Abuse of Power (6:1–11).” 
82
 Thiselton, Corinthians, 117 
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divisions or splits within the church with cliques or rival networks of influence outside 
the church and thereby doing double damage.”
83
 As a result of that influence, “the 
wealthy . . . could manipulate social networks outside the church to their advantage and 
thereby, in effect, take advantage of the poor or weak within the congregation.”
84
 
Therefore, with his critique of judges, civil courts, and fraudulent cases, Paul 
insists that believers are not to prosecute one another in the civil courts. Nevertheless, he 
presses on with two rhetorical gambits to drive this point home with even greater force. 
Paul has just finished castigating the church for its failure to judge the incestuous 
man (1 Cor 5:1–5). No one stepped forward to make the appropriate judgment and so 
Paul renders his judgment from afar, just as though he were among them. Continuing this 
theme of their reticence to judge, only with obvious sarcasm now, Paul asks a series of 
rhetorical questions with implied affirmative answers in order to lead them to accept his 
alternative to the civil courts: the appointment of believers to adjudicate matters in the 
church (1 Cor 6:2–5). 
If there were any doubts about the fitness of believers for the task of rendering 
judgments on the day-to-day disputes, Paul reminds them that as holy ones/saints they 
will one day judge the world, as well as the angels (6:2–3).
85
 Reasoning from the greater 
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 Thiselton, Corinthians, 421 
84
 Thiselton, Corinthians, 419. 
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 The role of the believers in judging the world and the angels cannot easily be harmonized with 
other texts in Paul. For example, Paul elsewhere claims that Christ will destroy all rulers and authorities 
(1 Cor 15:24) and seems to leave no place for the involvement of believers in that process. Yet, Paul also 
suggests that God will crush Satan (Rom 16:20) under the feet of the believers, leaving at least some room 
for the possibility that believers will have an active role in the destruction of Satan. However, that scarcely 
resolves the matter of the judgment of angels. For fuller discussion of the interpretative options, see Fee, 
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to the lesser, Paul implies with a measure of rhetorical sarcasm that if they will judge the 
angels and the world, then surely they must be fit to adjudicate the trivial cases and 
mundane matters in their day-to-day lives. As though to add further bite to his sarcasm, 
but also to guard against perpetuating within the church the same partiality toward wealth 
and power found in the civil courts, Paul directs the believers to appoint those who are 
the least esteemed in the church (6:4).
86
 
This rhetorical gem scores a double hit. First, given the endemic preoccupation 
with status at Corinth, whether socially or spiritually calculated, this remark heightens 
Paul’s sarcasm by implying that even the believer with the least social status in the 
church could hand down a better verdict than the most skilled, but unbelieving, civil 
jurist. Second, Paul’s comment also steers the church away from the self-proclaimed 
wise, strong, and honorable (4:10), the spiritually elite, the power brokers, or any others 
who might presume upon the judge’s role for themselves just for the associated power or 
status. In Paul’s mind, it would be a disaster for those with “worldly” perspectives on 
status and power to be given authority to adjudicate cases in the church. That would only 
exacerbate tensions within the church by encouraging the adoption of cultural patterns of 
                                                                                                                                            
Corinthians, 232–38, or Thiselton, Corinthians, 425–33. Ultimately, however, that matter need not be 
resolved to grasp the thrust of Paul’s logic and the tinge of sarcasm in his rhetoric. 
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 The interpretation of this verse depends on two determinations: (1) whether the participle tou;ß 
e!xouqenhme"nouß (“those who have been and continue to be considered of least significance”) denotes the 
unbelieving Gentile magistrates in Corinth or lower-status believers in the church, and (2) whether the 
sentence, or more specifically the main verb kaqi "zete (“cause to sit, set up, establish, convene; assign, 
designate, appoint”), functions as an interrogative, imperative, or indicative. This study understands the 
verb to be imperative and the participle to denote the lower-status believers in the church. Brent Kinman, 
“‘Appoint the Despised as Judges’ (1 Corinthians 6:4),” Tyndale Bulletin 48 (1997), 345–54, gives a full 
explication of this interpretation. For a survey of this and other options, see Thiselton, Corinthians, 431–33. 
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class, power, and privilege as the norm for the church, all of which are inimical to peace 
and unity. 
In a second rhetorical maneuver, Paul uses hyperbole to reinforce how ridiculous 
it is for the Corinthians to resort to the civil courts and how strongly he feels about the 
matter. To demonstrate the extreme to which Paul expects believers to go in maintaining 
peace with one another, he values peace within the community above justice and honesty. 
Paul expects believers to suffer the injustice (ajdikeiæsqe) and bear the dishonesty of their 
fellow-believers (6:7), rather than resort to civil courts in the name of justice. For in 
taking one another to court, they themselves are doing wrong (a˙dikeiæte), perpetrating this 
injustice upon their fellow believers (6:8). 
One reason that this comment has any rhetorical punch is that the suggestion of 
not insisting upon justice and honesty flies in the face of centuries of Greek philosophy 
and Roman jurisprudence. Not that the people actually follow the ideals—the hypocrisy 
of the courts has already been well-document above—but from Athens to Rome, the 
constitutions, political structures, literature, drama, and public monuments proclaimed 
justice as the noblest, most honorable virtue of them all.
87
 
Another reason that Paul can exploit this idea rhetorically is that he is merely 
echoing the well-established ideal from Greek philosophy that it is better to suffer an 
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 This was the great ironies of philosophy: the greatest minds of antiquity understood justice as 
rendering to another what was due, but they were unable to motivate or empower people to practice justice. 
They could define its qualities, identify its excesses and counterfeits, and even describe its beneficial 
effects for the individual and the state. However, none of that reasoning was persuasive enough by itself to 
transform individuals or societies through the exercise of justice. Paul’s response to this is the power of the 
indwelling Spirit to transform the mind and to reproduce the character of God in the children of God. 
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injustice (ajdikeiæsqe) than to commit one (a˙dikeiæn). Socrates taught that wrongdoing (to; 
ajdikeiæn) was the greatest evil, so the one who commits the injustice (to;n ajdikou:nta) is 
more morally wretched (ei«nai ajqliwvteron) than the one who suffers the injustice (tou: 
ajdikoumevnou).88 Therefore, Paul can soar to heights of absurdity implying that a believer 
can, and indeed should, endure whatever injustice or fraud may come by the hand of 
another believer as a small price to pay for preserving unity and peace in the community. 
For all its absurdity, there is a modicum of truth in the hyperbole. Paul really does 
believe that the life of holiness and fellowship in Christ, to which they have been called 
(1:2, 9), overrides all other considerations, including the highest of personal or cultural 
values. At the same time, however, it seems clear that Paul intentionally overstates the 
matter as well. Any injustice or fraud in the church, whether perpetrated by one for the 
sake of personal gain or endured graciously by another for the sake of conscience, is 
antithetical to the character of God and thus intolerable for Paul. Justice and truth are 
essential characteristics of God (Rom 3:4, 25–26; 1 Thess 1:9)
89
 and must likewise 
characterize the people of God in their dealings not only with one another but also with 
the world (Rom 6:13, 18–20; 1 Cor 5:8; 13:6; Phil 4:8).
90
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 Plato Georgias 473e–479d. 
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 Paul’s scriptures were replete with references to God’s justice, especially in the role of judge: 
Ezra 9:15; Neh 9:8, 33; Ps 7:11; 10:7; 119:137 (LXX 118:137); 145:17 (LXX 144:17). In that context, Paul 
presents God’s work of justification as a demonstration of God’s own justice. Similarly, in the scriptures 
God’s attribute of truth is associated with God’s faithfulness: Deut 32:4; Ps 40:10 (LXX 39:11); 86:15 
(LXX 85:15); 117:2 (LXX 116:2); Isa 65:16. 
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 Inasmuch as dikaiosuvnh can mean either “justice” or “righteousness,” believers who have been 
justified are expected to live righteous/just lives. The kingdom of God is justice and peace (Rom 14:17). 
The later writings attributed to Paul make the same point with more succinct and focused statements on the 
believer’s need to be identified with justice and truth (Eph 4:15, 24–25; 1 Tim 6:11). 
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Ultimately, then, tolerating these fraudulent court cases among believers is no 
strategy for peace. They must stop and Paul understands this. However, Paul also knows 
that legitimate disputes do arise among believers and that a process must be established to 
resolve the disputes appropriately. Therefore, Paul calls for the appointment of believers 
to handle disputes within the church (1 Cor 6:4). He does not, however, go into any detail 
regarding the logistics. While handling the disputes will require making decisions about 
certain matters, Paul is not appointing judges or setting up some kind of court system in 
the church to parallel the civil courts.
91
 Rather, he seems content to let the Corinthians 
work out for themselves how the intervention would be organized. 
The more pressing urgency for Paul is that the disputes be settled and the abusive 
cases be stopped because of the dire consequences that could occur. As in his letter to 
Philippi, so too in his letter to Corinth; Paul accompanies his exhortation to peace, unity, 
and reconciliation among believers with a severe warning that their eternal destiny 
depends upon it. If they persist in their injustices and fraud toward one another (6:8), they 
will not inherit the kingdom of God (6:9). The rhetorical form of Paul’s question implies 
that they already know this, or should know it,
92
 but either they are not impressed enough 
with the severity of their injustice to change their behavior, or they no longer recognize 
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 The command tou;ß e!xouqenhme"nouß e!n th#: e!kklhsi "a/ touvtouß kaqi"zete (“appoint these who 
are considered of least significance in the church”) does not specify a position to which they are appointed. 
Rather, the idea that they would be appointed as judges is inferred from the context of having to handle 
biwtika˝ krithvria (“disputes/lawsuits belonging to daily life”). Throughout his rhetorical taunt (6:2–5), 
Paul repeatedly mentions judging (kri "nw, diakri "nw) and lawsuits (“krithvrion”), so the use of arbitration 
is certainly possible. However, the use of negotiation, advocacy, and mediation is not excluded. 
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 In this passage (6:1–11), Paul moves his argument forward with a series of rhetorical questions. 
Three of the questions (6:2, 3, 9) use the formula oujk oi“date (“you do know, don’t you that . . .”) that 
anticipates an affirmative answer and leads the audience along in agreement with the speaker. 
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their own sinfulness. Perhaps the latter is more likely in that Paul warns them against the 
deception that leads them astray (mh; planaÇsqe, 6:9), implying that they are deceived and 
do not recognize their behavior for what it is. Yet, in either case, Paul attempts to jolt 
them into the realization of their wrongdoing and all the behaviors associated with their 
former way of life, their deliverance from all that, and their obligation to live differently 
now because of their new identity in Christ and in the Spirit (6:9–11). 
Adding theft, greed, and fraud—the most likely motives behind the civil court 
cases—to idolatry, immorality, and other indulgences of the appetites, Paul bluntly 
reminds the Corinthians that those who participate in these behaviors will not inherit the 
kingdom of God (6:9–10). Paul does not rank these on a scale from lesser to greater 
severity, but classifies them together under the umbrella of wrongdoing, so that all who 
do these things would be considered a[dikoi (“wrongdoers,” 6:9). Paul’s warning is clear, 
with a semantic poignancy and directness that translations may not fully exploit. Paul 
essentially says to them: You, Corinthians, are wronging (ajdikeiæte) one another (6:8), 
and wrongdoers (a[dikoi) will not inherit the kingdom of God (6:9). 
This is a severe, but not unwarranted, warning. This behavior is unacceptable for 
those who are in Christ. The status seeking, the hostility generated among believers by 
the court cases, their manipulation of the courts, their greed, and their dishonesty, along 
with all other evil deeds, belong to their old way of life. That kind of behavior represents 
who and what these Corinthian believers were, not their identity now (6:11). With the 
emphatic triplet a˙lla˝ a˙pelouvsasqe, a˙lla˝ hJgia!sqhte, a˙lla˝ e"dikaiw !qhte (“but you 
were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified”), Paul forcefully reminds 
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them of what God has done for them in Christ and the Spirit,
93
 and thus why everything is 
now, and must continue to be, different in their identity, behavior, and relationships. 
Paul’s rhetorical purpose for the three verbs is to reinforce the peace and unity 
that is to characterize life in Christ. Paul uses a˙pelouvsasqe (“you were washed”) just 
this once, though he clearly has baptism in mind. His choice of ajpolouvw (“I wash”) 
rather than bapti!zw (“I baptize”) may have been intentional to emphasize the idea of 
cleansing and purification, as well as initiation.
94
 For Paul, baptism is the unifying ritual 
(1 Cor 12:12–13) that represents the believer’s death to sin and the old way of life, 
resurrection with Christ to a new way of life (Rom 6:1–14), and initiation by the Spirit 
into the body of Christ, that is, the church (1 Cor 12:13). Here Paul anticipates his longer 
teaching on unity in the church with a diversity of spiritual gifts (1 Cor 12–14), but for 
the moment he simply reinforces both the radical break with the old way of life and unity 
among believers as an essential attribute of their new identity in Christ. 
Paul’s use of hJgia"sqhte (“you were sanctified”) reminds the Corinthians of their 
calling to holiness and their identity as holy ones in Christ (1 Cor 1:2). So pervasive are 
the effects of holiness that others in the community, including unbelieving spouses and 
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 Much discussion is devoted to this text as a Pauline trinitarian formulation in conjunction with 
baptism. See, for example, Thiselton, Corinthians, 453–55, where he cites Dunn extensively; and Fee, 
Corinthians, 245–48. Fee expands his treatment in the commentary in his Pauline Christology (Peabody, 
MA: Hendrickson, 2007), 566–68 and 586–93. However, not to be missed for this discussion is the agency 
of both Christ and the Spirit in the fullness of the redemption initiative of God. While the whole work 
makes peace possible, Paul does distinguish the roles of Christ and the Spirit. Through Christ, the believer 
is justified, reconciled,  and set free to live anew (Rom 5:1–2, 9–11; 8:1–3; Gal 5:1). However, through the 
Spirit, the believer is enabled to sustain the attitudes and behaviors commensurate with the new life (Rom 
8:4–9; Gal 5:16–18). So, for Paul, both freedom and empowerment are necessary to sustain peace in the 
new community. 
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 Note that the two verbs can be used together in the metaphor of washing away sins (Acts 22:16). 
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children, are drawn into that identity (7:14).
95
 Furthermore, the extension of that umbrella 
of sanctification is part of the strategy for maintaining peace within the community by 
preserving the integrity of those families with an unbelieving spouse.
96
 For Paul, this idea 
of a sanctified people implies both the status of being called and set apart for God and the 
moral transformation that occurs through sanctification. Therefore, just as Paul’s 
reference to being washed reinforces the break from the old way of life and the necessity 
of appropriately changed behavior, so too his reference to being sanctified reinforces the 
new identity in Christ and the transformed behavior both associated with it and required 
by it. 
Finally, with his use of e!dikaiw "qhte (“you were justified”), Paul arrives at the 
sine qua non of peace (Rom 5:1): being rightly related to God on the basis of faith and 
through Jesus Christ. While justification is not a major theme in the letters to Corinth, its 
juxtaposition here with sanctification recalls the pairing of the two ideas earlier in the 
letter (1 Cor 1:30) and focuses attention on Jesus Christ, who, as the wisdom of God, is 
righteousness, holiness, and redemption. 
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 Just how to resolve Paul’s typical use of aJgiavzw and related words as a reference to salvation 
with his application of the term to unbelieving spouses and children (7:14), without reaching the un-Pauline 
conclusion that marriage is a means of salvation, requires care and discernment in applying the lexical and 
theological meanings of aJgiavzw. Thiselton, Corinthians, 527–33, surveys the options and provides a brief 
excursus on the interpretative history of 7:14 from the Patristics to Calvin. 
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 One aspect of mixed marriages was discussed above. A further comment will clarify a broader 
principle here. In 1 Cor 7:12–16, Paul deals with the potential conflict in marriages where a believer is 
already married to a non-believer. Those couples who can live peaceably together are to do so and the 
umbrella of sanctification is extended to include the unbelieving spouse and children. However, should the 
unbelieving spouse wish to separate, Paul allows for that as well. His basis for allowing the divorce is the 
principle that e!n de… ei!rhvnh# ke$klhken uJmaÇß oJ qeovß (“God has called you in peace”). The call to holiness is 
also a call to a life of peace, a life characterized by harmony and reconciliation. Therefore, whether the 
unbelieving spouse chooses to stay or leave, the believing spouse has the possibility of a peaceful home. 
233 
Therefore, these three Pauline verbs (a˙pelouvsasqe, hJgia!sqhte, e"dikaiw !qhte) 
are not to be narrowly defined and just understood as aspects of salvation, but together 
they denote God’s gracious gift of salvation to the believer. Rhetorically, they have the 
cumulative effect of emphasizing the believer’s new identity in Christ, with all its moral 
and relational obligations to others of the same identity. Paul’s point in emphasizing the 
new life and new identity is that all the status seeking, the court cases, and the abuse of 
one another is such an aberration of life in Christ that one might wonder whether there 
was really any new life there at all. Of course there is. That is the point of Paul’s three 
verbs. The problem is that the people are behaving as though the grace of God were not 
active in them. They are behaving like those who have no part in the kingdom of God and 
no hope of any future in it. Even as the Corinthians have been delivered from their 
previous way of life, Paul exhorts them to recognize their true situation, to change their 
behavior, and thereby to eliminate the dissonance between their true identity and their 
behavior. Ultimately, his appeal is to the restoration of unity and peace within a church 
overrun with cultural values and status markers destructive to life together in Christ. 
Peter and Paul in Antioch 
Thus far, these texts have shown the deep passion and expectation Paul has for 
peace among believers. As Paul understands community life in Christ, peace is the norm 
and ought to prevail in relationships with God, oneself, nature, and others. Hostility, 
conflict, division, quarreling, selfishness, and all other attitudes or behaviors disruptive to 
peace have no legitimate place in the church. So insistent is Paul in his demand for peace 
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that he calls believers to reconcile with each other across social boundaries that would not 
typically be crossed in the surrounding culture; to accommodate the concerns of others, 
rather than pressing for their own rights and privileges at another’s expense; and even to 
suffer loss of their material resources and social status in order to preserve the peace and 
integrity of their community life. 
At the same time, for all his rhetoric, Paul himself is hardly an ideal model for the 
peace he espouses to his churches. Wherever he goes Paul faces hardship and opposition, 
and he is constantly embroiled in conflict.
97
 Unfortunately for the modern inquirer, the 
identity of Paul’s opponents, their teachings, and the issues they raised against Paul are 
not always clear and thus are subject to considerable speculation. However, Paul does 
give details concerning one such conflict in which both parties are known and their 
teachings are clearly presented. In an apparent contradiction of his own teachings about 
peace and reconciliation, Paul precipitates a conflict within the church and, as he relates it 
to the Galatians, confronts in blunt, if not harsh, terms one of his brothers in the faith—a 
so-called pillar of the church no less—the apostle Peter himself, or Cephas, as Paul 
typically referred to him (Gal 2:11–14). 
This conflict is significant because it confirms that Paul, for all his insistence on 
maintaining peace in the church, is not an advocate of peace at any price. He has limits 
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 By Paul’s own testimony this is true, as is quintessentially evident in 2 Cor 11:16–33, but in 
other texts as well. Furthermore, portions of Acts not only corroborate many of Paul’s own accounts, but 
also contribute reports and details not otherwise mentioned by Paul. Typically, major commentaries and 
studies of Paul give significant space to discussions about the identity and teachings of Paul’s opponents. 
See Paul W. Barnett, “Opponents of Paul” in Dictionary of Paul and His Letters (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1993), 644–53, for a scholarly introduction to the opinions and significant literature 
pertaining to Paul’s opponents. 
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and does not back down when he is convinced that the truth and purity of the gospel are 
at stake (Gal 2:5, 14). From Paul’s perspective, peace is only possible because of the 
gospel, that is, what God has graciously accomplished for humanity by making a right 
relationship with God possible through Jesus Christ (Rom 5:1). To defend the gospel 
from misunderstanding and false teaching is essential to the preservation of peace. 
The confrontation between Paul and Cephas arises during what Paul presents in 
his letter as their third meeting (Gal 2:11), which took place in Antioch.
98
 At their 
previous meeting in Jerusalem (2:1–10), Paul (and at least Barnabas too) met privately 
with James, Cephas, and John (2:2, 9) to clarify Paul’s gospel after some visitors to the 
predominantly Gentile ministry in Antioch had challenged it (2:4).
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 Paul’s initiative for 
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 In writing the Galatians, Paul speaks of three meetings with Peter. The first occurred about three 
years after Paul’s conversion/commissioning experience in Damascus and lasted about 15 days (Gal 1:18). 
The second happened either 11 or 14 years thereafter, depending on whether the time of the second visit is 
reckoned from Damascus (as was Paul’s first visit with Peter) or from that first meeting three years after 
Damascus (2:1). Both of those meetings took place in Jerusalem. The third meeting occurred in Antioch 
(2:11) during a visit from Peter. The task of matching Paul’s two trips to Jerusalem as given in Galatians 
with those recorded in Acts is fraught with chronological inconsistencies and much speculation. For 
summaries of the data and debates, see Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to 
the Churches in Galatia, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 9–12; F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to 
the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 97–108; and 
Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians, WBC 41 (Dallas: Word Books, 1990) lxxii–lxxxviii. Longenecker, 
lxxxii, concludes his scrupulously analytical survey with the opinion that this second meeting of Paul and 
Peter (Gal 2:1–10) equates to Paul’s so-called famine visit to Jerusalem (Acts 11:27–30), though he does 
admit that such a determination is not without its difficulties. 
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 Paul identifies the visitors as yeudade!lfouß (“false brothers,” that is, those claiming to be 
believers, but whose legitimacy he questions), and sees their visit as part of an intentional effort to require 
all non-Jewish believers to be circumcised and perhaps also to practice table discipline, two rituals typically 
required of non-Jewish converts to Judaism (2:4). Whatever the specifics of their opposition, their intent to 
reinstate Torah requirements for non-Jewish believers was clear to Paul. His use of the military expression 
pareish:lqon kataskoph:sai (“they infiltrated in order to spy/reconnoiter”) shows that he considered this 
a hostile act and an effort to precipitate a conflict. If these “false bothers” had officially represented James, 
as the later troublers apparently did (2:12), the intrusion would have fit the classic profile of a provocation 
to enmity. By taking such an initiative against Paul, James would have put Paul in the precarious political 
position of having to declare publicly his enmity against James in order to save face and promote his own 
perspective. All this is not to argue that the “false brothers” were from James (there is no way to verify 
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this meeting was apparently successful, as James, Cephas, and John extended to him the 
right hand of fellowship, acknowledged his call and commission to preach to the 
Gentiles, and made no other requirement of him than that he remember the poor (2:7–
10).
100
 As a result of that Jerusalem meeting with Cephas and the other leaders, Paul was 
considered an apostolic and missionary peer of Cephas, and furthermore, Paul’s gospel, 
which did not impose circumcision or observance of table restrictions upon non-Jewish 
believers, was accepted as valid.
101
 Cephas was a part of that decision and in full 
agreement with it.
102
 
                                                                                                                                            
that), or that any intentional provocation to enmity had occurred, but rather to demonstrate how politically 
charged the situation was and to show that the dynamics of enmity were present even if they were not 
acknowledged or exploited. 
100
 Nothing in Paul’s account of his meeting with the “pillars” suggests any kind of personal 
enmity and their agreement reflects a spirit of cooperation, mutual respect, and unity of understanding. 
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 Two items regarding Paul’s status need additional explanation. First, in Paul’s mind, his being 
set apart, his call, his revelation of Christ, his commission to preach to the Gentiles, and his status as an 
apostle were all the work of God’s grace in him (1:1, 15–17). Therefore, when Paul says that the “pillars” 
recognized the grace that had been given to him (2:9), he is referring to the full accomplishment of that 
grace in him including apostleship and not just grace for an effective Gentile mission. Contrary to 
Longenecker, Galatians, 56, Paul is asserting that the “pillars” recognized his apostleship as well as his 
commission to the Gentiles, and therefore accepted him as a partner in mission. The chiastic parallels 
between Paul and Peter (2:7) and then Peter and Paul (2:8) both have ellipses in the second element of the 
parallel. Therefore, one ought not to conclude that the omission of ei !ß a˙postolh;n (“as an apostle”) with 
reference to Paul (2:8) means that Paul was not considered by the “pillars” as an apostle, any more than the 
omission of pepi"steumai to; eujagge"lion (“I have been/am entrusted with the gospel”) with reference to 
Peter (2:7) meant that Peter was not likewise entrusted with the gospel. Therefore, the pillars recognized 
that both Peter and Paul were apostles entrusted with the gospel for the Jews and Gentiles respectively. 
Second, it is important to emphasize that Paul did not go to Jerusalem to have the “pillars” authorize or 
authenticate his gospel. As far as he was concerned, he had received his gospel as a revelation from Jesus 
Christ (1:11–12) and that was the only validation required. His trip was an effort to forestall conflict, to 
clarify misunderstanding, and to secure a favorable working relationship with the “pillar” apostles and the 
church in Jerusalem, without whose support Paul’s mission would have been difficult, if not impossible, to 
carry out. In this respect, Paul is taking the appropriate initiative to protect unity and peace not just within a 
local assembly, but also within the whole body of Christ. 
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 If one concludes with Longenecker that Paul’s second visit with Peter (Gal 2:1–10) 
corresponds to Paul’s famine visit to Jerusalem (Acts 11:27–30) and “that Paul wrote Galatians on the eve 
of the Jerusalem Council” (lxxxii), then Peter’s vision of the clean and unclean foods (Acts 10:9–23a) and 
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Later, however, when Cephas is in Antioch and freely enjoying table fellowship 
with non-Jewish believers there—a completely appropriate expression of unity among 
believers considering the freedom of the gospel and the agreements reached earlier in 
Jerusalem,
103
 Cephas suddenly reverses himself. A delegation from Jerusalem, ostensibly 
representing James and apparently wanting to impose Jewish rituals on non-Jewish 
believers, arrives in Antioch. Peter is intimidated by them, most likely concerning his 
failure to maintain the Jewish table disciplines, and immediately separates himself from 
the non-Jewish believers (2:12–13).
104
 Succumbing to the pressure from the delegation, 
                                                                                                                                            
his experience with the conversion and baptism of the Gentile Cornelius (Acts 10:23b–48) would both 
already have occurred before his second meeting with Paul and also before the incident at Antioch (Gal 
2:11–14). This could account for Peter’s enlightened attitude toward the Gentiles in his meeting with Paul 
and the other “pillars,” and could explain his readiness to agree with Paul’s gospel and their partnership 
together. Yet, whether that was the reason for Peter’s assent with the “pillars” or not, Paul is unequivocal 
that Peter did agree with them regarding Paul’s gospel and ministry (Gal 2:9). J. Paul Sampley, Pauline 
Partnership in Christ: Christian Community and Commitment in Light of Roman Law (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1980), 21–36, sees the right hand of fellowship as signifying a formal contractual agreement 
between the “pillars” on the one side and Paul and Barnabas on the other, with two stipulations: (1) a 
division of labor whereby the “pillars” would focus on the Jews, while Paul and Barnabas concentrated on 
the Gentiles, and (2) an obligation that Paul and Barnabas help alleviate the plight of the poor in Jerusalem. 
His position adds considerable weight to the argument that the “pillars” recognized Paul as an equal partner 
because they saw evidence of God’s grace at work in him and his ministry. Furthermore, Sampley argues 
convincingly that Paul intentionally eliminates any hint of a patron-client relationship between the “pillars” 
and Paul or his ministry in order to confirm God’s unique initiative in his apostleship and ministry, and his 
accountability solely to God. 
103
 The double significance of the meal ought not to be overlooked. Not only does the gospel open 
the way for fellowship between Jews and non-Jews in a way not permitted by the Torah and traditions, but 
meals in the broader Greco-Roman culture were also important symbols of friendship and thus occupied a 
central place in the celebration of marriages and treaties. See further, Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” 
323; Epstein, Enmity, 5; and Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early 
Christian World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 1–2, 8–12, 38–40. 
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 The verbs describing Peter’s table fellowship before, and his reaction after, the arrival of the 
delegation are in the imperfect tense, but their nuances differ and paint a vivid picture (2:12). The verb for 
his fellowship is a customary imperfect meta˝ twÇn e!qnwÇn sunhvsqien (“he used to eat with the Gentiles”), 
suggesting that Peter made a regular practice of dispensing with the Jewish purity laws and freely eating 
with the non-Jewish believers. However, the two verbs describing Peter’s reaction are inceptive imperfects, 
uJpe"stellen kai… a˙fw#rizen eÔautovn (“he began to draw back and to separate himself ”), showing how his 
demeanor changed and he immediately began to behave differently. The drawing back may imply self-
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Cephas has ignored the agreement of the Jerusalem “pillars;” he has reverted to the 
observance of Jewish purity laws despite his enlightened understanding of the freedom of 
the gospel; and he has created so much doubt and uncertainty by his example that the rest 
of the Jews, including Barnabas, Paul’s former mentor, his missionary companion, and a 
prominent church leader in Antioch, have been swept along in the compromise (2:13). 
This disruption parallels the earlier disturbance in Antioch by the “false brothers” 
(2:4–5). On that occasion, Paul went to great length to avoid a major conflict, traveling to 
Jerusalem and meeting with the Jerusalem leaders in private to defuse the situation. This 
time, however, Paul does just the opposite. He confronts Cephas immediately, face-to-
face, and in public (2:14).  
This is not a personal disagreement with Cephas,
105
 but rather a public dispute 
over the proper relationship of Jewish and Gentile believers. While Paul does not record 
any accusation of unbelief or false teaching against Cephas, Paul does recognize that his 
                                                                                                                                            
protection, but more likely denotes a shrinking back in fear, as Paul suggests. The separating is a Jewish 
technical term for the ritual setting of oneself apart from what is unclean (2 Cor 6:17).  
105
 As Paul relates the incident, none of the primary indicators of personal enmity are evident in 
his account. Paul does not publicly reject or ostracize Peter, nor does he dwell on Peter to defame him or to 
question the validity of his service for Christ. It is not possible to know absolutely whether the strong 
language Paul uses to recount the events in the letter is the same language he used in publicly rebuking 
Peter at Antioch. However, even if Paul spoke as bluntly to Peter as the account in Galatians implies, Paul 
does not approach the harshness or vileness of the vituperation associated with Greco-Roman enmity 
battles. Furthermore, with Sampley, “Frank Speech,” 294–95 and 299–304, one must recognize that Paul 
uses frank speech—the “ultimate sign of friendship,” not of hostility—extensively in the Galatian letter. 
Thus one might see something of Paul’s rhetorical strategy in dealing with the Galatians from the way he 
presents his confrontation with Peter. Just as Paul uses frank speech with Peter because he was seeking a 
change in Peter’s behavior, so too he risks frank speech with the Galatians. Just as Paul sees that Peter “has 
ventured onto a dubious or dangerous path, . . . [and] calls for a change of direction,” as any genuine friend 
would do, so too Paul sees the Galatians poised to make the same error as Peter. Using the edginess of 
frank speech to catch their attention and alert them to the gravity of their situation, Paul likewise urges 
upon the Galatians a change in direction and a return to the authenticity of the gospel he gave them. 
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behavior is hypocritical and that it reinforces a faulty understanding of the gospel held by 
the visitors from Jerusalem. Cephas’s concession on table discipline is a tacit admission 
that faith is not sufficient for justification, but must include works, whether circumcision 
(2:3), table discipline (2:12), or some other stipulation from the law. Such a definition of 
the gospel is anathema to Paul. It is no gospel at all, for there is no other gospel (1:7–9). 
Although Cephas himself is not a “false brother,”
106
 his behavior does endanger 
the truth of the gospel. With the gospel at stake, Paul does not hesitate to confront him: If 
Cephas is Jewish but exercises his freedom in the gospel to live as a Gentile and not 
observe the law, how then can he require Gentile believers to observe the law (2:14)? 
Cephas’s hypocrisy has serious, broad-reaching implications. Because of his 
reputation, his authority, and his influence, many others in Antioch followed his example 
and likewise lost sight of the freedom in Christ that lies at the very heart of the gospel. 
Therefore, the gravity of Cephas’s error and the extent of its effects require that Paul 
confront Cephas and the others concerning the Gospel (2:11, 14). 
In the broader picture of Paul and Cephas, there are two occasions of conflict 
resolution: the meeting with the “pillars” (2:1–10) and the public confrontation in 
Antioch (2:11–14). The former seems to have succeeded, the latter remains in doubt.
107
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 It is not clear precisely where Paul leaves off the account of his confrontation with Peter and 
begins to argue his case with the Galatians: perhaps as soon as 2:15, but certainly by 3:1. However, Paul’s 
continuing use of the inclusive we (denoting Peter and Paul, but rhetorically embracing the Galatians as 
well) through 2:17 reflects Paul’s assumption that Peter agrees with his statements in 2:15–17 and that he 
can thus base his rebuke of Peter on it. 
107
 Some suggest that the rebuke proved unsuccessful and created a permanent rift between Paul 
and Cephas, and perhaps also between Paul and Barnabas. Betz, Galatians, 104, sees the events of Gal 
2:11–14 as having occurred subsequent to the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15:1–35; Gal 2:1–10). Therefore, in 
his mind, the conflict with Peter (Gal 2:11–14) and the breach with Barnabas (Acts 15:36–41) reflect Paul’s 
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First, when confronted with a potentially explosive situation between his “law-
free” gospel and the “law-bound” gospel of the “false brothers” (Gal 2:4–5), Paul does 
not submit but rather seeks a resolution with church authorities in Jerusalem. Paul does 
his best to contain the matter and meets privately with the “pillars” in an effort to 
establish clarity and cooperation with the leadership before seeking a wider resolution 
within the church. From all appearances, this was a negotiated resolution of conflict. The 
parties met face-to-face, discussed their differences, and reached an amicable settlement. 
Everyone seemed to be clear on the terms and in agreement with the resolution (2:6–10). 
Paul’s initial retreat from the public confrontation with the “false brothers” in 
order to seek private resolution might have seemed politically weak and ineffectual to the 
general public. However, with the welfare of the churches in view, Paul’s approach risks 
the least misunderstanding among the leadership and garners the broadest support for 
unifying the church on this matter. 
Despite the friendly outcome of the first negotiation, tension did arise in the 
second confrontation between Paul and Cephas in Antioch (2:11–14). Although strong 
language is used, Paul’s account does not reflect the animosity that some suggest.
108
 The 
                                                                                                                                            
permanent break with both Peter and Barnabas. F. C. Baur took this conflict between Peter and Paul as an 
interpretative paradigm to explain the rest of the New Testament documents, as well as the development of 
the early Church. See further, Scott J. Hafemann, “Paul and His Interpreters” in Dictionary of Paul and His 
Letters, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1993), 666–71. Others think that Cephas may have prevailed. They argue that Paul never actually 
claims that Cephas yielded to his rebuke—a point Paul would surely have exploited in his argument with 
the Galatians Judaizers if it were in fact true. Longenecker, Galatians, 79, presents a list of adherents to this 
perspective. 
108
 For example, Longenecker, 79, asserts that “the sharpness of Paul’s public rebuke of Peter has 
always stood as a major problem for interpreters of the Antioch episode.” He goes on to imply that Paul 
was overly “quarrelsome, even vitriolic;” that Paul should have followed the steps of conflict resolution 
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vocabulary is not so focused on personal enmity as it is on endurance and perseverance  
in battle.  For example, the phrase kata˝ provswpon (“to his face,” 2:11) need not imply 
hostility, but simply means that the confrontation took place “in person,” “face to face,” 
or “in someone’s presence” (cf. Acts 3:13; 2 Cor 10:1, 7). The phrase aujtw/Ç a˙nte!sthn (“I 
opposed him, I withstood him”) does not pertain to personal hostility, but rather denotes 
successful endurance against an opponent and perseverance to victory. 
The battle motif is completely appropriate for Paul because he does see himself 
contending for the gospel. Paul stands against Cephas, not to condemn him, but to point 
out to all those present what Cephas already knew to be true, for his own actions had 
incriminated him. Paul says that Cephas was self-condemned (kategnwsme!noß h\n, Gal 
2:11) and then goes on to specify the evidence (2:12–14) for his hypocrisy.
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prescribed in Matt 18:15–17; and that Paul contradicts his own exhortations to restore others with “a spirit 
of gentleness and humility” (Gal 6:1). In Paul’s defense, one might note that the procedures for conflict 
resolution in Matt 18 address an interpersonal conflict between two believers, while Paul is dealing with a 
major interpretative issue that concerns all the churches. Therefore, even if Paul did have access to that 
material from Matt 18:15–17, which chronologically is highly doubtful, the procedures would not have 
applied in his situation. 
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 Two points merit special attention: the unusual form of the verb and the distinction between the 
self-condemnation of Peter (Gal 2:11) and the curses against those preaching another gospel (1:8–9). First, 
Paul’s choice of a pluperfect periphrastic (kategnwsme!noß h\n) indicates that Peter had become condemned 
at some point in the past and was in that state already at the time that Paul addressed him. Thus Paul is not 
rendering judgment against Peter as he speaks, but rather acknowledging Peter’s preexisting status. While 
some might argue for a passive sense with the participle and a divine passive at that, implying that Peter 
had been condemned by God, Paul’s explanation of the events (2:12–14) and his subsequent interpretation 
of the gospel (2:16–21) suggest that a combination of Peter’s own actions and his conscience led to his self-
condemnation. Thus a reflexive middle sense for the participle is preferred. Second, this self-condemnation 
is really a self-assessment in which Peter recognizes a deficiency. Bultmann’s meaning for kataginwvskw 
is “to note, to see something [bad] in someone, . . . especially to know someone to be guilty, . . . sometimes 
in the sense of self-judgment” (TDNT 1:714). In contrast, a˙na "qema e“stw (Gal 1:8–9) is a curse formula 
consigning someone to hell. Paul is not suggesting that Peter is preaching another gospel, or that he is 
worthy of eternal damnation. Paul’s reference to Peter’s self-condemnation is frank speech on Paul’s part, 
that is, the acknowledgement of a hard, painful truth, not an acrimonious, spiteful attack on his person. So, 
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In this second instance of conflict with Cephas, Paul is not willing to negotiate. In 
Paul’s mind, the conflict was resolved in their first negotiation and an agreement was 
reached. However, Cephas has violated the agreement and transgressed the boundaries of 
acceptable behavior for a believer, and Paul confronts him on it. This incident, then, is 
not so much a model of conflict resolution as it is an example of holding someone 
accountable for behavior that compromises the terms of a resolution and reintroduces 
conflict that had already been appropriately resolved. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented three social dynamics from the Greco-Roman thought 
world that are at work in conflict resolution: honor-shame, patron-client, and friendship-
enmity. The primary dynamic is honor-shame, with the others as social relationships that 
provide a means of acquiring honor and avoiding shame. Conflict resolution is an arena 
in which parties contest for honor and must exploit every advantage to get it. That kind of 
self-interest and selfishness exacerbates the conflict and works against reconciliation and 
peace. Amid these influences in the Greco-Roman culture, Paul models an approach to 
conflict resolution that places a higher priority on resolution than on the culture’s status 
markers of honor, wealth, and power. 
This chapter has demonstrated Paul’s skill as a peacemaker and his sensitivity to 
cultural dynamics in four examples of conflict resolution. The four situations portray Paul 
in several different roles associated with conflict resolution. 
                                                                                                                                            
the contention that Paul is being unkind, unnecessarily harsh, or hostile toward Peter simply does not agree 
with the evidence. 
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With Philemon and Onesimus, Paul is ostensibly a mediator. However, because of 
the difference in the social status of the two parties, Paul also acts as an advocate for 
Onesimus. With Euodia and Syntyche, Paul initiates the mediation and then hands that 
role over to someone on site. Paul’s comments about the women and his appeal to the 
local mediator reinforce the equal dignity and status of the women, particularly in co-
laboring with Paul.  Because there is no evidence of disparity in social status, as occurred 
with Philemon and Onesimus, neither Paul nor his deputy mediator show any indication 
of advocacy on behalf of the one over against the other. The civil court cases between 
believers in Corinth are particularly disturbing to Paul. His rhetoric is strong and highly 
directive: strong as he castigates them for their abuses and directive as he calls for them 
to settle disputes before believers in the church, and not before the civil judges. 
The first three situations have much in common. The last episode of conflict 
resolution, Paul and Cephas, differs from the others in that they have two confrontations. 
The first is handled well and results in an agreement that Paul and the “pillars” negotiate 
together. The second is not a negotiation at all. Paul confronts Cephas publicly regarding 
his hypocrisy and his compromise of the gospel. In so doing, Paul shows that the gospel 
cannot be compromised for the sake of avoiding conflict and that individuals must be 
held accountable for behavior that contradicts the gospel, the character of God, or their 
identity in Christ and the Spirit. 
In all of these situations, Paul’s authority is the same. His personal authority to 
facilitate derives from his commissioning by God as an apostle, his status as founder 
(patron/paterfamilias) to the church body, and the strength of his rhetorical skills to build 
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his own ethos and to persuade his audience. He appeals to God and to cultural norms for 
his persuasive power, but all of that depends upon the vibrancy of the Spirit in leading the 
parties along a proper path to resolution. Because of the nature of his authority, Paul is 
reticent to impose his solution for interpersonal conflicts, but simply lays out what is 
required and leaves it to the parties involved to respond appropriately. Paul is not shy at 
all about imposing his will when the definition of the gospel is at stake. 
In one sense, Paul’s letters function something like the preliminary statements of 
a mediator to the disputants before the negotiations begin. Paul seeks to build trust and 
cooperation, to set a positive tone, to establish common interests and values, to identify 
appropriate behavior patterns that will promote mutual respect and humility, and to make 
certain logistical arrangements for the negotiation. Paul also explains what is at stake and 
why the conflict must be resolved. 
The principles Paul employs will be summarized in the following chapter, with 
suggestions as to how they might be adapted to the same purpose of conflict resolution in 
the church today. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS 
 
 
This study has examined peace and peacemaking within two frames of reference: 
the thought-world of the Apostle Paul and the thought-world of the Greco-Roman culture 
around him. The study began with a survey of recent literature concerning peace and 
peacemaking in the ancient world. The study then discussed the history and development 
of Greek and Roman culture in order to explain the genesis of the ideas about peace that 
existed in the first-century Greco-Roman world. With this as background, the study then 
considered Paul’s perspectives on peace and peacemaking, acknowledging various points 
of similarity and contrast between the two worldviews. Finally, the brief summary of the 
argument that follows will show that this study has confirmed its original thesis that the 
Greco-Roman thought-world considered conflict the norm and viewed peace as a 
welcome, though temporary, respite from conflict, while Paul considered peace to be the 
norm and saw conflict as an intrusive and unacceptable aberration.  
Summary of the Argument 
The purpose of chapter two was to demonstrate how pervasive and influential the 
experience of war and conflict was for the Greek people, leading them ultimately to see 
war as glorious and conflict as the essence of being. This chapter addresses the first half 
of the thesis. 
Chapter two surveyed the history of Greece to show that the conglomeration of 
Hellenic city-states that was Greece was constantly at war for nearly a thousand years. 
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War was their way of life, and every other aspect of life was woven in and around the 
reality of war and conflict. The wars included the epic clashes between East and West 
(Troy, Persia, and Alexander), as well as the incessant battles among city-states, their 
colonies, and their allies. 
Chapter two then showed how the mythology of the Greeks preserved the idea 
that conflict was the constant and unifying principle of the cosmos. The gods fought 
constantly among themselves and created the cosmos through their conflict. These same 
gods then favored the legendary heroic warriors who established Greece and epitomized 
its highest ideals and noblest virtues. The religious rites and observances of the Greeks 
were intended to placate the gods, to gain their wisdom and favor, and to secure military 
victory and economic prosperity. The educational systems perpetuated the heroic ideal as 
the basis for character formation and model citizenship.  
Chapter two also explained how philosophers understood conflict as the essence 
of being for both the cosmos and the soul. The cosmos came into being and continues to 
exist because of the dynamic tension (conflict) of paired opposites (night/day, dark/light, 
cold/warmth, war/peace, life/death, etc.). The soul too was defined by conflict: the inner 
conflict of the mind, will, and emotion. This paradigm of conflict had a profound effect 
on political philosophy as well, as society and government were structured around the 
model of the soul. This ultimately led to the conclusion that peace had to arise in the soul, 
before it could affect the city-state, and ultimately affect the cosmos. 
In this culture where war and conflict were the norm, the Greeks conceived of 
peace primarily as the antithesis of war, and so their broader concept of peace embodied 
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all the good that war disrupted. The Greeks saw peace as the tranquility and prosperity 
that one experiences when free of fear, hostility, and conflict in five distinct relationships: 
with the gods (those holding ultimate power and control), with nature (forces that can 
devastate or prosper), within the self (amid conflicting impulses of mind, will, and 
emotion), with others of one’s own kind (insiders: family, friends, immediate community 
and other Greeks), and with others of different kind (outsiders: strangers, foreigners, 
barbarians, or anyone else). 
Chapter two concluded by showing that despite its noble ideals, Greece never 
experienced the sustained peace it sought. Nearly every facet of Greek life reinforced the 
idea that conflict was the norm, that life could not exist without it, and that peace came 
only as brief periods of respite from the hostilities of war. Because Rome inherited the 
mythology, religion, and philosophy of Greece, the heroic ideal and the necessity of 
conflict continued to be normative principles in the Greco-Roman world of Paul as well. 
The purpose of chapter three was to demonstrate that although Paul had a view of 
peace similar to that of the Greco-Roman world, he differed in his understanding of the 
source of peace, the basis for peace, and the means for obtaining and maintaining peace. 
This chapter addresses the second half of the thesis. 
Chapter three asserted that like the Greco-Roman world Paul regarded peace as 
security, tranquility, felicity, and contentment in one’s relationships with God, with the 
inner self, with nature, and with others. Similar as well to the Greco-Roman view, Paul 
made a distinction between others in one’s social sphere (for Paul that would include all 
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believers) and others outside (for Paul that would mean non-believers). Chapter three 
reaffirmed this similarity at various points in the presentation of Paul’s view of peace. 
However, chapter three focused more directly on the distinctive aspects of Paul’s 
view of peace. With obvious links to the blessing forms in Hebrew scripture, Paul viewed 
peace as originating in God, as an aspect of the character of God, and offered to humanity 
as a gift from God. One received this peace by being justified and reconciled to God 
through Jesus Christ. Only then could one experience peace with God, with the inner self, 
with nature, and with friends as well as enemies. 
Therefore, in contrast to the Greco-Roman view that saw peace as arising from a 
rational mind in control of the will and the emotion and then extending outward to affect 
the community, Paul understood that peace began with God and then affected the person, 
the community, and the cosmos. Furthermore, for Paul, the God of peace is the source of 
all things and so the controlling principle of life and being is not war but peace. 
Chapter three presented the double inclusio in the letter openings and closings that 
had grace as the outer term and peace as the inner term, suggesting that Paul understood 
grace and peace as the two overarching and definitive themes for the community of faith. 
Grace transforms the believer from an object of God’s wrath to a recipient of God’s 
favor, and peace means that enmity has been set aside and there is no longer any obstacle 
to the blessings of God.   
Chapter three also traces Paul’s use of peace in his paranetic material. There he 
makes explicit, as well as implicit, references to peace. The latter come through “linkage 
words” that relate to peace without actually naming it. Paul expects the believers to live 
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peacefully with one another, and then he elaborates how that should look in the church: 
loving concern and compassion toward one other, single-mindedness leading to unity but 
not necessarily uniformity, transformed lives that manifest a growing Christlikeness, a 
readiness to act in someone else’s best interest rather one’s own. 
What is more, this transformed life is to be extended in love to “outsiders,” where 
showing kindness, humility, generosity, and honor toward one’s enemy could become the 
starting point for reconciliation instead of deepening enmity. For Paul, one’s new life in 
Christ is to be a visible living out of the gospel whereby believers treat their friends as 
God treats God’s friends, and their enemies as God’s treats God’s enemies. In both those 
contexts grace and peace are to prevail. 
Conclusions 
Chapters two and three have confirmed the two halves of the thesis. Chapter two 
confirmed that in the Greco-Roman thought world war/conflict constituted the accepted 
norm and peace was a period of respite from the conflict. Chapter three has confirmed 
that Paul understood peace to be the norm and war/conflict was the unwelcome intrusion, 
an aberration to be resisted.  
The serenity, the calm, quiet security that both Paul and the Greco-Roman world 
knew as peace provided a common point of reference for them. However, while the 
heroic ideal was to fight the war, destroy the enemy, and secure the peace, Paul’s ideal 
was to receive reconciliation, which destroyed the enmity with God, and thereby receive 
the gift of peace. While the heroic ideal was to seek glory and honor for oneself through 
courage and victory on the battlefield, Paul sought to know and glorify God, and to give 
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honor to others. Therefore, in the call to reconciliation is also a call to sanctification, to 
live with a different set of values from the surrounding culture. Paul would label that 
tension as savrx (“flesh”) and pneu:ma (“Spirit”), and it is that very tension that created the 
conflicts presented in chapter four. 
The purpose of chapter four was to examine actual cases of conflict resolution in 
which Paul was involved to determine what principles might be applied effectively in the 
church today. Because Paul said so little about the logistics and procedures of mediating 
conflict, it is difficult to create something like a “Handbook on Conflict Resolution” as a 
result of this or any study of his letters. However, four conclusions may be drawn with 
respect to strategic principles. Strategic principles relate to dynamics that are at work as 
one seeks to establish an atmosphere and attitude in a church that encourages 
peacemaking. These might be distinguished from more procedurally-oriented principles 
that focus more narrowly on the handling of individual cases of conflict resolution. 
The first strategic principle is that peace is not something that human beings 
create by their attitudes, words, or actions. Peace is a gift from God to be received, not 
manufactured. Therefore, the church’s responsibility is not to figure out how to make 
peace, but how to create a climate in which the peace of God will be valued, received, 
nurtured, and preserved. The majority of what Paul did in conflict resolution was not 
resolving conflict, but in educating people for peace. 
The second strategic principle is that those committed to peacemaking must have 
a keen eye for cultural discernment and then be prepared to use that discernment both 
inside and outside the church. There will be cultural dynamics that support peacemaking 
251 
and those that hinder—and both kinds will be found inside the church as well as outside. 
Therefore, leaders must be prepared to critique the church as well as the culture, and find 
what is valuable to retain from both. 
The third strategic principle is that one must distinguish between doing conflict 
management and conflict resolution. The former seeks to minimize the negative effects 
and exploit the positive effects of conflict for the benefit of the organization. If resolution 
occurs in the process, that is all to the good. However, resolution is not the main purpose 
in managing conflict. By contrast, in conflict resolution the main goal is to uncover and 
resolve the underlying enmity that creates the conflict. 
The fourth strategic principle may be a corollary of the third, rather than an 
independent principle. Conflict resolution does not consist in imposing attitudes and 
behaviors on disputants, but in helping them to recognize the appropriate (Christlike, 
loving, kind, generous, etc.) thing to do in a given conflict situation and then to do it. 
These four strategic principles share a common theme: the church needs to be 
educated and trained for peace before conflict resolution can occur with any consistency 
and permanence. For Paul, the behavior of believers changes through the power of the 
indwelling Spirit and a renewed mind, and so his exhortation and training in the churches 
often relates to thinking differently and living under the control of the Spirit. Each of the 
four strategic principles presents a distinct set of educational needs, but all of them can 
draw upon Paul’s teaching and example their starting point for a curriculum. 
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Projections for Further Study 
This study has focused on peacemaking in Paul.  While there are certainly more 
questions to explore regarding Paul, this study has opened some broader issues as well. 
In light of Paul’s radical call to peace and yet his use of military metaphors for the 
life of faith, the question arises whether Paul’s call to peace is also a call to pacifism. An 
additional line of inquiry would draw Paul’s general eschatological framework of the 
“already and not yet” into view and ask whether Paul modifies his strict demand for 
peace in light of the realities of the “not yet” that render complete peace still just a future 
expectation. 
Paul places more emphasis in his paranesis on how peace should be made and 
kept within the church, where—at least ostensibly—everyone has common ground in 
church teaching and tradition. To what extent can Paul’s teachings on peace be applied in 
resolving conflict between non-churched disputants or a conflict between a congregant 
and someone not involved at all in religious life? 
Finally, this study looked at Paul with respect to the Greco-Roman world. Just as 
significant would be a study to compare Paul’s perspectives on peace with other blocks of 
text in scripture, such as the gospels, the Johannine corpus, or even collections in Israel’s 
scripture. This sort of comparative study has been undertaken already, but usually with an 
eye to harmonization or with a particular theological or political perspective in view. 
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